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# CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

# IRAQ

PART 1

January to December 1947

(Continued from  
"Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs," Part 67)



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CONFIDENTIAL.

## CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING IRAQ

PART I.—JANUARY TO DECEMBER 1947

(Continued from "Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs."  
Part 67)

E. 506/3/93

No. 1

### IRAQ POLITICAL REVIEW, 1946

*Sir H. Stanchewer-Bird to Mr. Bevin. (Received 15th January)*

(No. 3)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 6th January, 1947*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a political review of events in Iraq during the year 1946, for the writing of which I am indebted to the oriental counsellor, Mr. Perowne.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, the British Middle East Office, Jerusalem, His Majesty's Consular Officers in Iraq, and the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 1

*Political Review of Iraq for the Year 1946*

#### I.—General

During 1946 Iraq shone like a good deed in a naughty world, maintaining peace within its frontiers, amity with its neighbours and cordiality for its ally. Except for two small incidents—a demonstration in Bagdad and a strike in Kirkuk—security has been absolute.

#### II.—Domestic Affairs

2. When the year opened there was a general expectation that political life, stagnant for so long under the exigencies of war, would revive. It was hoped that, as the result of the Regent's public announcement on 26th December, 1945, political parties would once more come into

being and that elections would be held in accordance with a new Electoral Law. Oppressed by criticism in the Majlis, Hamdi al Pachachi, then Prime Minister, resigned in February and a new Cabinet was formed by Tawfiq Suwaidi. This plausible but shifty politician included in his Cabinet a number of "new men," which was encouraging; but with one exception they proved to be enemies of promise. Far from holding elections, Tawfiq Suwaidi was unable even to hold his Cabinet together, though he did succeed in passing the new Electoral Law. In order to divert attention from the anfractuositities of his own intrigues and in a bid for popularity, Suwaidi removed all the war-time restrictions on the press and on public assembly. Irresponsible agitators at once took advantage of this. Tawfiq, seeing that he was unable to get the djin back into the jar, raised a factitious clamour regarding treaty revision. This evoked remarkably little response from the general public; so, finding his store of political nostrums exhausted, Tawfiq resigned at the end of May, insinuating that his continuance in power had been made impossible by the Regent, to whom Tawfiq is, as His Royal Highness is aware, disloyal.

3. The choice of a successor was difficult. Once again efforts were made to form a genuine caretaker Government whose task would be to hold elections, and once again the experiment failed. Arshad al Umari, formerly Lord Mayor of Bagdad and later



Foreign Minister, became Premier. Most of his Ministers were men of straw, who were prepared to leave affairs entirely in Arshad's impulsive hands. Arshad had been a most successful lord mayor and had improved Bagdad by the same methods of enlightened dictatorship as the Prince Regent improved London. But a régime which can be successfully applied to bricks and mortar may lead to disaster when employed on human beings. With reactionary zeal, Arshad set out to repress what he conceived to be the licence which had been stimulated by his predecessor; a witch hunt of "reds" started throughout the country, editors were prosecuted, officials discharged and favours distributed at the sole whim of the Prime Minister. General resentment was naturally aroused by this proud and violent behaviour, and was increasingly directed not only against the Prime Minister but against the Regent and this embassy, who were supposed to be maintaining "the dictator" in power. Like his predecessor, he attempted to divert public opinion from his failure. He produced what he called a five-year plan, but nobody took it seriously.

4. At the end of November the Arshad Cabinet fell and, after much hesitation, Nuri Pasha was again asked to form an election Cabinet. This he did, and yet a third attempt to hold elections was thus inaugurated by the most able statesman in the country. Nuri Pasha took the novel step of inviting the two chief political parties, the Liberals and the National Democrats, to nominate members to his Cabinet. Both parties agreed, on written condition that the elections should be free. Within a month, however, the coalition had collapsed. The representatives of the two political parties complained, not without justice, that the Shia Ministers in the Cabinet were trying to manipulate the elections for their own ends, and resigned. On the last day of the year the resignation of the two Shia members was also accepted. To save face, it was announced that they had withdrawn in order to be free to conduct their election campaign. It was, nevertheless, apparent that what had started as a party difference on 20th century lines had resolved itself into a Sunni-Shia fission, and revealed once again the basic weakness of the country: now, as one thousand years ago, "in every profession which allowed room for two persons, the one was a votary, the other an antagonist, of Ali" (Gibbon).

5. Thus, throughout the year domestic politics have been stagnant. No new Parliament has been elected, no budget passed. Nevertheless, with the two small exceptions noted in paragraph 1, the peace has remained unbroken. There have been no troubles in Kurdistan or on the Euphrates. As regards the former, recent events in Azerbaijan and the fact that many of Mulla Mustafa's adherents have returned to Iraq as hunger-bitten suppliants, have damped the ardour of the most enthusiastic rebels. But on the Euphrates the fires of fanaticism still smoulder behind the black veils of Najaf and Kerbala, whose sterile and greedy hierophants are ever ready to exploit religious antipathy and racial hatred.

### III.—External Affairs

6. Politically, Iraq is extrovert. During the past year she has played an increasingly prominent part in international life. As regards the Arab League, the rash and unauthorised utterances of Azzam Pasha on such subjects as evacuation of British troops from Arab countries are deplored here. So is the disposition of certain members of the Arab League to exploit it in their own personal interests, or in those of renegades such as Amin Husseini, the former Mufti of Jerusalem, who is regarded in Iraq as an enemy of the State second only to Rashid Ali. But Iraq takes its international responsibilities seriously and has never permitted personal or dynastic differences to come before national or regional interests. In Rashid Ali's case great indignation was naturally felt that King Ibn Saud should have harboured this avowed traitor, but here, again, the interests of Iraq prevailed over personal resentment. Iraq has cultivated good relations with Turkey, with whom an economic agreement was concluded during the year. Nuri Pasha also laboured to induce a Syrian-Turkish rapprochement. His efforts seemed to promise well, but by the end of the year the negotiations had come to a standstill, because (according to Nuri) the Turks had intimated that, if the question of the Hatay were put forward in a form which called upon them to make any concessions to Syria, Turkey would raise the question of the whole of her southern frontiers—a hint to Iraq that there might be some points on the Iraq-Turkish frontier which Turkey would like adjusted in her favour. Iraq has taken a prominent part in the Palestine discussions. For

economic, no less than religious and political reasons, she is deeply concerned over their outcome.

7. Iraq's relations with Great Britain have been completely satisfactory. The official confidence and the personal cordiality which have marked them of recent years were maintained and strengthened. The raising of the Iraqi Legation in London to the status of an embassy naturally gave pleasure, as did the elevation of the Emirate of Transjordan into a kingdom. Iraq's election to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations was regarded as putting the seal on the country's status in world society.

8. There has been little disposition in Iraq to follow the example of Egypt in demanding the evacuation of British forces, nor has the frothy nationalism of Syria found any following here. There are, of course, those who hate us. They are noisy but so far insignificant. On the other hand the number of those who, like Nuri Pasha feel that the future of Iraq, like its past, is indissolubly bound up with the fortunes of Great Britain are many, though few of them have Nuri's courage in proclaiming their belief as an article of political faith.

9. The credit for this state of affairs must in large measure be assigned to the Regent. He was again in England for several months this summer, together with the young King. There is no doubt that His Royal Highness has a great admiration and liking for Britain and for British methods and persons. His cars, his aircraft, his clothes, his hunters, his foxhounds, even his swans, are British, and so are many of his closest friends. The influence he exerts on politics and administration in Iraq is all-pervading, if often unseen. He is still shy, and suffers from the introverted melancholia of his house; but he has made strenuous and largely successful efforts to overcome this defect. He often carries procrastination and indecision to almost Elizabethan lengths, but in the end he generally comes down on the side of prudence and progress. The only Iraqi statesman in whom he has real confidence is Nuri Pasha, and in this he shows wise judgment. If this combination can be continued, and provided that His Majesty's Government does not attempt to coerce the Arabs of Palestine, there is reason to hope that Iraq in 1947 may be as tranquil as in 1946, and that, with the election of a new Majlis, political life may proceed on sound and productive lines.

E 845/3/93

No. 2

### IRAQ POLITICAL SITUATION

*Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Mr. Benin (Received 27th January)*

(No. 13)

*Bagdad,*

*9th January, 1947*

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you, in continuation of my despatch No. 482 of 10th December, and in amplification of my recent telegrams about the Cabinet crisis, that the position of the Government at the moment appears sound. At one time, however, it looked as if the Cabinet might fall owing to the number of resignations, and the situation should perhaps be placed on record.

2. The accusations made by Mohammed Hadid, the representative of the Democratic Party in the Cabinet, and by Ali Mumtaz, the representative of the Liberal Party, that Saleh Jabr was using his position as Minister of Finance to interfere with the elections, obtained considerable credence in Bagdad and, indeed, there was

so much smoke that I myself cannot but feel that there was a certain amount of fire behind it. Throughout the Prime Minister took the line with the two critical Ministers that he would be prepared to take action if proof of malpractice of any kind could be produced to him. It is not surprising that no such proof was available. Mohammed Hadid informed the counsellor to this embassy that, while he was certain of his facts, he could induce no one to come forward to give evidence, since all concerned were afraid of offending such powerful politicians as Nuri Pasha and Saleh Jabr. It therefore became inevitable that the two Ministers would resign—Mohammed Hadid, I think, genuinely on a question of principle, and Ali Mumtaz very probably on pressure from his leader, Tawfiq Suweidi, who is



thoroughly disgruntled at having been personally left out of the Cabinet and annoyed that the Prime Minister refused to have anything to do with his proposals that "closed" constituencies should be selected at which nominees of Suweidi's Liberal Party would be unopposed. I believe that throughout Nuri Pasha has been actuated by a desire to show the world that in Iraq, unlike many other countries, elections can be held freely and without pressure. He was willing to go to great lengths to secure this objective. After the resignation of Mohammed Hadid and Ali Muntaz it looked as if he might do so only by giving too much power to the two Shia representatives, Saleh Jabr and Sadiq al Bassam, who, after the resignation of the other two Ministers, would be able to proceed with their plans for the selection of Deputies.

3. Saleh Jabr has throughout played a somewhat tortuous game. For many months he has been talking about his "group," "his friends" and "his programme." All attempts to draw from him who these friends were and exactly what his programme consisted of have been fruitless, and this is one of the reasons that make the Regent suspicious of him. (See Mr. Busk's telegram No. 761 of 23rd September.) During the Cabinet crisis it was widely stated that he had formed a *blocc* known as the Qitla, which was, in fact, an undeclared party. One of Mohammed Hadid's accusations against him was, in fact, that he was trying to derive all the benefit of a party without actually establishing one in accordance with the law.

4. As reported in my telegram No. 980 of 31st December, Saleh Jabr and Sadiq al Bassam at one moment threatened to resign on the ground that they had been accused of malpractice. It fortunately proved possible to persuade them not to take this course but instead to resign on the inoffensive ground that they wished to be free to take part in the elections without Cabinet ties. I have every reason to believe that this has all along been Nuri Pasha's objective. At the time when the Regent asked him to form a coalition Government, Arshad Beg was still in the field with a proposal to revise his existing Cabinet. If this had been done Arshad would have continued in power and the effects might well have been disastrous. It was therefore essential for Nuri to attract to himself men of note who

would join his coalition Cabinet. Saleh Jabr has informed me, and I see no reason to doubt his word, that he was at first reluctant to join the Cabinet precisely because he wished to devote himself to the elections, but that he was persuaded to do so by Nuri Pasha, who maintained that without him no Cabinet could be formed.

5. Nuri Pasha's mixed team was thus assembled, but I have little doubt that he was not happy with them, and wished as soon as possible to eliminate any who were likely to cause trouble, and leave him with completely impartial individuals whom no one could accuse of rigging the elections.

6. Unfortunately, however, the resignations of Mohammed Hadid and Ali Muntaz were preceded and accompanied by great publicity, and when Saleh Jabr and Sadiq al Bassam threatened to follow suit because they had been accused of interference with the elections, Nuri Pasha felt that this position was extremely shaky.

7. In the event, however, things have turned out as he wished, and as reported in my telegram No. 3 of 2nd January, two of the four vacancies have been filled, the other two being occupied in an acting capacity by other Ministers. I think, therefore, that we may reasonably hope that the crisis is past and that the electoral procedure will be carried out without further serious disturbances.

8. The Prime Minister has thought it wise to give the widest publicity to the events leading up to the resignation of Ali Muntaz and Mohammed Hadid, and the entire correspondence between these two Ministers and the Prime Minister has been published.

9. In a letter conveying his resignation to the Prime Minister, Hadid complained that Ministers and officials were making preparations to influence electors in the interests of the *blocc* (Qitla), and that officials were delaying on various pretexts permission for the political parties to open branches in the provinces. The Prime Minister replied that from all the constituencies he had received only four complaints of interference with the election preparations by Ministers and none of interference by officials. Branches of political parties had been already, or were about to be, opened in eleven liwas. The Prime Minister asked to be acquainted with any concrete evidence to support these allegations.

10. In a letter to the Regent conveying these resignations, the Prime Minister stated that the resignation of Ali Muntaz was unexpected, as the only question which had been discussed with him was that of "closed" constituencies, which were wanted exclusively for Liberal Party candidates, and which would have been contrary to law. On 28th December Ali Muntaz suddenly handed in his resignation, making the same allegations as Mohammed Hadid. The press later published a statement by Ali Muntaz denying that he personally had ever mentioned "closed" constituencies. This is probably true, as is also the Prime Minister's reply to the effect that it was other members of the Liberal Party who had raised the subject with him.

11. I think it probable that Saleh Jabr will shortly come out into the open. He informs me that his programme has been completed and will be published in the very near future. I gather that it is not the usual collection of high-sounding general statements but a detailed exposition of the policy his group propose to follow if elected. He tells me that he will also shortly be registering his group as a legal party. He is in some difficulty over the choice of a name since the most suitable name (the Progressive Liberal Party) has already been taken by Tawfiq Suwaidi. The new party, though predominantly Shia, will, Saleh Jabr hopes, also have Sunni representation, particularly from the north.

12. Mr. Busk stated in paragraph 8 of his despatch No. 367 of 19th September that he was impressed by Saleh Jabr's views on the future of Iraq and I see no reason to dissent from this opinion. From all the conversations I have had with him, I have the impression that his views are sound and that, if he should form a Cabinet or, at least, play a large rôle in a Cabinet, he should be able to carry out a policy highly beneficial to this country. In Iraq policies are, however, rarely achieved as planned, and it would be optimistic to hope that, even if Saleh Jabr came to power, he would be able to complete his programme of internal reform.

13. Even more important is the question of continuity. The constant succession of Cabinets falling after five or six months is disastrous to Iraq. It would really be preferable to have a Cabinet of

mediocrities who remained in power for three or four years than a Cabinet composed of first-class men who were thrown out at the end of six months. We have all done our best to impress the importance of this on the Iraqis and I can only hope that the elections will produce a solid body of parliamentary opinion which will support one Cabinet during the life of this Majlis.

14. It would be unwise to try and forecast the exact nature and composition of the Cabinet that will emerge as a result of the elections. However much the elections are "arranged," there are so many imponderables and personal factors that prophecy is risky. I have, however, for some time held the view that Nuri Pasha is determined so to organise the elections that he will be able to continue as Prime Minister. He can rely on a large number of personal supporters (mostly Sunnis) and for the Shia element he will count on Saleh Jabr and his Qitla. I am strengthened in this view by the conversation with Nuri Pasha recorded in my telegram No. 21 of 8th January. Maintaining as he does that the elections must be free, the Prime Minister could hardly tell me that he proposed to retain office, but he came as close to doing so as he properly could, and his decision to postpone discussion of treaty revision until after the elections is a pretty definite indication.

15. Against this must be set Nuri Pasha's well-known reluctance to take on a "steady job" which would bind him to his desk and prevent the journeys in the Arab world and to Turkey in which he delights because of the opportunities they give him to play the rôle of elder statesman of the Middle East.

16. I hope, however, that my forecast in paragraph 14 above will prove to be correct. Nuri Pasha is one of the very few Iraqis who can see the world as a whole. He realises that Iraq cannot live in isolation, and he can be relied upon not to take the limited view. If his statecraft, long experience and breadth of vision can be allied in a Cabinet with the energy and progressive ideas of Saleh Jabr, I shall be happier for the future than at any time since I came to Bagdad.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.



## CONVERSATION WITH Dr. JAMALI (IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER)

*Mr. Bevin to Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird (Bagdad)*(No. 52)  
Sir,Foreign Office,  
8th February, 1947

## Problems in Iraq

Dr. Jamali, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, came to see me on 6th February, when we had a general talk on problems in Iraq. He indicated that they were not so keen on revising the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty now, in view of the experience in Egypt and the danger that might arise if the subject were reopened. Dr. Jamali stressed the handicapping feature, particularly in relation to the employment of experts, of the terms of the Treaty, which compelled them to consult the British before calling in any expert of any kind. He felt that this constituted an interference with their independence and said it would help them if this could be remedied. I promised to see whether the matter could be dealt with in an exchange of notes. He again

mentioned the question of the military arrangements with Iraq.

2. I then broached the subject of the irrigation report and gave Dr. Jamali an outline of Mr. Haigh's plans. He was very interested and thought it would create interest in Iraq; he said he would like to see the report. Dr. Jamali told me, however, that Nuri Pasha was more in favour of the ideas put forward by another person, whose name I did not quite catch. I pointed out that, if this question could be discussed now so that I knew the Iraqi reaction to it, it might be possible for me to have a friendly talk with General Marshall in Moscow and to interest the United States in the problem. He replied that this would be a good idea, for he believed that a stable Government would be elected in Iraq which would be ready to cope with these economic developments.

I am, &amp;c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

J 686/12/16

No. 4

## CONVERSATION WITH Dr. JAMALI (IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER)

*Mr. Bevin to Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird (Bagdad)*(No. 53)  
Sir,Foreign Office,  
8th February, 1947

## Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Negotiations

In the course of conversation with Dr. Jamali, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, on 6th February, he referred to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty negotiations. I indicated that we were dissatisfied at the attitude of the Egyptian Prime Minister and I hoped

that this would not be allowed to come between us and the Arab world. I explained our difference to him and he recognised quite fully that Egypt had placed herself in a position of very great difficulty. Dr. Jamali thought it probable that if Egypt delayed taking the question to the Assembly a solution would be found.

I am, &amp;c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

E 1243/771/93

No. 5

## SITUATION IN IRAQ: ARRESTS AFTER SEIZURE OF COMMUNIST PRINTING PRESS

*Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Bevin. (Received 10th February)*(No. 27)  
Sir,

Bagdad, 25th January, 1947

On 13th January, the Iraqi police seized the printing press of the Iraqi Communist

Party. On seven previous occasions over the last four years attempts to take it had been made: each time the information which the police had received proved to be

correct, but the press had always disappeared by the time they arrived. When it was finally seized in Bagdad on 13th, a number of printed leaflets, booklets, drafts, reports of "agents" and Communist banners for use in demonstrations were captured at the same time. A second portion of the press was discovered next day in another house.

2. The seizure of the printing press was followed by a number of arrests. Probably the most important in the first round up was Daud al Sayigh, a lawyer who has long been known as a violent extremist. Others included students, railway workers, a weaver, a shoemaker and a hirer of bicycles. Arrests have been made also in Kirkuk, Basra, Kut and Nasiriyah.

3. These arrests shook the morale of the party, and information was given to the police which enabled them on 18th to arrest the "Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Iraq," a certain Yusef Sulman Yusef, the Scarlet Pimpernel of the Bagdad Underground, who under the *pseudonyme* of "Fahad" (Leopard) has eluded capture for years. He is a Christian, about 45 years old, who was born in Nasiriyah and has admitted his alias. If convicted he will be liable to a maximum penalty of seven years' imprisonment. With him were arrested four others, two of them being partners in a leading Jewish wholesale and retail drug store—both among the organisers of the Anti-Zionist League.

4. Despite the suddenness with which the raid was made, the occupants of the house (which is next door to the Staff House of this Embassy) were able to throw a number of documents into a cesspit in the garden and others into the water tank on the roof. These have been recovered and will be decyphered in due course. It is already clear that among them are lists of party members with pseudonyms, and particulars as to the dates when each was admitted and confirmed, his occupation and capabilities. There was also a list of members of the party who are in the army and air force. There were no officers among these, but some of the *n.c.o.s* are in the Royal Bodyguard, which has alarmed the Regent. For the present no steps are being taken to arrest these men as it is thought that it will be more profitable to watch them. Correspondence with the Syrian Communist Party for the information of Khalid Baktash and Abdul Qadir Isma'il of Syria was also seized, together with a number of documents containing

evidence linking the Iraq organisation with an Armenian Communist Party which it was proposed to establish in Iraq.

5. The Prime Minister has informed the counsellor of this embassy that there is no doubt that the chain of direction came from Paris via Syria, where the Communist Party had been well established during the French régime. It is at first sight curious that very little evidence of a link with the Tudeh Party in Persia has so far been discovered. Nuri Pasha explained that in his view this was due to the fact that the Tudeh Party was in Russian eyes only second-rate material. The members were easily corruptible and it was far too dangerous to use such an organisation as a channel of direction. As far as my own information goes one or two agitators entered Iraq from Persia at the time of the Kirkuk strike and there is evidence of the presence of disruptive elements from Persia in Kerkela and Najaf, who may constitute a parallel organisation. It should also be noted that many of those now arrested appear to be Shi'ahs (*cf.* my despatch No. 224 of 15th June, 1946, paragraph 5). The fact that there was a women's section of the organisation points strongly to Christian and Jewish participation.

6. It will be some time before the full implication of these raids are known. So far it is evident that the police have made a major *coup* and have unearthed, and at any rate temporarily disorganised, the chief subversive movement in the country, though in the opinion of the Prime Minister probably only one quarter of the organisation has so far been uncovered. In particular it is highly probable that there exist other presses which will be brought into operation. The fact that the organisation calls itself "Communist" is incidental; its main purpose is to foster enmity to Britain. It is already clear that the organisation includes:—

- (i) "Rabitat al Shiya'iyyin al 'Iraqiyyin" (The union of Iraqi Communists).
- (ii) "Hizb al Taharrur al Watani" (National Liberation Party).
- (iii) "The Anti-Zionist League"; and that it connects with,
- (iv) "Hizb al Shaab (People's Party).

The inner select few styling themselves the "Central Committee," surround "Fahad" himself. The first three organisations mentioned above are all proscribed



by law. There is in Iraq no really clear-cut division between one party and another. It is highly probable that many individuals are members of two or more of these parties.

7. It is also clear that sums of money have come from Jewish sources. Thirdly, the captured documents prove that this organisation has correspondents in neighbouring countries and in Britain, whence a certain amount of literature has been sent. Whether or not it has any connexion with Russian communism it is not yet possible to say definitely, but there can be little doubt that the chain of control extends from Paris to Moscow.

8. There is absolutely nothing as yet to implicate the Soviet Legation. This was only to be expected and the Prime Minister proposes to take the wise line in any public statements that this is a purely Iraqi internal affair and that relations between the Iraqi Government and the Soviet Legation are entirely proper and normal. He will thus avoid the sort of slip committed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my Saving telegram No. 170 of 31st December.

9. The Prime Minister also told Mr. Busk that he had for some time been alarmed by the rift between the executive and judiciary departments of the Iraqi Government. This has also caused me some disquiet, particularly in connexion with the Kirkuk strike, when action by the Mutasarrif was frequently rendered ineffective by the local judge and magistrates who, almost automatically, took an opposite course. Before the police pulled off their *coup* Nuri Pasha therefore consulted Judge Prichard, the senior British judge, and summoned the fourteen leading Iraqi judges. In the presence of the Minister of Justice he appealed to their hearts and sympathy. He told them that if they desired anarchy they were going the right way about it and he begged them to co-operate in future. He states that the response was satisfactory and that magistrates and judges played up nobly while the investigation was proceeding, issuing search and other warrants without delay and conducting prolonged investigations in the houses of suspects at all hours. Furthermore there have as yet been none of the releases on bail (except in the case of one woman school teacher), which marked Arshad Beg's attempts to suppress his opponents. There is not likely to be much public sympathy for those who

have been arrested and we can hope that the trials will go through without the legal quibbles and quashed verdicts of the previous régime. It is most fortunate that the police did not uncover this organisation while Arshad Beg was in power, when those arrested would inevitably have become to some extent confused with his other more respectable victims and would have benefited by the public sympathy extended to all whom the Prime Minister was trying to "suppress."

10. The conduct of the police and magistracy has been so efficient that the Prime Minister proposes to arrange for bonuses to be paid in future to magistrates working late hours and to police who perform similar duties or who actually make arrests. I understand that as far as the police are concerned this system has been in use for many years in Palestine. In a country such as Iraq, where all officials are pitifully underpaid, there is much to be said for any scheme that acts as an incentive to honesty and efficiency. A judge or senior examining magistrate receives £768 a year inclusive of high cost of living allowance, which in purchasing power represents less than half of what he received before the war. It is obvious that anything the Prime Minister can do to improve the pay of judges will be very beneficial. It is important, however, that any increase, affecting only one class of judge, should be in the form of a bonus for overtime, not an automatic raise applied to all judges who handle political cases. I intend, with Judge Prichard's assistance, to stress this to Nuri Pasha.

11. As regards wider publicity the Prime Minister proposes to hold his hand until further investigations on which I will not fail to report, have been carried out and the cases are ready for the courts. He told Mr. Busk that he might then request my assistance to obtain wide publicity outside Iraq. He is determined, however, to maintain his policy of representing this as a purely Iraqi question, unrelated to any foreign country. With this end in view no public credit will be given to Major Wilkins, the British adviser to the C.I.D. who performed invaluable work. It will thus be impossible for anyone to claim that it was the British who put the Iraqis up to this.

12. So far the Left-wing press has maintained almost complete silence about the arrests. In other papers and by the public in general great satisfaction has been

expressed at the work of the police and much credit has been gained by the Prime Minister. Another result of the arrests has been to cause consternation among the moderate Left wing who realise for the first time what the extremists have been up to.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Damascus, Beirut, Tehran and Moscow, to the High Commissioner for Palestine and to the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER-BIRD

E 1455/1455/93

No. 6

## TURCO-IRAQI RELATIONS

*Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Mr. Bevin. (Received 18th February)*

(No. 35)

His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of despatch No. 1 of 3rd February to Sir David V. Kelly, Angora, regarding Turco-Iraqi relations.

*Bagdad, 3rd February, 1947*

Enclosure in No. 6

*Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Sir D. Kelly (Angora)*

(No. 1)

*Bagdad,*

Sir,

*3rd February, 1947*

In your despatch No. 560 to the Foreign Office you said that it was now clear that the Turkish Government are anxious to improve their relations with the Arab States. From subsequent correspondence on the visit of King Abdullah to Angora, and from the published results of that visit, I think your thesis is abundantly proved. It seems to me, moreover, so far as Iraq is concerned, that the desire for improved relations with Turkey is quite as evident on the Arab side. Indeed, it has long been one of Nuri Said's main objects, and it was he who first raised the question of a treaty during the Regent's State visit to Turkey in 1945. If the Iraqis have not yet ratified the treaty, this is, I think, due to the fact that the Prime Minister of the day was rather piqued that Nuri Pasha, who negotiated it early in 1946, exceeded his instructions, and to the fact that, shortly after it was signed, the Iraqi Parliament adjourned so that ratification was then impossible. Parliament did not reassemble

in December as is normally the case but was dissolved and new elections are to take place soon. The present plan is that the new House will meet at the end of March, and it seems likely that among the first items of business before it will be the Turco-Iraqi Treaty.

2. I cannot say whether the treaty will be ratified by Parliament without opposition. The Iraqis are peculiarly unpredictable in such matters. The large majority of the ruling class are still Turkish-educated and speak Turkish almost as easily as they speak Arabic. Many of those who do not, have Turkish wives. Turkish influence in short is strong here still, and I feel that Nuri Pasha, like many others, considers it perfectly natural that there should be a treaty of friendship with Turkey. Yet they are all very touchy. Any suggestion that they may have had the worst of a deal and they will promptly call it off. There has been more than a suggestion that Nuri gave away more than he got in the Angora negotiations, and I shall not be surprised if some criticism is heard of the treaty when it comes before Parliament. Nevertheless, I think it will be ratified.

3. Sir Ronald Campbell has suggested in his despatch No. 17 of 19th December to you that the readiness of Iraq and Trans-jordan to be friends with Turkey is based on a distrust of the intentions of the Saudi-Egyptian combine in the Arab League. This may well be one of the reasons. I believe that the Hashimites, particularly the Regent of Iraq, eldest son of the eldest son of Sherif Hussain, still wish to rule the Hejaz, where, they consider, Ibn Saud wields the power of a usurper. Real friendship with Ibn Saud seems then to be



impossible; and friendship with Egypt will always be difficult so long as the Egyptians automatically assume that the rest of the Arab world must follow their lead and as long as Egypt and Saudi Arabia collaborate closely. Iraqis, whether the ruling house or the people, are by no means prepared always to admit that leadership in Arab affairs is divinely bestowed on Egypt. There can be no doubt, moreover, that Nuri Pasha, at least, believes that the union of the Fertile Crescent, if it can be achieved, will be the most durable form of Arab Confederation, and he has often expressed his regret that the "Arab League" did not take this form. Any such union of northern Arab States must have the benevolence of Turkey. It might even help to bring such a union about.

4. I do not think that fear of Russia will spoil Iraq's relations with Turkey: on the contrary, it is likely to strengthen them. Fear no doubt there is, and certain so-called Left-wing newspapers here have not failed to stigmatise the Turco-Iraqi Treaty as a move against the Russians. Many Iraqis, moreover, have an uneasy feeling that if there is ever a war between the Soviet and the Anglo-Saxon Powers a part of it at least will be fought in the Mesopotamian plain. They are possibly right in this; but I fancy they are frightened of Russia for what she is, for her propagation of a hateful doctrine and her advocacy of a spurious democracy (which is seen to be, in fact, a sinister tyranny). I think the idea of a defensive barrier against these things is stronger than the fear of what the Russians might do if such a barrier is, in fact, created and common cause with Turkey seems a natural step in building the barrier.

5. There is no doubt that the question of the Hatay vexes the minds of Iraqis, as well as of Syrians. Good relations between Syria and Turkey are an essential part of the idea of the Fertile Crescent mentioned in paragraph 3 above, and the Hatay alone seems to stand in the way. I have already reported (see my Savingsgram No. 168 of 30th December) that it has been conveyed to the Iraqi Government that, if Iraq attempts to intervene on Syria's

behalf over the Hatay, Turkey will raise the question of the whole of her southern frontier, and this has certainly had its effect. None the less, Iraq would like to have the Hatay question settled. At the moment the only Mediterranean port directly connected by rail to Iraq is Iskanderun, and it would cause much satisfaction if "free zone" facilities there could be given to Iraq in a general settlement with Syria.

6. As regards the frontier between Turkey and Iraq there is, I think, in spite of the previous paragraph, no major outstanding problem. Iraq is most anxious that none should arise. She remembers what a prolonged struggle took place before the Mosul Vilayet was finally awarded to Iraq and is determined that there shall be no ground for reopening the question if she can avoid it. The fact that there are Kurds on both sides of the line does not, of course, make for ease in administration, and there are more or less continual small complaints of fugitives from justice finding sanction beyond the limits of the Power by which they are wanted. But on the whole relations between Turkish and Iraqi frontier officials are far better than on the Koweit, Saudi Arabian and Persian frontiers.

7. Mr. Eyres has reported in his despatch No. 92/46 of 6th January that, with the approaching completion of the report on economic development in Syria by Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, it will be necessary for Turkey, Syria and Iraq to agree on the use to which they will put the waters of the Euphrates. I agree that this is most necessary and I have recently explained to Mr. F. F. Haigh, chairman of the Iraqi Irrigation Commission, that if he contemplates any development of the Euphrates in Iraq it will be necessary for the Iraqi Government to consult with the Syrian and Turkish Governments before taking any definite steps. There can, I think, be no doubt that the first step will have to be the establishment of the joint commission mentioned in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 61 to the Foreign Office of 16th January, 1946.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

## THE EFFENDI CLASS IN IRAQ

*Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Mr. Bevin. (Received 22nd March)*

(No. 80)  
Sir,

Bagdad,  
10th March, 1947

I am convinced that the solution of the problem of the effendis in Middle Eastern countries which you discussed in your despatch No. 24 of 15th January last is vital, not only to the maintenance of our own position, but to the well-being of the countries themselves.

2. The problem of the effendis exists, but before considering it, it is as well to define more closely what we mean by the word. So far as Iraq is concerned the effendis can, I think, be divided into three groups. The first includes those Iraqis who have either had a genuine western education in the west, or who come from sufficiently wealthy families to obtain without difficulty the better jobs in the Government or commerce. From this class chiefly come the Ministers, directors-general, mutasarrifs, &c. The second class is made up of the rest of the literate town-dwellers who have had rather scrappy western-style education in Iraq, the school teachers, clerks in Government offices, shop assistants, lawyers, journalists. The third class, which is separate from the first two by reason of its occupation, consists of the junior army officers.

3. Of these three classes it is only the second which matters in the present context. The first is, so far at least as Bagdad is concerned, the stratum of society in which I and my staff naturally move, and it is, I think, already adequately covered. (I am, however, making it once more clear that it is essential that the staff of this embassy should do everything possible to keep on close and cordial terms with as many Iraqis as possible.) The third is covered by the British Military Mission which, under the most able direction of Major-General Renton, is now in the friendliest relations with officers of all ranks. The Regent, too, has done much to bring the officers of the army into contact with his British friends. He sent a number to Britain last summer for the victory celebrations, in addition to the official delegation, with excellent results, and he encourages them to hunt and play polo with Britons, including civilians. I am urging upon all married members of the embassy and military mission staffs

the important part that their wives can play by cultivating still further Iraqi wives of the same classes.

4. It is then the school teachers, the clerks in Government service, the shop assistants, the lawyers, the more advanced technicians, who present a vital body of opinion which it is essential that we should reach. It is, I fear, precisely this class which the embassy staff are least able to influence. At the best of times it is difficult for a member of the staff of the embassy to mix freely with such people: it is hard for example to find any subjects of common interest, and junior secretaries, when confronted by them, report that the conversation usually degenerates into a monologue or lecture. Apart from this, I feel there can be little doubt in Iraqi minds that the oddity of such meetings is to be explained only by the reason of propaganda. I think you will agree that "odd" would be the word if a senior member of the staff of this embassy were deliberately to seek out, say, the confidential clerk of the Director of Tobacco Monopoly. The accusation of propaganda would be raised at once. None the less, it is precisely the confidential clerk and his like who yearly form a larger part of the inhabitants of the capital and, because they have, or are at least capable of having, an opinion of their own (as opposed to tribesmen who still, sheep-like, follow their Shaikhs), are yearly acquiring a greater (as yet, perhaps, only potential) importance.

5. But while the embassy cannot as yet do much directly to reach this effendi class, there is at hand an admirable instrument, ready made, in the shape of the British Institute which, in fact, does already attract just these people. The British Institute Club in Bagdad has an Iraqi membership drawn almost exclusively from the poorer Effendis, the black-coated workers, and it is a great success with rapidly rising membership. It is these people who form the majority of the students at the Institute English classes. But you will probably not be surprised to hear that it is hampered by lack of funds. Last year, for example, the British Council was able to provide a British teacher of English for the police college, another



for the medical college, and a third for the military college, and these three men had considerable influence in their respective spheres. But there were staff difficulties at the beginning of the year and the police college contact was lost. Last year the military college students complained to the British Council of the lack of organised welfare (sports, &c.) and asked if the council could help. It could not afford to. In short, I think we could do a great deal with our present machinery if we were given sufficient fuel. But it is, I fear, likely to be impossible to do more than we are doing at present if the ration is cut any further.

6. Money is a major factor also in the degree of success with effendis which our information service can hope to achieve. Effendis read the Bagdad daily press, which has in recent years shown itself fairly willing to accept material offered for publication by the information officer. But it must be offered in Arabic, and it costs money to have it translated. Effendis are serious-minded and would willingly buy a British magazine of the nature of the American *Al Mukhtar* (Arabic version of the *Reader's Digest*) if it was offered in Arabic. They would read cheap editions of English books—if they were cheap enough. These questions have been taken up separately with your department.

7. I agree that the problem is of sufficient importance to warrant the appointment of an officer to make a special study of it in all its aspects. There is no such area, culturally, as "the Middle East," or even "the Arab world." The variations

of level and direction between one country and another are just as great in Asia as they are in Europe, and one can no more judge Bagdad by experience in Cairo than one can gauge feeling in Madrid from investigations made in Paris. In general, Palestinians and Syrians are more advanced culturally than Iraqis. On the other hand, politically they are more backward. Each country, therefore, must be studied by itself.

8. In this despatch I have emphasised the financial aspect, but I would not wish you to think that I consider it more important than the human side. In fact, of course, the latter predominates, and we shall continue to do our best with the means at our disposal. I merely consider it imperative to sound a note of warning in connection with my information services and the British Council. If their budgets are to be subjected to cuts, our efforts in dealing with the effendi problem and in other directions are bound to be seriously hampered. I realise, of course, the urgent need for economy, and we shall make every effort to cover essential needs by readjustment, but the field is so fruitful that I regret deeply our inability to sow and harvest it adequately.

9. I have been impressed by Sir D. Kelly's despatch No. 588 of 11th December, which has reached me in print. My first secretary (information) will make contact with his opposite number in Ankara and consult him about the measures adumbrated in paragraph 9 of that despatch.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

E 2616/951/31

No. 8

## IRAQ AND THE ARAB LEAGUE

### Crisis over the Palestine Question

*Sir H. Stonchewer Bird to Mr. Bevin. (Received 25th March)*

(No. 281) *Bagdad,*  
(Telegraphic) *25th March, 1947.*

My immediately preceding telegram: Arab League.

Government yesterday took unprecedented step of summoning a joint meeting

of both Houses of Parliament. The proceedings, which lasted four hours, were followed by the Regent from the Royal Gallery. First in secret session the Prime Minister read out the resolutions of the Bludan Conference. Then in open debate

a number of speakers criticised the Arab League for its inefficiency, lack of unity and neglect of the Palestine question.

2. Finally, a resolution was adopted requiring the league unanimously to approve the following action:—

- (1) United Kingdom and United States to be informed that they are responsible for the present critical state of affairs in Palestine.
- (2) Arabs should go to U.N.O. and demand the setting up of independent Arab State in Palestine. If demand is not met Bludan decisions to be implemented, including reconsideration of economic and political relations with the United Kingdom and United States.

(3) Full boycott of Zionist goods, including transit trade, to prevent raw materials reaching the Zionists.

3. If the resolution is not adopted by the league, Iraq will consider herself free of all responsibility in the matter.

4. This resolution was telegraphed to Janali yesterday. The proviso in telegram is meant to hint, Nuri told me this morning, that either the league must take Iraq's views into serious consideration or Iraq must "suspend her membership" or even withdraw altogether. Iraq could not continue to be dragged along at the heels of Azzam and Egypt in their use of the league merely as an instrument for furthering Egyptian aspirations rather than genuine Arab interests and still retain her self-respect as an independent sovereign State.

E 2695/3/93

No. 9

## THE IRAQI ELECTIONS

*Sir H. Stonchewer Bird to Mr. Bevin. (Received 28th March)*

(No. 92) *Bagdad,*  
Sir, *13th March, 1947*

With reference to my despatch No. 13 of 9th January, 1947, I have the honour to report that the elections were completed on 10th March, and the Cabinet resigned on the same day. The new Parliament will meet on 17th March. A full account of the elections is contained in the accompanying copy of a memorandum prepared by Mr. Stewart Perowne, oriental counsellor.

2. I sought the earliest possible audience with the Regent after the elections, and enquired whom His Royal Highness had in mind as Prime Minister. He replied that he hoped Nuri as Said would agree to form a Government, but he was at present reluctant to do so. He was suffering from low blood pressure and had overtaxed his strength during his recent premiership, when, in addition to leading the Cabinet, he had held the portfolio of Minister of the Interior and, during Dr. Janali's absence, that of Foreign Affairs also. If Nuri Pasha felt unable to accept the burden, the next best solution in the Regent's opinion was to choose a man wholly loyal to Nuri Pasha and who would be prepared to follow his guidance. I said that I hoped His Royal Highness would use all his influence to induce Nuri to accept:

it was in my opinion essential that there should be continuity in the direction of the affairs of State for at least three or four years. This would be the fifth Cabinet I had known in two years; each had had a plan for the development of the country and the betterment of social conditions, but nothing had been achieved, nor would it be unless there were a stable Government. If a good man could be found to fill the Ministry of the Interior, Nuri would be relieved of the greater part of his office work and could concentrate on the wide issues. I did not believe that any existing politician in Iraq could, even with Nuri's sustained backing, hold a Cabinet together for three years. The Regent listened patiently but made no comment, and I am not convinced that he will press Nuri hard; he is credited with not liking an influential statesman to hold power too long, and there is talk of his choice being Shakir al Wadi, late chargé d'affaires in London, an inefficient light-weight whose sole claim to premiership is his unquestionable loyalty to the Regent. I shall endeavour to see Nuri in the near future and discuss his views and intentions. I fear from conversation which he has had lately with me and members of my staff that his real reason for not wishing to continue in power is his belief that he



cannot count on the Regent's support over a long period.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 9

#### Memorandum

The long-awaited elections took place throughout Iraq on 10th March. Public order was nowhere infringed. The country's tranquillity was born not of indifference—indeed, interest in the contest and its outcome was intense in capital and provinces, town and tribe alike—but of the Government's determination to maintain the kingdom's reputation in the eyes of the world. As Jemal Husseini remarked to me during his visit here last week: "When Fauzi Qawnujji goes home, twenty people are killed and fifty injured; but here, the elections of which we have heard so much for so long pass off without a drop of blood." Compared with the atmosphere of turmoil, resentment and indignation which disfigured the Umari régime last autumn, when to have held elections would certainly have provoked civil violence, the calm in which they have now been conducted—apart altogether from their political significance, which I shall discuss below—may be held to reflect great credit on the humanity, no less than on the sagacity, of Nuri al Said.

2. It may be useful to recall the sequence of events which preceded the final poll. The old Chamber, elected under the old law, consisted of 115 Deputies. It was dissolved on 21st November last, the day on which the late Government took office. The new electoral law, No. 14 of 1946 (a copy of which was enclosed in Bagdad despatch No. 221 of 15th June, 1946) makes no change in the ratio of members to primary electors, which remains as one Deputy for every 20,000 registered males; but owing to the increase in the population since the last electoral lists were compiled, the new House will comprise 138 Deputies—68 Sunnis, 57 Shias, 6 Christians, 6 Jews, and, for the first time, 1 Yezidi. This augmentation by 13 of the lower Chamber will automatically increase the permitted strength of the Senate, which, under the constitution as it now stands, may consist of not more than one-quarter of the number of Deputies. There are at present 25 Senators: so that 9 vacancies are in the

Regent's gift. His Royal Highness mentioned in conversation with me a few weeks ago that he proposed to wait until after the elections were over, and then announce one list of nominations, instead of appointing one or two Senators at a time, as has been the practice hitherto. It is to be presumed that some at least of the available seats will be awarded to unsuccessful candidates for the Lower House. This is almost certain in the case of Tewfiq Suaidi (see paragraph 7 below), who told me that the Regent has promised him a senatorship. The Regent does not deny that he has done so; but, being unwilling, on account of Tewfiq's known disloyalty, to accord him any individual honour, prefers apparently to include him in the general elevation. The new Parliament has been summoned to meet on 17th March.

3. I must now attempt to answer the question: "Were the elections free?" If by "free" is implied freedom from physical interference or menace, the answer is "yes." Neither the Government, nor, so far as I know, any other individual or association, has used force, or threatened to use it. There have been no arrests, no interrogations. In no instance have the police been called in "to preserve order." The press was given complete licence, and abused it to the full. Coercion and intimidation, such as have become the melancholy and humiliating routine in so many States of Europe and America, were entirely absent in both the primary and secondary States. For 77 constituencies, returning in all 138 members, 334 candidates presented themselves. Only 36 were returned unopposed, and only some two dozen withdrew. The electors, that is to say, were left entirely free to vote as they saw fit. In other words, they were given full liberty to follow their interests. What were their interests?

4. In England, as the result of a long process of development, Parliament has at length become, beyond question or challenge, the sole fountain of secular authority. All government depends on Parliament. In Iraq it is the other way round: Parliament depends on the Government. The Iraqi Parliament is little more than ten years old: the Government of the country—Assyrian, Babylonian, Roman, Persian, Arab, Turkish or British (to mention but a few of the Powers that have exercised dominion over this oldest of lands)—is of far more venerable antiquity. The fear of the lord of the land is the beginning of wisdom. In the latter days of the Ottoman Empire, it is true, the three

vilayets of Basra, Bagdad and Mosul, sent obsequious representatives to the Constantinople Majlis: there were, I believe, three from Mosul, three from Basra, and seven from Bagdad—thirteen in all. The British Mandatory Government instituted a General Assembly, which met on 24th March, 1924. Its principal functions were to draw up the Organic Law and an Electoral Law. Despite the denunciations of the trembling prelates of Nejj and Kerbala, it fulfilled its task, and the election of Deputies to the first Iraqi Parliament began on 25th November, 1924. Parliament met for the first time on 10th July, 1925. Democracy had arrived; but it was hardly to be expected that it would be the democracy which (in Mr. Shaw's phrase) "substitutes election by the incompetent many for appointment by the corrupt few." King Feisal dominated his Parliament. He procured what he wanted: a majority strong enough to ratify a treaty with Britain, and an Opposition sufficiently vocal to ensure that the treaty should be favourable to Iraq.

5. After King Feisal's death, the royal primacy waned. The constitution, and the spirit of our age, were invoked against it. But latterly, as in the England of King George the Third, "the power of the Crown, almost dead and rotten as prerogative, has grown up anew, with far more strength, and far less odium, under the name of influence." In the chances and changes of political life in a nascent oriental kingdom, Prime Ministers and their Cabinets may change and pass, but the Crown remains. Naturally, therefore, it is to the Crown that men look for promotion, security and lucre.

6. In such circumstances, party government, as we in Britain know it, must be impossible; and the recent elections have very strikingly manifested its impossibility. At the outset of the electoral campaign, five so-called parties were in the field, parties in name only. The selfless dedication to a principle, the acquiescence in obloquy, neglect and disappointment, the indifference to personal advancement, and the stubborn confidence in the eventual vindication of a cause, such as invigorated and ennobled a Wilberforce, a Shaftesbury or a Webb—these are not to be sought in an oriental political party. Its prototype is rather the Italian "combinazione," a transient association of a few interested individuals for a transient material end. Of the five self-styled but legal parties in Iraq the Liberals, the People's Party and

the National Unionists, seeing no prospect of success, decided to boycott the elections. Rather surprisingly, the National Democrats and the Independence Party resolved to participate. The latter did so, no doubt, in order to annoy the Government—they are extreme malignants. None of their candidates was returned, though a former member, an ex-internee, having withdrawn from the party, has been elected. The National Democrats, who were the principal victims of Arshad al Umari's venom, have four representatives in the new Parliament. They are the sole exponents of Iraq's party system, four out of 138.

7. Who, then, are the other 134? Salih Jabr is an able administrator and an astute politician. He aspires, quite legitimately, to become Iraq's first Shia Prime Minister. For the electoral campaign he organised an association known as the Kitla, or *bloc*. The Kitla published no programme, elected no officers, and established no branches in the provinces. It was an election machine, pure and simple. Salih Jabr thought to succeed where he knew that the "parties" (for the reasons given above) would fail. Industrious he fostered an interest not only in the Shia South, but in the Sunni North and among the minorities. His task was made easier because his most serious rival, Saad Salih, being chairman of the Liberal Party, was prevented from standing by their boycott. But Salih Jabr, too, failed in his desire to return to Parliament as the head of a powerful *bloc* or party. If he achieves office, even the Premiership, he will do so, like the rest, as the Regent's nominee and at His Royal Highness's pleasure, not because of his following in the House. For electors, left to themselves, sought guidance where alone true guidance is to be found, from the Government. And the Government gave it. Not in every case was it taken. In Iraq to-day, as in England a while ago, men will vote for the power which they consider will do them most material good—the county magnate, the tribal sheikh or the T.U.C. nominee. Generally, he has Government backing; but not always. In the Samarra division, for instance, the tribal champion opposed and beat the Government's man. At Museiyib also, the candidates, which the Mutesarraf at the instance of Salih Jabr was supporting, were both beaten. In the seventh district of Bagdad, Tewfiq Suaidi, an ex-Prime Minister and—*rara avis*—a resident in his constituency, was challenged by Shakir al Wadi, Minister of Defence in the present Cabinet. Despite the fact that



Shakir was known to be the Palace nominee, he only got home by six votes out of a secondary college of over 200.

8. But these are exceptions. Generally speaking, the elections have been a victory for the Government, that is to say, for the Regent and Nuri al Said. In some cases they backed different candidates, as was inevitable, and, equally inevitably, friction between them has resulted. It is to be regretted that so many colourless

nonentities, few of them "ministrable," have been returned, while outstanding men, who might have brought new ideas and new blood into Iraqi politics, have been rejected. For this, the British will, of course, be blamed, though in fact our influence has been consistently exerted in the opposite direction. In broad terms, the old régime has received a new mandate. What it will do with it remains to be seen.

S. H. P.

E 3116/3116/93

No. 10

### IRAQI-TRANSJORDAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE

*Sir A. Kirkbride to Mr. Bevin. (Received 14th April)*

(No. 121) Amman,  
(Telegraphic) 12th April, 1947.

Regent of Iraq has arrived in Amman with Nuri Pasha and Shakir el Wadi bringing draft of a treaty of brotherhood and alliance between Iraq and Transjordan. The present intention is that Nuri Pasha and Samir Rifai should fly to Bagdad on Sunday in order that signature of the treaty should take place there.

2. The following are provisions of draft articles in brief:—

First clause: Permanent brotherhood and alliance and periodical consultations as to the manner in which the objects of the treaty are to be secured.

Second clause: Undertaking not to enter into agreements with a third party on any matter injurious to the interests of the other party to the treaty.

Third clause: Dispute between the two parties to be settled by friendly negotiations.

Fourth clause: If either country is involved in a dispute with a third party likely to lead to war, the two parties will undertake united effort to settle such a dispute by peaceful means and in accordance with appropriate international instruments.

Fifth clause: (a) If in spite of their efforts under article 4 an act of aggression is committed by a third party against one of the parties to the treaty, including an unforeseen attack which precludes the application of article 4, the two parties will consult as to means of repelling the aggressor.

(b) The term aggression covers a declaration of war, the occupation of territory by armed forces of a third party without a declaration of war, an attack by forces of a party to the treaty without a declaration of war, and direct or indirect support or assistance to an aggressor.

(c) The resort to measures of self-defence, or, in other words, resistance to an act of aggression as described above, shall not itself be deemed to be an act of aggression. Action undertaken to execute a decision of the United Nations shall not be deemed to be an act of aggression.

Sixth clause: (a) If internal disturbances take place in territory of one party, the other party shall—

- (1) Take all possible steps to prevent its territory being used by the insurgents;
- (2) To prevent its subjects participating with or assisting or managing [sic] the insurgents.
- (3) Prevent any direct or indirect assistance reaching the insurgents from its territory.

(b) Insurgents who take refuge in territory of the other party shall be disarmed and surrendered.

(c) The two parties shall consult as to method of co-operation to be adopted if joint measures are necessary in order to suppress internal disturbances.

Seventh clause: The two parties shall co-operate in unification of their military methods by exchange of military missions to acquire information on such methods

and to benefit from military instructions and training.

Eighth clause: If required, diplomatic and consular representatives of either party may represent the interests of the other party in countries in which the latter is not represented. This does not affect the freedom of either party to appoint its own representatives.

Ninth clause: Special permanent committee, possessing executive powers, consisting of representatives of both kingdoms, shall be appointed to ensure co-operation between the two parties in all matters referred to in article 2 of the Covenant of the Arab League, and to give effect to articles 5, 6 and 7 of this treaty.

Tenth clause: Provides that nothing in this treaty shall affect the rights or obliga-

tions of either party under treaties with other States.

Eleventh clause: Provides for ratification.

Twelfth clause: Provides for ten years' duration with an automatic renewal for five-year periods unless notification is given by either party to the contrary.

Text of the treaty may be revised at expiration of any period in order to enforce closer co-operation or to strengthen the alliance.

Reference is made in the preamble to the fact that the treaty is concluded in accordance with the terms of article 9 of the Covenant of the Arab League.

3. (As this information has only just been given me and Samir Pasha is leaving Sunday for Bagdad, I am not delaying its transmission for my comments.)

E 3239/3116/93

No. 11

### IRAQI-TRANSJORDAN TREATY

*Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Mr. Bevin. (Received 16th April)*

(No. 352) Bagdad,  
(Telegraphic) 16th April, 1947.

Iraqi Government have signed treaty with Transjordan. Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me that text is identical with Iraqi-Saudi Treaty, with one new

article providing for the establishment of mixed committees to study problems of common interest (education, customs, &c.).

2. Text has not yet been published, but I have been promised a copy privately.

UE 2817/176/53

No. 12

### ANGLO-IRAQI FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC POSITION

*Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Mr. Bevin. (Received 19th April)*

(No. 109. Secret) Bagdad,  
Sir, 3rd April, 1947

With reference to your circular despatch No. 024 of 10th February, circular despatch No. 028 of 12th February, and your despatch No. 84 of 6th March, I have the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum on the United Kingdom-Iraq financial and economic position.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 12

*Memorandum on the United Kingdom-Iraq Financial and Economic Position*

The economic memoranda enclosed in Bagdad despatch to Foreign Office No. 83E. 36494

of 13th March, 1947, forms a background to this memorandum.

Iraq at present enjoys economic stability and its financial position is sound but, according to modern ideas and standards, the country is under-developed and social organisation is poor. Political organisation is theoretically based on Western models but in practice it is backward. Owing to the individualistic nature of the people, party Government is non-existent and the formation of a strong and really democratic Government and a permanent and reliable civil service is still a goal for the future.

2. At the time of writing, a Parliament has just been elected under a new Electoral Law and a Government is about to be formed which, it is hoped, will have a



longer life than its predecessors, and will be able to introduce a system of planned development and maintain its execution.

3. That Iraq appears to be more stable than adjacent countries is largely due to British influence and advice and to the employment by the Iraqi Government in their civil service and institutions of some 230 British advisers, doctors, technicians and specialists of all kinds.

4. Throughout the war the Iraqi Government has been able to maintain a balanced budget and to acquire a running credit balance of between 3 and 4 million dinars; in addition to this it has lent about 1 million dinars for domestic industrial enterprises and has floated internal loans totalling 2 million dinars. Owing to the establishment of British troops in Iraq during the war and the shortage of imported commodities resulting in a considerable rise in the price of internal production, both for consumption and export, Iraq has acquired sterling balances which now stand at a figure of about £65 million. Of this about £35 million may be assumed to be purchasing power over and above current earnings.

5. Since the end of the war most of the internal economic controls have been lifted and increasing availability of many types of imported goods has increased the volume of imports with the result that, during the last two years, there has been a drawing down of the sterling balances; the present rate of this is estimated at about £4 million per annum.

6. In an endeavour to assess the possible economic and financial position of Iraq over the next five years there are three main factors to be taken into consideration:—

- (a) The settlement of the sterling balance question;
- (b) increasing oil revenues; and
- (c) the need for planned development of the country, including social rehabilitation.

7. Iraq is one of the countries within the sterling area to which the United Kingdom should, if there were no moderating factors to be considered, diminish to the utmost her exports in order that exports to hard currency areas might be increased.

8. There are, however, important modifying factors which must be taken into consideration:—

- (a) *Political*.—In view of the Egyptian Treaty position and the Palestine question and the need to ensure the

growth of a democratic State on Western European lines with increasing benefit to the masses, it is essential that the United Kingdom's relations with Iraq should be as friendly as possible.

- (b) *Economic*.—It is necessary to preserve our important oil interests and to encourage wise land development in order to increase production of food-stuffs, under a planned economy.

- (c) *Financial*.—It is most desirable to come to a friendly arrangement regarding the drawing down of the sterling balances.

9. If Iraq could be considered in isolation the sterling debt problem is small and could easily be solved, but it is part of the total sterling balance problem and difficulties of principle arise in connexion with the negotiations to which the United Kingdom is committed under article 10 of the Financial Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom on 6th December, 1945. These negotiations are as yet only in the preliminary stage. Discussions took place in Bagdad on 5th and 6th March, 1947, between the mission headed by Sir Wilfrid Eady and the Iraqi Minister of Finance and his assistants. The matter has got no further than a general statement of the position by the British side and a suggestion that Iraq should draw down a total of only about £15 million of the balance over the next five years provided that another portion is cancelled and that the remainder should earn only half of 1 per cent. interest; the matter to be reviewed in five years' time. There was no clear reaction by the Iraqi side to these proposals in the practical execution of which there would be considerable difficulties for the Iraqi Government to surmount. It appears likely that there will be strong opposition to cancellation of any part of the balance. A new Government will shortly be formed and on the stability of this much will depend.

10. While it may be expected that the prices of Iraq's exports will decline and it is understood that Iraq has somewhat drawn on future oil royalties, it is thought that with a proper control of imports, which would enable priority to be given to essential goods, both for consumption and for capital development, the current income earned by Iraq, plus an average of £3 million a year of the sterling balances,

should be sufficient to satisfy Iraq's reasonable current needs, and provide a margin to cover the initial execution of development plans during the next five years. In the meantime the development of Iraq's oil resources will increase her revenue from royalties. This additional income may go some way to cover the rising cost of flood prevention, irrigation and general development towards the end of the five-year period.

11. The principal difficulty for Iraq in this situation will be the extension of an adequate trade control and the tapping by the Government of the wealth in private hands in order to devote it to development schemes. The country is a loose-knit association of individuals whose economic knowledge extends little beyond a faculty for lining their pockets, and it will need a strong and able Government to reimpose any form of control, tighten up tax collection, and float loans.

12. According to the figures available it would appear that Iraq has a considerable adverse balance in hard currencies, but there may, in fact, be hidden hard currency earnings in respect of oil; i.e., although all oil royalties are paid to Iraq in sterling, a portion of the oil derived from Iraq may earn hard currencies for the oil companies. While this point will not be important to Iraq herself after a settlement of the sterling balance question, as all current earnings will then be convertible, it assumes some importance in a consideration as to whether or not Iraq will unduly drain the hard currency resources of the United Kingdom. As time goes on, it appears that it will be more than likely that the United Kingdom oil interests in the Middle East will earn a considerable amount of hard currency, and that this, together with current hard currency earnings on trade account, would, if it were visible, be more than sufficient to show a balance. This, of course, can only remain true if the United Kingdom is able to supply the bulk of the goods needed in the area at prices competitive with those of supplies from hard currency countries, and there is not an undue drain over the exchanges, but there would at present appear to be less to fear on the grounds of competitive prices than on the grounds of availability.

13. Iraq is fortunate inasmuch as practically all the food needed for the population is locally produced, the main exception being sugar and tea. There is, however, a considerable shortage of textiles and common consumer goods, a better supply of

which will produce a fall in prices; a deflationary tendency is already noticeable. Iraq's import needs are therefore mainly—

- (a) Machinery, equipment and manufactured goods for development purposes;
- (b) Common consumer manufactures plus a limited quantity of semi-luxury manufactures; and
- (c) Textiles for the clothing of its people.

The United Kingdom's expanding interest in the oil production of the country (involving an increasing hard currency earning capacity) may well be considered a sufficient economic reason for considerable endeavour by the United Kingdom towards satisfying these needs. We also desire to retain markets for our future output and to retain political goodwill.

14. Against the above points must be set the fact that the United Kingdom cannot afford to devote a large percentage of labour to the production of goods which will merely go to reduce the large volume of sterling debt and will not earn imports into the United Kingdom vital for the purpose of regaining stability. For the settlement of the sterling balances it is therefore necessary to find a figure for the minimum possible release which may satisfy the above points and at the same time impose no undue strains on the United Kingdom position.

15. It is felt that this may be attained and that even a show of liberality may be possible. It is neither desirable nor practicable that development in Iraq should proceed at an enormous speed. It is true that if financial aid became available from the International Bank or the United States the importation of machinery, equipment and advice into Iraq might be accelerated, but labour, skilled and otherwise, is very limited, and a pace greater than that with which the country, as a whole, can keep up, might well produce unbearable strains on the general economy of the country. With material development must come the slower processes of education, health organisation, and the creation of an ability in the people wisely to use an increase in their standard of living. All this is best achieved by steady endeavour spread over a period of years. On a present view, it is believed that, at least in the early stages, this could be attained by the utilisation of Iraq's own resources plus such assistance as may naturally be induced towards it in the course of development, rather than by an



undue artificial stimulus from outside. By the time that Iraq has got under way in this manner there may be reason to suppose that the United Kingdom will be better able to assist in the later and perhaps more costly phases of development.

16. This is not to suggest that we should not welcome aid from international organisations and the United States, far from it. At present it seems more likely that the United States might assist in the field of agriculture rather than in any other form. An American agricultural mission recently visited Iraq. It is, however, suggested that we should not endeavour to stimulate aid from other sources which might work to our ultimate economic disadvantage. It seems unlikely that in the near future America would be prepared to give financial aid to Iraq on a commercial basis, as it is not at all clear how Iraq would be able to service a hard currency loan. To emphasise the point in short form, completion of planning and the execution of the flood prevention schemes now being planned, the gradual irrigation and putting under agriculture of new lands, the expansion of oil production, and the development which will inevitably spring from all these in the next few years, will absorb the limited financial and working capacity of the country, but it seems probable that only after some time will much in the way of external financial aid be necessary, desirable or capable of absorption, and that this should form the subject of a loan proposal by Iraq to the World Bank.

17. There are two main questions which at present entirely overshadow all this consideration of economic relation between Iraq and the United Kingdom. The first and most important is the Palestine question. A solution which the Iraqis consider to be against Arab interests will set back our whole position in this country, and might place in great jeopardy our economic interests, not the least of which is oil, even though in the course of any inimical process Iraq herself might be injured. The only set off against this is Iraq's fear of Russian influence. The second is the sterling balance question which, tied as it is with the same question in India and Egypt, may be very difficult of solution. The Iraqis cannot or will not understand why the United Kingdom should demand that they should give up a part of this war-accumulated purchasing

power, and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to make them believe that by aiding the United Kingdom in this manner they will in the long run be helping themselves. It may be possible when negotiations are resumed for the British side to give an Iraqi delegation a still clearer understanding of the position. It will, however, still remain for the delegation to convince a Government and people composed of individualists mainly concerned with their private pockets. There remains to be considered the political desirability of associating the United States more closely with us in the Middle East in general and in Iraq in particular.

18. Through its commercial oil interests the United States is already considerably committed in parts of the Middle East and these interests are increasing. With the exception of those in Saudi Arabia they are intertwined with British interests. The only other form of United States associations which can be envisaged in Iraq are: (a) in agriculture, the provision of experts and advice in the exploitation of land made available in the future as the result of flood prevention and irrigation measures; (b) the provision of social organisations such as hospitals, clinics and schools; and (c) the provision of loans for general development purposes.

19. It is unlikely, however, that the United States would be prepared to engage in any of these activities without considerable control over the processes, while any control by America would, because of her attitude towards the Palestine question, be unacceptable to Iraq.

20. It follows that, while it may be possible to a greater extent to interest the United States in other countries of the Near and Middle East, it is not desirable, until the Palestine question is solved, that we should be active in promoting American interest in Iraq. It would probably be resented by the Iraqis and tend to lower our prestige and weaken our benevolent influence in the country. From the point of view of Anglo-United States relations it is, however, essential that we should never lay ourselves open to the accusation of blocking American expansion. If, therefore, the Iraqis themselves should seek American aid, particularly in directions in which we are unable to assist, the time would be ripe for us to endeavour to ensure that such aid would harmonise with our political and economic objectives.

## IRAQI GOVERNMENT PROGRAMME

*Sir H. Stophewer Bird to Mr. Bevin. (Received 25th April)*

(No. 127)  
Sir,

Bagdad,  
15th April, 1947

I reported briefly in my telegram No. 340 of 12th April on the programme which the new Iraqi Government has issued. I now enclose a summary of the programme, from which you will see that it is extremely ambitious and extensive. It is quite unlikely that it will be carried out in its entirety; but it may nevertheless be taken as fair evidence of the Prime Minister's real desire to promote progress, even if for reasons beyond his control he will not be able in every case to put his ideas into effect.

2. In my telegram under reference I drew attention to a few of the more salient points in the programme; and it may be useful if I now comment in greater detail. Each Ministry has a section devoted to it, and the programme no doubt represents the sum of the several utopias of individual Ministers. The programme, I understand, not only includes the legislative projects of the Government but also sets out their administrative aims.

3. *Section 1: Foreign Affairs.*—As regards the adjustment of the treaty, I consider that the phraseology used is satisfactory. I quoted it in my telegram under reference; it runs as follows:—

“Work for the adjustment of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty on the basis of ensuring mutual interests as between equals and in the light of the principles of the United Nations Charter with a view to consolidating the traditional friendship existing between Iraq and Great Britain.”

It was in fact submitted to me privately in advance. The remaining points 2 to 5 of section 1 involve good neighbour policy with Arab States, with Turkey and Persia and support of the Palestine Arabs and of the United Nations. They are what one would expect; though the reference to Turkey and Persia by name is significant at this juncture. It reflects Iraq's anxiety to omit no step which may promote anti-Russian solidarity. The proposed amendment of the Foreign Service law is of interest. The Iraqi Foreign Service is in its infancy, and the country has no regular,

graduated service such as more advanced nations possess. You can be appointed by law a Minister or a clerk, but appointments to ranks in between are at the whim of the Minister. Moreover, there is no provision for ambassadors under the present law. It is hoped by reorganising and expanding the service to attract to it the brighter spirits among the rising generation.

4. *Section 2: Internal Policy.*—Point 1 is an interesting indication of the ideas of the present Government. I learn on enquiry that this phrase embodies their hope that traditional barriers which have been imposed on grounds of religion will be done away with. Whether this is to be applied only to the Shias or to the Jews and Christians as well, remains to be seen. Point 2: The “combating of the destructive principles,” which means communism, will be no doubt vigorously undertaken; it is to be hoped that points 3 to 6 will be pursued with the same attention. The deterioration of Government machinery over the past few years, due to the strain of war, inflation and the lessening of British control, has been a matter of concern to many, including no doubt the Prime Minister, who has a good record as a mutessarif. As regards point 4, security in the country is good, but the standard of the police force in education and technical qualifications is deplorably low. As regards points 5 and 6, the Liwa Administration Law, of which such great things were hoped in the way of decentralisation and local initiative, have so far remained completely inoperative. Point 7 will no doubt give rise to much controversy. Nevertheless, the Government seems determined to take steps at last to check the reckless and damaging abuse of the freedom of the press which at present disfigures Iraqi journalism.

5. *Section 3: Defence.*—The Minister of Defence in the present Cabinet is a close friend of the Regent, who, as you are aware, takes great interest in the army and its efficiency. The crux, however, will be whether or not we are able to supply the equipment which the Iraqi army needs.

6. *Section 4: Judicial Affairs.*—Point 1 is a cut at Arshad al Umari, who was notorious for his attempts to influence the



judges in cases where his political opponents were concerned. It does not, I understand, imply any legislative proposal but is merely a pious announcement that the executive will keep its hands off the courts. Under point 2 the most controversial measure will be the Emergency Law. This was drafted by Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet in order to give the Government by Act of Parliament the powers which it possessed by decree during the war period. Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet fell before the Bill was introduced. His successor, Tewfiq Suweidi pigeon-holed it. It is bound to be very sharply attacked when it comes before the House.

7. Sections 5 to 11 of the programme virtually constitute the outline of a financial and economic plan for Iraq, the substance of which has largely been inducted into the minds of Saleh Jabr and his associates and rivals, the principal persons who make up the governing and intelligent section of the people, by myself and my staff over the period of the last two years. As the main points of these paragraphs have been discussed in a number of despatches and memoranda I do not here propose to take them up in detail. There are, however, a few comments which should be made, more particularly on those items in the programme which have not been brought up or encouraged by this embassy.

8. The first is the plan to establish a Central Bank to take over the work of the Currency Board. This is a matter which has never been raised officially either with me or with Lord Kennet when he visited Iraq last October; the only discussions of which I am aware have been between Ibrahim el Kebir, the Director-General of Finance, my commercial counsellor and Mr. Iliff of the Treasury; and, at the request of Ibrahim el Kebir, those discussions were deemed to be strictly personal and private. We have known for some time that there has been an under-current of opinion in certain Iraqi circles that the Currency Board should be moved to Bagdad and that there were vague ideas in the mind of Ibrahim el Kebir for the establishment of a Central Bank, though he has candidly confessed that he knows of no Iraqi who could conduct its affairs. It has become somewhat apparent that, apart from taking over control of the currency machine, Ibrahim's ideas have included some measure of control over banks operating in Iraq. The attitude of Mr. Iliff and Mr. Pelham in these discussions has always

been mildly to discourage the setting up of a Central Bank on the grounds that it would be an expensive and unnecessary luxury as all Iraq's financial affairs are, for the present, very satisfactorily covered by the existing machinery. While saying nothing to encourage the transfer of the Currency Board to Iraq (quite the reverse), they have felt that it would be impossible to oppose such a move should the Iraqis be determined to make it and that it would be better to endeavour to ensure that the move would not affect the present high standard of currency control and the faith of the people in their monetary system. Whatever transpires regarding this point in the programme, we can be sure that as long as Saleh Jabr remains Prime Minister and Ibrahim el Kebir is Director-General of Finance there is little likelihood of hasty and ill-considered action. It is inconceivable that anything will be done without request for British advice and assistance, and I feel that once the move is decided we should be ready and willing to help to make it sound and successful.

9. According to section 7, point 2, of the programme it is proposed to go ahead with the establishment of the Government oil refinery at Baiji as early as possible. This project was reported some time ago and we know that the British oil interests are much opposed to the scheme. In such conversation as has arisen between members of my staff and Iraqis on this subject, we have mildly deprecated the establishment of such a refinery when Iraq's requirements are adequately covered by the existing plants of the oil companies. In this project, however, an element of prestige arises and we may hear more of it. It would be an expensive item, costing more than £2 million, and it seems doubtful whether it would be given high priority among the many projects of greater economic importance. This and the probable difficulty of obtaining plant may put this project into the background for some time.

10. Section 7, point 16, again mentions an Iraqi ambition to own a national line of cargo vessels, which has arisen largely with the idea that if Iraqi produce were to be transported in Iraqi bottoms freight charges could be reduced. It seems unlikely that with the gradual increase in freight space owned by large world operators and perhaps consequent decrease in freight rates that this project would be

pursued. Here again, however, prestige may tend to over-ride economic sense.

11. For the remaining long lists of items covering finance, supply, agriculture, industry, irrigation and public works, education, health and social affairs, there can be nothing but warm support. The programme is immense, careful planning and the evolution of priorities in performance is essential. The rate of progress must inevitably be governed (a) by finance, and (b) by the items which come slowly to fruition, i.e., health, education and social uplift. Continuous performance must largely depend on the existence of stable Governments and the establishment of a permanent civil service, though it is hoped that much of the difficulty which arises due to the absence of these may be minimised by the establishment by law of a central organisation for development and the aid of a large body of British advisers and technicians.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 13

*Iraqi Government Programme  
Presented to Parliament on 10th April,  
1947*

#### 1. Foreign Policy

- (1) To work for the adjustment of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.
- (2) To strengthen bonds with Arab League States.
- (3) To support Palestine.
- (4) To further friendly relations with Turkey and Persia in the spirit of the Saadabad Pact.
- (5) To support U.N.O.
- (6) To amend the Foreign Service Law.

#### 2. Internal Policy

- (1) To work for Iraqi unity.
- (2) To combat destructive principles and harmful propaganda.
- (3) To improve Government machinery.
- (4) To raise the standard of the police, both officers and men.
- (5) To pay attention to the local administration of Liwas.
- (6) To raise the standard of municipal administration.
- (7) To amend the Press Law.

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#### 3. Defence

- (1) To improve the army and to equip it with modern arms.
- (2) To increase the efficiency of army officers, n.c.o.s and men.
- (3) To amend the Army Officers' Service Law and the Military Pension Law.

#### 4. Judicial Affairs

- (1) To strengthen the independence of the judicature.
- (2) To pay attention to the promulgation of Bills submitted to the Chamber of Deputies and to the submission of the Civil and Commercial Procedure Regulations, the Companies Law, the Advocates Law and the Emergency Law.

#### 5. Finance

- (1) To establish a Central Bank, to ensure the execution of a sound monetary policy, including the control of currency policy and currency exchange, within the requirements of the public economic interest.
- (2) To consider the sterling balances which accumulated to the credit of Iraq during the war as national wealth, which should be safeguarded to support the edifice of national economy and to endeavour to solve the question in a manner which will fully satisfy the rights of the country.

(3) To exploit native capital by the opening of branch banks in important economic centres in Iraq and the issue of various local loans for the financing of economic projects.

(4) To obtain the capital necessary to finance development and economic schemes through the International Bank.

(5) To increase the capital of the Agricultural and Industrial Banks.

(6) To create an Estate Bank and a Mortgage Bank.

(7) To restrict Government interference with imports and exports to scarce commodities, and to trade between Iraq and other countries, with a view to avoiding the waste of national capital on the importation of luxuries.

(8) To reconsider and amend the Civil Service, Cadre, State Officials Disciplinary and Civil Pension Laws.

#### 6. Supply

To deal with the high cost of living.

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### 7. Economic Affairs

(1) To develop national wealth and increase agricultural and industrial products and to exploit natural resources so as to raise the standard of living in the country.

(2) To carry out the scheme for the establishment of an oil refinery at Baiji as early as possible.

(3) To solve the tobacco question in a manner which will safeguard the rights of cultivators, and will be compatible with public interest.

(4) To develop agriculture and to set up scientific experimental centres and model farms, and to teach the cultivator modern agricultural methods and to introduce agricultural machinery.

(5) To make available modern agricultural implements for ploughing and harvesting and to set up repair workshops for these implements.

(6) To encourage small ownership as a basis for agricultural expansion and its enforcement in all agricultural projects to be carried out in future by the Government on purely miri lands.

(7) To make advances to cultivators to meet agricultural expenses or buy implements and improve the land.

(8) To attend to the country's animal wealth by increasing it and improving stock.

(9) To attend to the fishing industry, by setting up technical fisheries and providing them with modern means of storage, transport and export.

(10) To establish veterinary hospitals, dispensaries and laboratories.

(11) To expand the Institute for Industrial Research and Experiment and to man it with foreign and local industrial experts.

(12) To reduce or exempt customs duty on implements, machinery and raw materials imported for national industries and the distribution of lands for the erection of factories thereon free of charge or at moderate charges. To reduce railway freight charges for all national imports and exports.

(13) To undertake or participate in essential economic industries.

(14) To encourage national exports and exempt them from customs duty according to the requirements of the economic interests of the country, and to disseminate propaganda for all Iraqi products in foreign markets.

(15) To construct Silos.

(16) To solve the problem of the transport of Iraqi products to foreign markets, either by Government contracts with foreign firms, or by the establishment of a national steamship company in which the Government will participate effectively.

### 8. Education

(1) To direct education towards developing natural gifts and abilities throughout Iraq.

(2) To work for the primary education of all the "sons of the Iraqi people."

(3) To consolidate the regulations for secondary education.

(4) To encourage instruction in vocational, industrial, agricultural, commercial, domestic arts and fine arts, and to direct the majority of school graduates, especially those of primary schools, to this kind of instruction.

(5) To encourage general education among all classes of the people through the intermediary of evening schools, wireless, the cinema, exhibitions and the setting up of colleges to raise the general cultural and vocational standard.

(6) To support translation and publication by the setting up of a "literary institute" and the expansion of public libraries.

(7) To expand the system of higher schools with a view to inaugurating an "Iraqi University."

(8) To increase and raise the standard of student missions with a view to meeting the needs of the country for scientists and technicians.

(9) To construct boarding schools in the capital and the headquarters of important liwas and qadhas.

(10) To open cultural clubs for schools graduates.

(11) To encourage sports and scouting.

(12) To encourage and raise the standard of private education and to assist it effectively.

(13) To undertake the construction of a museum.

(14) To draw up a Teachers' Service Bill.

### 9. Irrigation, Communications and Works.

(1) To solve the problems of floods in the Tigris and the Euphrates, to complete the Habbaniyah Scheme, and to study the questions of the construction of reservoirs at Bekhme, Tharthar, Diyala and the Lesser Zab.

(2) To execute irrigations schemes for the improvement of the system of irrigation.

(3) To attend to surface drainage in agricultural districts.

(4) To protect bunds with a view to warding off the menace of floods, in particular in Basra.

(5) To expand the road network and the construction of bridges.

(6) To complete complementary works and carrying out of small constructional works.

(7) To construct a wireless broadcasting station.

(8) To attend to air transport and the construction of airfields in the important towns of Iraq.

### 10. Health

(1) To open and expand hospitals and equip them with X-ray apparatus.

(2) To combat epidemic and endemic diseases.

(3) To expand infant welfare centres.

(4) To expand the institute for malaria research.

(5) To construct a hospital for ophthalmic diseases and another for psychiatry and neurology and to appoint experts for these hospitals.

(6) To expand the Medical College and teaching hospitals and their teaching staff; also the laboratories; and to encourage medical researches by the setting up of a laboratory and research institute, for the scientific study of health problems in Iraq.

(7) To send medical missions abroad for specialisation in medicine and teaching at the Medical College.

(8) To expand the School of Pharmacy and to open a school of dentistry.

(9) To draw up a "Health Service Bill."

### 11. Social Affairs

(1) To combat unemployment and raise the economic and social standard of workmen, to safeguard their rights and provide cheap sanitary residential quarters to workmen and junior State officials.

(2) To build modern villages in the country and improve drinking water.

(3) To encourage and assist clubs and associations.

(4) To undertake a general census.

(5) To establish co-operative societies.

(6) To encourage and direct unions.

(7) To improve the jails and the condition of prisoners.

### 12. Aqaf Affairs

To improve the condition of Aqaf.

E 3689/3116/93

No. 14

## IRAQI-TRANSJORDAN TREATY OF BROTHERHOOD AND ALLIANCE

### Speech by Iraqi Foreign Minister

*Sir H. Stanshew-Bird to Mr. Beein. (Received 9th May)*

(No. 134) *Bagdad, 23rd April, 1947*  
Sir,

With reference to Amman telegram to you No. 121 of 12th April, which summarised the provisions of the draft Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance between Iraq and Transjordan, I now forward a translation of the treaty as signed in Bagdad on 14th April.

2. In announcing to Parliament the signature of the treaty, the Iraqi Foreign Minister spoke as follows:—

"In view of the ties of brotherhood and racial relations existing between Iraq and the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan, I am very glad to announce to the High Assembly the news of the

registration of these ties and relations in the shape of a Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance between Iraq and the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan, on the basis of articles 2 and 9 of the Covenant of the League of Arab States and on the lines of the Treaty of Alliance and Brotherhood concluded between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen. After carrying out negotiations which terminated this morning I signed this treaty in the name of the Iraqi Government at 10 o'clock this morning. It was also signed by his Excellency Samir al Rifa'i Pasha, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan.



" This treaty will be submitted to your High Assembly for ratification. I do not wish to enter into its details, which will be made known to your High Assembly and the Iraqi people in the near future.

" I only wish to say most frankly and assuredly that it will put a final end to the malicious reports and calumniations of intriguers concerning the rumours spread about it that it will involve Iraq in financial and military undertakings.

" In this connexion I wish to point out that the policy being pursued by Iraqi Governments in their relations with sister Arab States is a policy of construction and co-operation based on brotherhood and exchange of interests in execution of the principles of the Covenant of the League of Arab States."

3. It will be seen that the treaty follows very closely the text of the treaty concluded between Iraq and Saudi Arabia in 1936. In fact, many of the clauses are textually identical. The only important difference is article 9, which provides for the appointment of permanent committees with executive powers, especially in regard to articles 5, 6 and 7, which relate to military institutions and defence. This article might be held to envisage the setting up of a Joint Defence Council for Iraq and Transjordan. I will report to you in due course any steps which may be taken to implement it. (It is perhaps significant that the Regent, on his visit to Amman, which preceded the drafting of the treaty, was accompanied not only by Nuri Pasha but by his Minister for Defence.)

4. The treaty has aroused no enthusiasm and much criticism here. It is felt, I have little doubt correctly, that it has been foisted on Iraq by King Abdullah, before whom the Regent, with the connivance of Nuri Pasha, weakly gave way. The treaty will probably arouse resentment in Syria and Saudi Arabia, and I have done my best to induce the Iraqi Government to emphasise to the representatives of those countries that there is no evil intent.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch, with enclosures, to His Majesty's representatives in Angora, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem and British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER-BIRD

Enclosure in No. 14

[Translation]

In the Name of God the Merciful the  
Compassionate

*Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance  
between the Kingdom of Iraq and the  
Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan*

His Majesty the King of Iraq, and his  
Majesty the King of the Hashimite King-  
dom of Transjordan:

In view of the brotherly ties and racial  
unity binding them, desirous of safeguard-  
ing the integrity of their territories, having  
regard to the necessity which they feel for  
close co-operation and complete under-  
standing in regard to matters affecting the  
interests of their kingdoms, and in execu-  
tion of article 9 of the Charter of the  
League of Arab States, have agreed to con-  
clude a Treaty of Brotherhood and  
Alliance, and for this purpose have  
appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of Iraq—

His Excellency Dr. Saiyid Muhammad  
Fadhil al Jamali, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.

His Majesty the King of the Hashimite  
Kingdom of Transjordan—

His Excellency Sameer Pasha al  
Rifa'i, Prime Minister and Minister  
for Foreign Affairs.

Who, having reciprocally communicated  
their full powers found in due form, have  
entered into an alliance and have concluded  
the following treaty:—

#### ARTICLE 1

There shall be perpetual ties of brother-  
hood and alliance between the Kingdom  
of Iraq and the Hashimite Kingdom of  
Transjordan, and the two high contracting  
parties shall consult together when neces-  
sary with a view to furthering the objects  
set forth in the preamble to this treaty.

#### ARTICLE 2

Each of the high contracting parties  
reciprocally undertakes not to enter with  
any third party into any understanding or  
agreement over any matter whatever of a  
nature prejudicial to the interests of the  
other high contracting party or to his

country or its interests, or of a nature cal-  
culated to expose to danger or harm the  
safety or interests of his country.

#### ARTICLE 3

The high contracting parties undertake  
to settle any dispute arising between them  
by means of friendly negotiations.

#### ARTICLE 4

Should any dispute between either high  
contracting party and a third State pro-  
duce a situation involving a threat of war,  
in that case the high contracting parties  
shall jointly endeavour to settle such dis-  
pute by peaceful means in accordance with  
such international pledges as may be appli-  
cable to the case.

#### ARTICLE 5

(a) In the event of an act of aggression  
being committed against either high con-  
tracting party by a third State, notwith-  
standing efforts exerted in accordance with  
the provisions of article 4 above, and  
similarly in the event of the occurrence of  
a sudden act of aggression which does not  
leave time for the application of the pro-  
visions of article 4 above, the high con-  
tracting parties shall consult together  
regarding the measures which should be  
taken to concert their efforts to repel and  
drive back such aggression.

(b) The following shall be deemed acts  
of aggression:—

- (1) The declaration of war.
- (2) The seizure, by an armed force of a  
third State, of territory belonging to  
either high contracting party, even  
without a declaration of war.
- (3) An attack on the territory, land,  
naval or air forces of either high  
contracting party by the land, naval  
or air forces of a third State, even  
without a declaration of war.
- (4) Direct or indirect support or assis-  
tance to the aggressor.

(c) The following shall not be deemed  
acts of aggression:—

- (1) The exercise of the right of legiti-  
mate defence, i.e., resisting any act  
of aggression as defined above.
- (2) Action undertaken in enforcement of  
the provisions of the United Nations  
Charter.

#### ARTICLE 6

In the event of the outbreak of distur-  
bances or disorders in the territory of one

of the high contracting parties each of  
them undertakes reciprocally as follows:—

(a) To take all possible arrangements or  
measures:—

- (1) To make it impossible for the insur-  
gents to utilise his territory against  
the interests of the other high con-  
tracting party; and
- (2) To prevent his subjects from taking  
part in the disturbances or dis-  
orders or from helping or encourag-  
ing the insurgents; and
- (3) To prevent any kind of help being  
given to the insurgents either  
directly from his own country or  
otherwise.

(b) In the event of insurgents from the  
territory of one of the high contracting  
parties taking refuge in the territory of  
the other high contracting party, the latter  
shall disarm them and surrender them to  
the other party.

(c) If circumstances should necessitate  
the adoption of joint arrangements or  
measures to suppress disturbances or dis-  
orders, the two high contracting parties  
shall consult with each other concerning the  
policy of co-operation which shall be fol-  
lowed for this purpose.

#### ARTICLE 7

The two high contracting parties will co-  
operate with a view to unifying the mili-  
tary systems of their two countries by  
means of the exchange of military missions  
to study the systems followed in their  
respective countries, and to seek to obtain  
benefit from their respective military insti-  
tutions and the training and instruction  
which is available in them.

#### ARTICLE 8

The diplomatic or consular representa-  
tives of either high contracting party may,  
if requested, undertake the representation  
of the interests of the other high con-  
tracting party in foreign countries where such  
other party has no representatives.

This shall not in any way affect the free-  
dom of such other party to appoint separate  
representatives of his own should he so  
desire.

#### ARTICLE 9

Special permanent committees with  
executive powers from representatives of  
the two kingdoms shall be appointed, the  
competence of which shall be to ensure  
and put into force actual co-operation



between the two high contracting parties in all matters provided for in article 2 of the Charter of the League of Arab States, and also to carry out the requirements of the provisions of articles 5, 6 and 7 of this treaty.

#### ARTICLE 10

There is nothing in this treaty to contradict the rights and obligations arising from treaties with which each of the two high contracting parties is bound with any other State.

#### ARTICLE 11

This treaty shall come into force from the date on which its ratifications are exchanged.

#### ARTICLE 12

This treaty shall remain in force for a period of ten years from the date of its coming into force. It shall be deemed to

have been renewed automatically for further periods of five years each unless notice of desire to terminate it shall have been given by either high contracting party to the other one year prior to the date of expiry of its period. On the expiry of the first period, or any other following period of renewal, either high contracting party may demand the reconsideration and revision of this treaty for the purpose of furthering the co-operation and consolidating the alliance in a manner more than what is provided therein.

In confirmation whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Bagdad, in duplicate, in Arabic, this 22nd day of Jamad al Awwal, 1366, corresponding to the 14th day of April, 1947.

E 4162/3116/93

No. 15

### IRAQI-TRANSJORDAN TREATY

*Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Mr. Bevin. (Received 16th May)*

(No. 449)  
(Telegraphic)

*Bagdad,  
16th May, 1947.*

Transjordan-Iraqi Treaty passed the Senate yesterday by 17 votes to 1. It had previously passed Chamber of Deputies by 87 to 2.

E 4853/3/93

No. 16

### INTERVIEW WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER

*Mr. Bevin to Sir H. Stonehewer Bird (Bagdad)(<sup>1</sup>)*

(No. 217)

*Foreign Office,*

*Sir, 13th June, 1947*

I transmit to your Excellency herewith a record of my interview with Dr. Jamali, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 2nd June.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

Enclosure in No. 16

*Record of Interview with Dr. Jamali  
(Iraqi Foreign Minister)*

The Secretary of State saw Dr. Jamali for half an hour this morning. Mr. Butler

was also present. Dr. Jamali congratulated the Secretary of State on his speech at Margate; he said that he had been in New York for the Palestine dispute. He still thought that it was for the United States and British Governments to settle the question. The Secretary of State replied that this was an issue, perhaps the only one, on which the United States Government had failed to give us the help that they should. He referred Dr. Jamali to his words at Margate and said that the difficulty was the Zionists in America; if he had had to deal only with British Jews he thought that he could have got an arrangement which the Arab States would not have

(<sup>1</sup>) A similar despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Representative in Cairo (No. 408).

thought too bad. Mr. Butler asked Dr. Jamali what he thought of the composition of the Commission of Investigation set up by the Special Assembly. Dr. Jamali replied that he had reason to believe that perhaps four of those who would compose the commission were already committed to pro-Zionist views; but did not indicate who they were. He emphasised that if the commission decided to concern itself with the position of Jewish displaced persons outside Palestine, this might impel the Arab States to boycott the commission, which ought to restrict itself to its one subject, namely, Palestine. (Mr. Butler said that our delegation in New York had this point in mind.)

2. The Secretary of State emphasised that it would be a very great mistake if the Arab States boycotted this commission set up by the United Nations. A boycott impressed others unfavourably. The Jews had done much to damage their case with public opinion here by declining to take part in the conference in London.

3. The conversation turned to the recent military talks in Bagdad on the military aspects of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Mr. Bevin said that our representatives' report had not yet reached us. Dr. Jamali said that the Iraqi Government was confronted by two conflicting principles. First, they had the obvious duty of ensuring the security of their country for which they desired our help. Secondly, they were pressed from both wings, the Right and the Communists, that it was derogatory to Iraq to have foreign troops in occupation on their soil. The Secretary of State replied that the defence of the Middle East might be fundamentally affected by what was decided in India in the course of the next few days. Mr. Butler suggested that Arab support for the Egyptian Government in their wish to clear us out of Egypt before alternative arrangements had been made was not conducive to security in the Middle East. Dr. Jamali quoted Nokrashi as having said that he was a friend of ours and had prevented anti-British feeling developing much more violently. The Secretary of State replied that he was convinced that the Egyptian Government had not wanted to give him a treaty. In his Margate speech he had given Nokrashi

another opening, if he wished it, for approaching us again.

4. The Secretary of State said that in his view security and stability could be powerfully assisted by economic means. If the Iraqi Government could get going a big development plan which would eventually bring their comparatively small population up to some 20 million, this by itself would have a big stabilising effect. A bold development plan with that ultimate objective would hit the headlines and impress opinion especially in the United States, where the ordinary man had no true conception at all of present-day Arabs. Mr. Bevin said that he had ventured to show Mr. Marshall in Moscow a copy of Mr. Haigh's report. Mr. Marshall had been interested and had said that it was sometimes preferable for such developments to be carried out between the Government concerned and private companies or corporations rather than between Governments.

5. Dr. Jamali said that he had spoken to Dr. Dean Acheson and Mr. Henderson at the State Department about the possibilities of American help, and with their concurrence had made a preliminary approach to the International Bank for assistance which had been well received. He had made it clear that he hoped that American experts would combine with our own in producing a bold plan on the lines of the T.V.A., but that he wished to get materials as far as possible from his ally, the United Kingdom. Mr. Butler said that Sir Alexander Gibb and Company had offered to produce an overall plan of development for the Iraqi Government; that he had found opinion in Bagdad to be that such a plan would need to be put through by stages in view of the limited man-power and other resources available to Iraq. Dr. Jamali commented that Iraq had suffered hitherto from development having been too slow, and the Secretary of State emphasised the necessity for bold and far-reaching plans.

6. Dr. Jamali asked for, and was given, a copy of the Secretary of State's speech at Margate.

(Signed) N. M. BUTLER.

*2nd June, 1947.*



## CONVERSATION WITH DR. JAMALI (IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER)

*Mr. Bevin to Sir H. Stanshewer-Bird (Bagdad)*(No. 258)  
Sir,*Foreign Office,  
18th July, 1947*

I saw Dr. Jamali for half an hour this morning, 11th July. He began by referring to the negotiations over the Iraqi Sterling Balances. He said that a large measure of agreement had been reached, but that a point was outstanding in connexion with the provisions as to the rate of interest to be charged and the method by which it should be paid. The point was essentially one of presentation. I consulted Mr. Iliff, and agreed with Dr. Jamali that Mr. Iliff should clear this point up without delay with Ibrahim el Kabir, the principal Iraqi expert, and that they should report in the course of the day. I said that I had kept in constant touch with the negotiations, and that I could not press the Chancellor of the Exchequer to go any further. On broad grounds I earnestly hoped that the Iraqi Government would accept the agreement reached here. Dr. Jamali affirmed his desire for an agreement. Later in the day Mr. Iliff reported that the Treasury and the Iraqi Delegation had worked out an agreement satisfactory to both sides which the Iraqi Delegation were telegraphing to Bagdad with a strong recommendation that their Government should approve it.

2. Dr. Jamali then spoke to me of the Regent's forthcoming visit and of a pledge given by the Iraqi Prime Minister to the Iraqi Parliament that the Government would seek a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The Regent was anxious to have talks on this subject in August. I explained that my whole programme as regards bringing up-to-date the arrangements for the defence of the Middle East had been put back a year by the failure of the Egyptian Government to accept the proposals that I had worked out with Sidky Pasha, notably that for a Joint Defence Board after our troops had evacuated Egypt. I was still ready to negotiate with some Egyptian Government on these lines, but it must be realised that

what was then proposed must be modified in the light of this loss of nearly a year. For the present, I had to stand on the solid basis of the 1936 Treaty. All this reacted on Iraq. Had I got my arrangements with the Egyptians, it would have been timely to begin thinking about modifying the military arrangements in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. I did not favour armies of occupation, and was only too glad to replace them by effective arrangements that would not make inconvenient precedents. I hoped, however, that any modifications that the Iraqis had to suggest would be modest ones. I foresaw a period of danger until 1951: it would be a tragedy if the Iraqis or the Egyptians took a line *vis-à-vis* ourselves that made this period more dangerous. Dr. Jamali assented warmly to this.

3. He then told me that he had just received a telegram from his Prime Minister suggesting that if talks in August were impossible they might be held in October. I said that I had no wish to stall over this, but that the programme of work before me made it likely that the winter would be the earliest convenient time. I would be very ready to listen to anything that the Regent might have to say to me quite informally in August, but would deprecate his bringing experts. In particular we did not want a repetition of what had happened as regards Egypt. Dr. Jamali again assented warmly to this.

4. I mentioned confidentially to Dr. Jamali that waterways were a delicate subject and that I found that anything mooted as regards the Suez Canal was liable to be applied by the Soviet Government to its pretensions as regards the Dardanelles. My effort had been to avoid any specific reference to the Canal and to give the Anglo-Egyptian arrangement a regional character that would not prejudice things between the Soviet and Turkey.

5. Dr. Jamali said that he had two further points to raise with me, Palestine and irrigation plans for Iraq. It was agreed that as I was overdue for a Cabinet

meeting he should discuss these points with my experts.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Angora, to the Head of the British

Middle East Office and to His Majesty's Ministers at Beirut, Damascus, Jedda and Amman.

I am, &amp;c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

E 7155/7155/93

No. 18

## HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS IN IRAQ, 1947

*Mr. Busk to Mr. Bevin. (Received 7th August)*(No. 266. Confidential)  
Sir,*Bagdad, 25th July, 1947*

With reference to His Majesty's Ambassador's despatch No. 282 (E 7301/654/93) of 31st July, 1946, I have the honour herewith to transmit to you an annual report for 1947 on the heads of foreign missions in Iraq.

I have, &amp;c.

DOUGLAS L. BUSK.

Enclosure in No. 18

*Report on the Heads of Foreign Missions in  
Bagdad, 1947*

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports)

**Afghanistan**

Abdur Rahman Khan, minister (21st October, 1941).

A friendly and amiable colleague. He has served in Bombay and Paris and has travelled extensively in Europe and Russia. Has by now established a fairly wide circle of friends in Iraq. In 1947 he was appointed Afghan Minister at Amman in addition to Bagdad, but he continues to reside here. He is married to an attractive wife, who makes infrequent appearances in society. Can be very interesting when he chooses.

**Egypt**

Mohammed Yasin Beg, minister (11th October, 1945).

Also accredited to Transjordan in 1947, but continues to reside in Bagdad. An agreeable and more than usually hospitable colleague. He appears to be genuinely well-disposed towards us and he and all his secretaries are members of the chief British Club, where they are often seen.

**Holy See**

M. de Jonghe d'Ardeye left in July 1947 for Batavia to open an Apostolic Delegation, and has not yet been replaced.

**Persia**

M. Mohsen Rais, left Bagdad in May 1947 and has since been promoted to be Persian Ambassador in London. In his absence the legation is in charge of the counsellor, M. A. Keiwani. The Persians are understood to be contemplating the elevation of the legation to an embassy.

**Saudi Arabia**

Abdullah al Khayyal, minister (9th February, 1947).

After a period in the legation as a secretary and then as secretary-in-charge, Abdullah al Khayyal was appointed minister in February 1947. He is friendly and intelligent, a genuine Saudi from Riyadh and, since being in Bagdad, has taken the trouble to learn to speak some English. He frequently consults me on Saudi-Iraqi relations.

**Soviet Union**

Grigori Titovitch Zaitzev, minister (14th February, 1945).

\*M. Zaitzev is still here, but neither he nor his staff appear much in society. I suspect that the Iraqis regret having let him come here and prefer to see as little of him as possible. He is very affable when we meet, but, as we have no common interests and he is obviously forbidden to talk on any subject but the weather, I cannot say that our relations are really intimate. (Written in 1946.)

**Syria**

Afi as Solh, minister (25th April, 1947).

Diplomatic relations were established with Syria for the first time in 1945 by the establishment of a Syrian Legation in Bagdad and the appointment of a first secretary and *chargé d'affaires ad interim*. He also assumed charge of Syrian and Lebanese consular interests in Iraq.

Afi as Solh and I exchanged calls after his appointment in 1947. After about a month's residence he left again for Damascus to take part in the Syrian elections, and I hardly feel that we can take him very seriously as Syrian representative here. The real work continues to be done by the original first secretary, Baha Edin al Bakri.

**Transjordan**

Omar Zaki el-Afyouni, minister (7th October, 1946).

Omar Zaki Beg has a long connexion with Iraq, having been Kalimakam of Kut in 1916. He later accompanied General Maude to Bagdad. After a considerable period as consul he was promoted minister in October 1946. Though not a man of any remarkable ability, he is a loyal servant of Transjordan (although by birth a Lebanese) and a firm supporter of Britain. He has always shown himself most friendly to us. He has a French wife, who appears little in public, and himself speaks French with greater facility than English.

**Turkey**

M. Nebil Bati, minister (17th March, 1945).

\*M. Bati has proved a friendly and intelligent colleague. He handled with tact and dignity the



difficult situation arising from Nuri Pasha's unauthorised signing of the Iraqi-Turkish Agreement. (Written in 1946.)

#### United States

Mr. George Wadsworth, ambassador (15th February, 1947).

Mr. Wadsworth, who presented his credentials as first American Ambassador to Iraq on 15th February, 1947, is a 2-handicap golfer and a bridge-player of considerable skill. Born in 1898, he joined the staff of the American University at Beirut in 1914, but transferred into Government service in 1915. He has had great experience of the Middle East and speaks both Arabic and French. Has been twice married and twice widowed. Has two children living in the States and himself shows every sign of developing the inconsiderate domestic habits of the bachelor. He works hard and without regard for his staff, looks on every invitation as a sub-jornal, and entertains with more generosity than discrimination. He is a great talker and something of a bore who is more interested in his own opinions than in those of others. He has not so far succeeded in making himself very popular with the Iraqi Government.

*Representatives Accredited to the Iraqi Government but Resident Elsewhere*

#### Belgium

Count Geoffrey d'Aspremont-Lynden, minister (June 1947).

The minister resides in Beirut. He paid a flying visit to Bagdad in June to present his credentials, but did not stay long enough to permit any estimate of his qualities. M. Laurent Janssen, who now resides here permanently, continues as chargé d'affaires.

#### China

There is at present no minister accredited to the Iraqi Government, but Mr. Lee Ginfa, who has been chargé d'affaires since July 1946, continues to show himself perfectly capable of performing the duties required of him. He has an attractive wife, is a member of the English Club, where he is frequently seen, and is deservedly known and liked.

#### Czechoslovakia

M. Miroslav Kudrat, minister (11th December, 1946).

The minister resides in Tehran and there is no Czech representative in Bagdad.

#### Denmark

There is no Danish Minister accredited to the Iraqi Government at present. Count Schack replaced Dr. Fensmark as chargé d'affaires, residing in Tehran, in May 1947, but has not so far appeared in Bagdad. I was visited in May by his ponderous attaché, M. von Stenmann.

#### France

M. Gabriel Bonérand reopened the French Legation in November 1946 as chargé d'affaires. He is only in Bagdad temporarily until the minister-designate, M. Balay, arrives and the Free City of Trieste is established, to which M. Bonérand has been appointed French Consul-General. He is a didactic bore, who suffers from an inferiority complex. He has tried to be pleasant in his occasional dealings with us, but has offended the Iraqis more than once by his abruptness.

#### Poland

In July 1946 M. Eugeniusz Jan Milnikiel announced that he had been accredited to the Iraqi Government as chargé d'affaires and would reside at Tehran. He does in fact reside at Tehran, but the Ministry for Foreign Affairs state that he has never presented his credentials and that there is no Pole accredited to the Iraqi Government. He called on me last year, when he appeared friendly. He speaks moderate English.

#### Sweden

M. Pousette having been recalled, M. Bengt Ohlner is acting as chargé d'affaires. He lives in Tehran and I have never met him.

#### Switzerland

M. A. Brunner, minister (1st May, 1946).  
\*M. Brunner resides in Cairo. From what I have seen of him he seems a solid and worthy man. But the Swiss have very little to do here now and I do not know why they bother to keep a full-time career consul, the agreeable but melancholy M. Steiner, in Bagdad. (Written in 1946.)

which is promised in part 2 of their programme but has so far received very little attention. It seems, therefore, a favourable opportunity to survey the achievement of the Government of the first Shia Prime Minister of Iraq, Saleh Jabr, and to attempt an estimate of the strength and weakness of his political situation.

3. The main measures passed through Parliament had of necessity to be economic or financial in character and included the passing of the budget, the first since 1945. (In the interim provision had been made for carrying on the Government by a series of monthly provisional budget laws.) The contents of the budget will be reported shortly, and it is only necessary to mention here that it raises the salaries of officials, an important prerequisite of any serious effort to combat corruption. It also provides for the appointment of a considerable number of British technical experts. Other important financial measures passed during the late session included the Law setting up a National Bank and Capital Works Ordinances for the Railways, the Port of Basra and the Fao Dredging Scheme. In social affairs a useful Bill has been passed to compel owners of the larger industrial undertakings to provide housing for their workers. In the field of foreign affairs the Iraqi treaties with Turkey and Transjordan, both of which were subjected to strong criticism, inside and outside Parliament, and the extradition agreement with the Yemen, were ratified. It will be seen that much of the Government's programme has yet to be presented to Parliament in the form of draft laws. Part 2 (internal policy) has only been tackled in its negative aspect by the introduction of the Draft Emergency Law reported in my despatch No. 251 of 14th July, 1947. The debate on this law has been wisely postponed. Little has been done to implement the Government's programme in economic affairs and nothing in education. Preparatory work on the Tharthar flood control scheme is going forward and efforts are being made to enlarge and improve the Medical College.

4. In reading through the proceedings of Parliament as reported in the press one gains two strong impressions. The first is that although all Bills are passed by large majorities, the great bulk of the speeches are from the Opposition side. The second is that no subject is dealt with on its merits, but is used merely as a peg on which to hang an attack on the Govern-

ment and on their alleged subservience to the British. An interesting though perhaps incomplete explanation of the working of Parliament was given to a member of my staff by a former Deputy and member of the Nationalist Democratic Party. He said that in every Parliament there is a *bloc* of about fifty tribal Deputies, who seldom or never speak and who vote in accordance with the wishes of the Palace. Some ten or fifteen city Deputies can be relied on to do the same. The remaining sixty odd may be called the politically-minded section of Parliament (in this Parliament their numbers are probably less), which will be divided between friends and enemies of the Government in power. It is thus by the maintenance of the support of the Palace, or by its withdrawal, that Governments rise and fall. This explanation is probably an over-simplification of the true state of affairs, but I am satisfied it reflects an important aspect of the truth. It will be clear that since nationalism is unfortunately still the greatest single political motive in Iraq, the politically-minded sections of Parliament, comprising, as is inevitable, the younger, more active and better educated members, should interlard their speeches with attacks on the too great dependence of the reigning Government on British advice. It is also to be expected that, being without responsibility, they should bid for popular support by clamouring for the removal of the slights to Iraqi *amour-propre* represented by such institutions as the Railway Board, the British Advisory Military Mission, the Port Directorate and so on. To these attacks few Governments have the courage to reply, but it is pleasant to be able to point to one forthright defence by the Prime Minister, in the debate on the Railway Capital Works Ordinance on 22nd May, of his Government's policy of engaging foreign experts.

5. While the Government cannot be said to have consolidated its position during the months it has been in office, it has not been seriously weakened. Apart from the Premier there is no Minister who carries much personal political weight and against more than one there is the strong suspicion of misusing their position. Too much should not be made of the smell of corruption which hangs around most Middle Eastern politicians of ministrable status, but if it is unaccompanied by personal ability or political influence it can be

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No. 19

### INTERNAL SITUATION IN IRAQ: MEASURES PASSED THROUGH PARLIAMENT

*Mr. Busk to Mr. Benin. (Received 7th August)*

(No. 278)

Sir,  
Bagdad, 31st July, 1947  
I have the honour to refer to His Majesty's Ambassador's despatch No. 127 of 15th April and to report that the Extraordinary Session of the Iraqi Parliament, which met on 17th March, 1947, closed on 19th July. Parliament will remain in recess until 1st December unless summoned by the Regent before that date

to decide specific matters. It was originally the Prime Minister's intention to summon the Majlis in October to discuss his supplementary budget for economic development. He now doubts whether his plans will be ready before December.

2. The Government have now a breathing space from the criticism of Parliament and will be able to devote their whole attention to administration, the improvement of



dangerous for a Government when it grows too strong. Makram Pasha's Black Book played some part in the downfall of so able and popular a Prime Minister as Nahas Pasha. The present Government in Iraq does not feel itself to be on firm ground, and this fear is betrayed by the appeals frequently made to me for understanding of the difficult position in which the Government finds itself, which, it is argued, requires from His Majesty's Government a specially generous attitude. This argument has been used to explain the hesitation and vacillation which has characterised the attitude of the Iraqi Government to questions such as the Egyptian appeal to U.N.O. and the recognition of the Republic of Indonesia.

6. The present Iraqi Government attaches great importance to a generous settlement of the sterling balances and to a satisfactory outcome, from the point of view of Iraq (or, more precisely, that of the Opposition), to any preliminary conversations that may take place this autumn on the question of treaty revision. It is, I think, true to say that the reason for this is one of internal politics rather than any settled views on the merits of the treaty. On this question it is, perhaps, of interest to record that Nuri Pasha, speaking in the Senate on the question of claiming from His Majesty's Government part of the costs of the Sinn el Dhibban channel for the Habbaniyah flood control scheme, said that it was hardly worth while to press for this since Iraq would soon take over the Royal Air Force Treaty Base at Habbaniyah.

7. Turning from the Government to the Opposition, which bulks so large in Ministerial minds, it consists of three main elements; for, in spite of persistent rumours which were very strong immediately after the election, there have been no effective steps to form a united *bloc* which would join all Opposition groups in a concerted onslaught on the Government. Nor, indeed, do I consider it probable that such discordant elements could ever coalesce. The first and most important element is made up of tried politicians of weight and influence who find themselves out of office. To this group must be added the Liberal Party, now led by Saad Salih, an ex-Minister, who is the rival of the present Prime Minister for influence among the Shia tribes of the Middle Euphrates area. The great majority of this group are now summering outside

Iraq, but we must expect in the autumn a political campaign which may prove dangerous for the Government. Although I am by no means entirely convinced of the truth of stories hinting that this group of politicians have anti-Royalist tendencies, I should be failing in my duty if I did not report that such rumours are in circulation. If there is any truth in them the blame must in part be attached to a characteristic of His Royal Highness the Regent, which was described in a minute by the last oriental counsellor, Mr. Perowne. He wrote: "... once His Royal Highness has written anyone off they stay written off." This characteristic may, I do not put it higher than that, have led some of those who regard themselves rightly or wrongly as distrusted by the Regent to feel that their only hope of again tasting the sweets of office lies in desperate courses.

8. It is not easy to draw the dividing line between the second element in the Opposition, the so-called Leftist parties, and the Communists proper, who form the third element. The Iraqi Government tends not to make any distinction between them. In this it is justified to the extent that the parties are penetrated by true Communists, but since the discovery by the police of the underground Communist Party, reported in my despatch No. 27 of 25th January, 1947, and the trials of its members, the distinction has become easier to make. Not to make this distinction is unwise to the extent that the more moderate Leftist parties enjoy the sympathy of those educated elements on which Government must rely to make the machinery of the Administration work. Moreover, it is the Government's own policy which is tending to push the latter into the arms of the former. Thus, though it is true that some of the parties are probably penetrated by communism, and all are more nationalistic ('anti-imperialist') than the politicians of the old school, their main idea in the field of domestic policy are reformist and directed towards the cleansing of Government machinery and division of the big estates. For the moment neither of these elements represent an immediate threat to the Government of Saleh Jabr.

9. To sum up, the present Government has made a slow and shaky start on its programme of economic development, but it has made no serious effort so far to reform the administration or the courts,

without which any effective economic development will be gravely hampered. This is not entirely the fault of the Government. There was a mass of legislation to be enacted owing to the delay in the elections, and the Prime Minister is entitled to praise for the way he has forced legislation through. No Majlis has ever been so ruthlessly driven or worked so fast.

10. The Government has adopted an intolerant attitude towards Opposition elements, which is probably unwise. In the autumn or winter it will face a political campaign which will perhaps be assisted by any Palestine settlement unfavourable to the Arabs, and by the wide currency which the Egyptian periodical press, much read in this country, will be giving to malignant criticism of imperialism. The Government is probably hoping to meet and defeat this campaign by pointing to a successful outcome of the exploratory talks on treaty revision and by publicising its schemes for economic development which should by then be on paper.

11. Every Iraqi agrees that the frequent changes of Government which have characterised Iraqi political life over the past quarter of a century have been unfortunate, and that continuity and stability are essential to orderly progress, but in spite of the efforts of His Majesty's Ambassador and the staff of this embassy the Opposition clings to the view that the present Government (as has been the case with all Iraqi Governments and Oppositions) is insufficiently representative to carry through a programme of reform and development. In its present form this may be true, but we have in the Prime Minister a sincere and hardworking patriot and one who ought to be given an opportunity to put his programme into effect. I miss no opportunity of urging on him the need for strengthening his Government by filling the vacant seats in the Ministries of the Interior and Economics. Equally I try to impress on the Opposition that the true interests of Iraq require that Saleh Jabr should be given sufficient time to carry out

the main features of his programme, which in essentials does not differ from that advocated by his opponents.

12. In these troublous times political prophecy is dangerous anywhere. In Iraq it would be daring indeed to attempt it owing to the personal nature of the political set-up. Continuity of Government is certainly in our interests as much as in Iraqis, but I would not care to hazard a guess whether Saleh Jabr will be able to stay in office long enough to see his plans through. It is my hope that he will at least be able to survive the next parliamentary session (*i.e.*, until this time next year). If he can do this he should have been able to start a large number of economic schemes and administrative reforms and have invested considerable sums in them. This will go far to commit his successor, whoever he may be.

13. Meanwhile the Prime Minister's team, and therefore his position, are weak. He will use this argument in attempting to obtain concessions from us, which he can use to prove to the Iraqi public the value of the British alliance and the "nationalistic" way in which he conducts affairs. For my part I have yet to meet the Arab who is really lastingly grateful for concessions—the same might be said of many other races—and in this part of the world the moral of the "Voyage de M. Perrichon" still remains true—you will win a man's esteem not by saving his life but by letting him save yours. Nevertheless, it would be heart-breaking if another change of Government within a year were to delay Iraq's economic development still further. I hope, therefore, that the difficulties of the Prime Minister's position will be sympathetically considered. While I would not advocate concessions on points of major British interest, I hope that we shall be able to meet him in smaller matters.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

DOUGLAS L. BUSK.



## TRANSJORDAN-IRAQ TREATY

*Mr. Pirie-Gordon to Mr. Berin. (Received 8th August)*

(No. 80)  
Sir,

Amman,  
28th July, 1947

I have the honour to refer to Sir Alec Kirkbride's despatch No. 37 of 15th April, 1947, and to enclose a copy<sup>(1)</sup> of No. 909 of the *Official Gazette* of the Transjordan Government containing the Arabic text of the Transjordan-Iraq Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance. I also enclose translation made by the legal and economic expert to the Transjordan Government.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch together with a copy of the second enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

C. M. PIRIE-GORDON.

Enclosure in No. 20

*Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance  
between Transjordan and Iraq*

Hereunder is published the text of the Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance made at the city of Bagdad, on 22nd of Jemadil Aulā 1366/14th April, 1947, between the Kingdoms of Transjordan and the Kingdom of Iraq, after ratification by both Governments.

"ABDULLAH IBN EL HUSSEIN."

We, Abdullah Ibn El Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan,

Whereas the Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance was concluded between us and His Majesty the King of Iraq, and was signed in the City of Bagdad on 22nd day of Jemadil Aulā 1366/14th April 1947, on our behalf by our Plenipotentiary his Excellency the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Samir Pasha El Rifa'i, and by the Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Iraq Dr. sayed Mohd. Fadil El Jamali, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, duly authorised for this purpose, hereunder is the full text of the Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance:

*Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance  
between the Hashemite Kingdom of  
Transjordan and the Kingdom of Iraq.*

His Majesty the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan; His Majesty the King of Iraq;

In accordance with the brotherly relations and national unity that bind them, and for the sake of safeguarding their countries, and in accordance with the great necessity for close co-operation and full understanding between them regarding the affairs relating to their kingdoms; and in execution of article 9 of the Arab League Charter, agreed to conclude a treaty of brotherhood and alliance between them and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan:

His Excellency Samir Pasha El Rifa'i, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Majesty the King of Iraq:

His Excellency Dr. sayed Mohd. Fadil El Jamali, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Who, having communicated their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed on and concluded the following articles:—

ARTICLE 1

There shall be perpetual relations of Brotherhood and Alliance between the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan and the Kingdom of Iraq, and the high contracting parties shall consult each other when necessary for the execution of the object stated in the preamble hereof.

ARTICLE 2

Each of the high contracting parties undertakes not to make any understanding or agreement with a third party in respect of any matter detrimental to the interests

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

of the other high contracting party or to his kingdom or which exposes the safety of his kingdom or its interests to danger or damage.

ARTICLE 3

The two high contracting parties undertake to settle all differences arising between them by friendly negotiations.

ARTICLE 4

Should a dispute arise between either of the high contracting parties and a third State which threatens the danger of war breaking out, the high contracting parties shall unify their efforts to seek a solution by peaceful means in accordance with the international undertakings applicable to the case.

ARTICLE 5

(a) In case of an aggression on either of the high contracting parties by a third State in spite of the efforts exerted in accordance with the provisions of article 4 aforesaid, and also in case of a sudden aggression where there is no time to apply the provisions of article 4 aforesaid, the high contracting parties will concert together the necessary measures to consolidate their efforts to oppose such aggression.

(b) The following shall be regarded as acts of aggressions:—

- (1) Declaration of war.
- (2) The occupation by a third State by its armed forces of the territory of either of the high contracting parties even without a declaration of war.
- (3) The attack by a third State by its land, sea or air forces on the country of either of the high contracting parties or its land, sea or air forces even without a declaration of war.
- (4) The help or support of the aggressor directly or indirectly.

(c) The following shall not be regarded as acts of aggression:—

- (1) The right of legal defence, *i.e.*, of resisting any action of aggression as defined above.
- (2) Actions carried out in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations.

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ARTICLE 6

In the case of disturbances or riots in the country of either of the high contracting parties both shall undertake reciprocal action:—

(a) The measures or actions to be taken:—

- (1) To prevent the rebels from using its territory against the other high contracting party.
- (2) To prevent its people from taking part in the disturbances or riots or found helping or encouraging the rioters.
- (3) To prevent any kind of help from reaching the rioters through its country directly or indirectly.

(b) If the rioters seek shelter in the territory of either of the high contracting parties, the high contracting parties shall disarm and hand them over to the other party.

(c) If the case requires joint proceedings or measures to settle these disturbances or riots, both high contracting parties shall consult together on the method of co-operation which should be adopted for this purpose.

ARTICLE 7

The high contracting parties shall co-operate as for the unification of the military methods in their countries by the exchange of military missions for the study of the military methods adopted in both Kingdoms and for benefiting from the military schools and the training therein.

ARTICLE 8

The diplomatic and consular representatives of each of the high contracting parties shall represent the affairs of the other party when this is requested in foreign countries where such party is not represented.

But, this shall not be inconsistent with the freedom of such party from appointing independent representatives if he so desires.

ARTICLE 9

Permanent special committees with executive powers shall be appointed from representatives of both kingdoms, the jurisdiction of which shall be to make and execute co-operation in fact between both high contracting parties regarding all affairs specified in article 2 of the Arab



League Charter, and also to execute the provisions of articles 5, 6 and 7 of this treaty.

#### ARTICLE 10

Nothing in this treaty is inconsistent with the rights and duties arising from treaties by which either of the high contracting parties is bound with another State.

#### ARTICLE 11

This treaty shall be in force as from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

#### ARTICLE 12

This treaty shall remain in force for a period of ten years from the date of its coming into force. If either of the high contracting parties does not inform the other party of his desire to terminate the same one year before its expiration, it shall be considered to be automatically renewed for further periods each of five years. Either high contracting party at the expiration of the first period or at a subsequent period of the periods of renewal may request the re-consideration and the amendment of the treaty for the purpose of increasing the co-operation and strengthening the alliance to a greater extent than was therein provided.

and in confirmation whereof, the said delegates plenipotentiary have signed this treaty and sealed it with their seals.

Written at Bagdad in duplicate in Arabic 22nd day of Jemadil Aulā 1366/14th April, 1947.

After perusal and consideration of the said Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance,

We have agreed and confirmed its contents article by article and paragraph by paragraph and therefore We by this instrument declare Our consent to the same and confirm its execution by Us and on behalf of Our Heirs and Successors, undertaking and promising to carry it out loyally and faithfully: and We also undertake and promise that We will not as far as it is within Our power allow any breach at all of any articles or part thereof by any body whatsoever in any way.

Having confidence in the correctness of the treaty and authenticating the signature of Our Plenipotentiary, We ordered this instrument to be sealed and We signed it with Our Hashemite Hand.

Written at Our Raghadan Palace the 27th day of Jemadil Akhira, 1366/17th of May, 1947.

By order of His Majesty the King,  
SAMIR EL RIFAT,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

#### *Execution of the Transjordan-Iraqi Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance*

As the exchange of the decisions of ratification of the Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance between Transjordan and Iraq has been completed on the 22nd of Rajab, 1366/10th June, 1947, in accordance with the duly signed documents, it is hereby declared that this treaty, as provided in article 11 thereof, is in force as from the said date.

MOHD. ABBASS,  
Acting Prime Minister.

10th June, 1947.

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No. 21

### CONVERSATION WITH THE REGENT OF IRAQ

*Mr. Bevin to Mr. Busk (Bagdad)*

(No. 287)

Foreign Office,

18th August, 1947

Sir,

I received the Regent, Nuri Pasha and the Iraqi Ambassador to-day. I told them how glad I was to welcome them.

2. The Regent said that what was principally in the mind of the Iraqi Government was Treaty Revision. Their hope had been that the strategic problems involved might be dealt with by common

defence arrangements between all the Arab countries and Great Britain.

3. I told him that, as he knew, this had been my thought also, and I had hoped that the conclusion of a revised treaty between the United Kingdom and Egypt would pave the way for this. To my regret this hope had received a set-back owing to the attitude of the Egyptian Government. The Regent and Nuri Pasha interjected

that the action of the Egyptian Government had, in their view, been a mistake and that they believed that the bulk of opinion in Egypt was on the same lines.

4. I went on to say that, however that might be, the present status of the Egyptian and also of the Palestine question made it, in our view, unlikely that common defence talks with all the Arab countries could be entered into in the near future with any prospect of success. If, therefore, the Iraqi Government wished for talks with us on Treaty Revision in the near future, these would have to be bilateral. We would not refuse to consider bilateral negotiations, but, if there was to be a new treaty, it must be on a long-term basis which would be really satisfactory to both parties and therefore likely to be of a lasting character.

5. The Regent replied that the Iraqi Government were anxious either for a new agreement or for progress towards it by the time that the Iraqi Parliament re-assemble at the beginning of December. They appreciated that until the outcome of the Egyptian appeal to U.N.O. and the decision of the Assembly about Palestine were known it was difficult to make any plans, and that even then the atmosphere for common defence arrangements with all the Arab countries might be unfavourable. If that proved to be the case, the Iraqi Government would favour bilateral negotiations in October or November.

6. In reply to a question from Nuri Pasha about the future of Europe, I explained that November would be the critical month. The Four-Power Meeting in London would show whether agreement was possible with the Soviet Union about Germany and Austria. We

had not abandoned hope of agreement, but the result was unpredictable. If there were no agreement the division of Germany, roughly along the line of the Elbe, into a Soviet and other Zone or Zones would be stabilised. This division would be most regrettable, but there must be a decision one way or the other. On the other hand, if the economic unity of Germany was established the Slav frontier would be on the Oder.

7. The Regent and Nuri Pasha suggested, in the light of the above, that, subject always to a change of plans in the light of any developments over Egypt and Palestine, tentative arrangements might be made for the Iraqi Prime Minister to come to London in October for talks on Treaty Revision. Meanwhile, they had brought with them a draft showing on what lines their minds were working, and we might like to talk this over informally during the next few days. I informed them that I agreed, provided there was no publicity whatever at this stage. To this they assented. I emphasised that it might be unwise for the Prime Minister to come unless there were prospects of his visit proving successful, and repeated that we could only consider a new treaty on a long-term basis.

8. It was arranged that the Regent should talk over the Iraqi draft with us informally during the next few days.

9. The Regent said that he was pleased at the progress being made in obtaining equipment for the Iraqi army. I told him that I was doing my best to obtain economic experts for the Iraqi Government and he expressed his appreciation.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

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No. 22

### LEADING PERSONALITIES IN IRAQ, 1947

*Mr. Busk to Mr. Bevin. (Received 3rd September)*

(No. 501)

Sir,

Bagdad, 22nd August, 1947.

When reference to Sir Hugh Stenhouse Bird's despatch No. 401 of 25th November, 1946, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on the leading personalities of Iraq as on 1st August, 1947.

2. Last year's report has been brought up to date and the names of two newcomers to Cabinet rank have been added.

I have, &c.

DOUGLAS L. BUSK.

Enclosure in No. 22

Royal Family

#### 1. King Feisal II.

Born in Bagdad the 2nd May, 1935. Succeeded to the throne on the death of his father, Ghazi I, on the 3rd April, 1939. His mother is a sister of the Amir Abdul Ilah.

He and his mother were confined in the Qasr Zahur during most of May 1941, but were removed to the summer palace at Pir Mam (Ardal) just before Rashid Ali and his associates decamped. He is a



bright, intelligent child, though somewhat delicate with a tendency to asthma. His Majesty visited Egypt in April 1943, proceeding and returning via Palestine and Transjordan. In 1944 he again spent the summer at Alexandria. In 1945 he did not leave the country.

In June 1946 the King paid his first visit to England. He was present at the Victory celebrations on 8th June and afterwards was the guest of The King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. He was accompanied by the Queen-Mother and the Princesses. Early in 1946 an English tutor was appointed to succeed the governess who had previously been in charge of his studies. The Regent decided that, on his return from England, the King should start to learn Kurdish.

He returned to Bagdad on 8th October. There is reason to hope that his asthma has been reduced by treatment in the United Kingdom.

It has been decided that his Majesty shall continue his education in England. He will go to a preparatory school for one year and then to Brynaston. He and the Queen-Mother, who will stay in England with him, left Iraq at the end of July 1947.

His health has been better during the year and he shows promise.

## 2. *Abdul Ilah, His Royal Highness the Amir.*

Only son of Ali-bin-Hussain, ex-King of the Hejaz, who died in 1935. Born in the Hejaz 1912. Came to Bagdad as a child with father in 1926, after the latter's expulsion from the Hejaz. Educated partly at home and partly at Victoria College, Alexandria. He speaks good English.

In November 1936 he married in Bagdad the daughter of Salub-ul-Din Fauzi Beg and granddaughter of Amin Yahiyyah Pasha of Cairo.

He is keenly interested in Arab horse racing and maintains a large stable.

Became Regent on the death of King Ghazi on the 3rd April, 1939.

In November 1949 he was declared heir to the Throne under the provisions of an amendment to the Organic Law passed in October.

Divorced his wife in the summer of 1940.

During the Cabinet crisis of January 1941, which led to the fall of Rashid Ali's Cabinet, he endeavoured to resist the Prime Minister's demands for the appointment of new Ministers, but fled to Diwaniyah to escape the threats to his life made by the four army officers—Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, Kamal Shubib, Fakhri Saïd and Mahmud Salami. Rashid Ali thereupon resigned and Taha al Hashimi succeeded him. The Regent then returned to the capital.

During the night of the 1st April the four army commanders already mentioned occupied the city with their troops and went to the Palace to demand the resignation of Taha al Hashimi and the appointment of Rashid Ali as Prime Minister. The Regent was, however, warned in time, eluded them and took refuge in the American Legation. Thence he was smuggled out to Habbaniya on the 2nd April and flown to Basra. On instructions from Bagdad the Officer Commanding, Iraq army, at Basra attempted to arrest the Regent, who took refuge on board one of His Majesty's ships. By now any hope of rallying support for his cause in the south had been lost. On the 16th April he was flown to Jerusalem, together with Ali Joudat and Jamil Madfal, who had meanwhile joined him at Basra. During the hostilities in May the Regent remained in Palestine. He returned to Bagdad on the 1st June after the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime and was welcomed by a large gathering of officials, notables and well-wishers.

Since then, he has taken his public duties seriously and has done his best to establish his position among the people. He has undoubtedly developed in character during the past five years and has, on several occasions, shown marked firmness and powers of decision, but he lacks the personality which appeals to the imagination of the public and is painfully shy. Like all weak men he suffers from too much advice and is apt to believe the last person he has spoken to.

He was made an Honorary Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force in September 1943. He caused a Cabinet crisis in September 1943 by injudicious interference in the choice of Government candidates for the General Election. He has, however, shown sound sense in his desire to reform the Administration and improve the general condition of the country. At the invitation of His Majesty's Government the Regent paid an extensive visit to the United Kingdom in December 1943. For three days he was the guest of Their Majesties the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. He returned delighted with the hospitality shown to him and much impressed by Britain's war effort.

During 1944 the Regent toured extensively within the country and paid particular attention to the army manoeuvres which he constantly attended. In June he visited Alexandria, returning early in July. In September he again visited Transjordan and Egypt. He paid a second brief visit to Transjordan in February 1945.

In the spring of 1945 he was much discouraged by Mr. Churchill's failure to invite him to join King Ibn Saud and others for talks in Cairo. This led to a threat of abdication.

In May 1945 he left on an official visit to the United States, returning via Canada and Britain. In London he was twice received by the King, met the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and attended the Victory Thanksgiving Service. He also visited the occupied area of Germany. He returned via France and Italy, whence he proceeded on an official visit to the President of the Turkish Republic before returning to Iraq in September. While in the United States he displayed irresponsible extravagance, spending over \$200,000 on jewellery. He has also invested heavily, at the cost of grave indebtedness, in speculative industrial enterprises in Bagdad. All this is generally known and has markedly decreased his prestige, and may give rise to serious political complications.

In 1946 the Regent again visited London and was present at the Victory Celebrations on 8th June. He returned to Iraq at the end of July. He greatly enjoyed his visit and there is no doubt that he finds English life and methods increasingly congenial. This has its disadvantages from the Iraqi point of view.

He was widely accused of capricious interference in the elections of 1947 and is consequently unpopular in Reformist and Leftist circles. He maintains, however, his interest in and influence over the army, particularly the younger officers, a number of whom were sent to England during the summer of 1946.

There is no doubt that this step produced excellent results in that all the officers came back with pronounced pro-English views.

The Regent was created G.C.M.G. in 1942 and G.C.V.O., with the award of the Royal Victorian Chain, in 1943.

## 3. *Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir.*

Born in Constantinople in 1906. Youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz. Half-brother of King Ali, King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah (of Transjordan). His mother was a Turk. Educated in

Constantinople. Fought with the Arab Nationalist forces during the Great War, and won the good opinion of the British officers with the Sharifian army. Made a G.B.E. for his services in the war of 1914-18.

Came to live in Iraq in 1922, and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. Acted as Regent for a short time in 1924 during King Feisal's absence.

In 1925 he went to England and studied agriculture at Oxford for nearly three years. During this period he took an active part in the social life of the university and rowed in the torpids for Balliol. In 1928 he joined his father in Cyprus and remained there until King Hussein's death in 1931. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in January 1932.

In 1933 it became known that one of his sisters had contracted a clandestine marriage with Atta Beg Amin, some time first secretary at the Iraqi Legation at Angora (and later at the Legation in London). The Royal Family were indignant, and Zaid was transferred to Cairo in January 1934 as the first Iraqi Minister at King Fuad's Court. He did not, however, proceed to this post, which he ultimately refused to accept. At the end of 1934 he was busy in Athens engaged in litigation concerning extensive properties which he claims to have inherited in Greece. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In the spring of 1937 it was suspected that he had been using his position as Iraqi Minister to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He was recalled to Iraq for enquiries, but apparently established his innocence and returned to Berlin.

He is a pleasant, well-mannered man. A shrewd and somewhat cynical observer. He likes his easy private life in Istanbul and is reluctant to assume official responsibilities. He speaks excellent English and Turkish.

In 1933 he married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her husband. She is agreeable and flimsy with artistic pretensions. She is never seen in Iraq. This indifference mattered little so long as he was not living in Iraq, but when he was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and came to live in Bagdad it was counted against him locally. But for his wife he would probably have been made Regent after the death of King Ghazi in April 1939. In the summer of 1939 he went to live in Istanbul.

Came to Bagdad in October 1941 to meet his brother the Amir Abdullah on the occasion of his State visit to the capital and remained for some time living quietly in a small house.

He returned to Turkey in June 1942. Accompanied by his wife, he came to Bagdad in November 1943 to act as Regent while the Amir Abdul Ilah was in England, and remained until May 1944, when he went back to Turkey.

He returned to Iraq in 1945 to act as Regent during the Amir Abdullah's absence in America and Europe.

In 1946 he acted in a similar capacity. When, in 1946, agreement was reached that the Iraqi Mission in London should be raised to the status of an embassy, he was nominated as the first Iraqi Ambassador.

## 4. *Hussein Nagir*

Cousin of the King and Regent with the style of "Highness."

For a time held an appointment at the Palace. In 1945 married a daughter of the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. In 1946 appointed Iraqi Consul in Jerusalem. A good-humoured, genial person without pronounced personality.

## Other Personalities

### 1. *Abbas-i-Mahmud Agha.*

Chieftain of the Pizhder tribe (Kurdish) (see Babekr Agha). Generally on the side of disorder when trouble is brewing. Maintains a tradition of being at feud with Babekr Agha, but both take care that this enmity shall not weaken the strength of the tribe.

### 2. *Abbas Mahdi.*

Shiah. Born 1898. Secretary to Iraqi Legation in Tehran 1931. Minister for Education, November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of Tapsu in October 1933.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in February 1934, but resigned with Jamil-al-Madfal's Cabinet in August 1934. Reappointed Director-General of Tapsu, December 1934.

Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace, March 1937. Joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937 as Minister for Economics and Communications, and was appointed Minister for Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfal in August 1937 after Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation.

Transferred to the Ministry of Economics and Communications in October 1938, and resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938.

Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

Appointed Minister at Tehran in January 1943. Pleasant but without personality. Returned to Iraq in June 1945 and appointed first Iraqi Minister in Moscow.

Proceeded in November 1945 full of gloom. After a holiday in Stockholm, returned to Bagdad in October 1946 ostensibly on leave. He has since returned to his post.

### 3. *Abdul Amir al Uzri.*

Shia, born Kadhima in 1899. Educated Bagdad and United States, where he graduated from Michigan University as D.Sc. (S.E.). He returned to Iraq in 1929 and was appointed engineer in the Directorate-General of Irrigation, in which he rose to the post of Assistant Director-General in 1941. He acted as Director-General on several occasions.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in Hamdi Pashachi's Cabinet in June 1944. Was Minister of Supply in August 1944, returning at the end of the month to his former Ministry. Resigned with Cabinet in February 1946. Appointed Director-General of Irrigation in May 1946. Speaks English well and is pleasant, intelligent and friendly.

### 4. *Abdul Aziz-al-Mudhaffar, M.B.E.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1897. Speaks English, German and French well. Served as superintendent in Deputy Military Governor's Office, Bagdad Rasafah, under the Government of Occupation from March 1917, and in 1919 became Mudir of Rasafah. Secretary to the Ministry of Interior, December 1920, and Director of the Press Bureau in 1922. Director of Census Department 1927.

Appointed Mutasarrif of Mosul, May 1931. Withdrew September 1931 for incompetence and tried for misappropriation of public funds. Found not guilty and appointed to be member of Muntaliq Land Court. Lost this post when the court was abolished in June 1932. In the summer of 1933 was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Tehran, and in May 1934 was transferred to be consul-general in Beirut.

Appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Paris, May 1935.



In the spring of 1937 he was accused of giving false certificates for munitions bought for Spain and recalled to Iraq. In Syria he was arrested, but extradition was refused and he was released, but remained in Syria. He is married to a daughter of Raji al-Suwaidi, and this family connexion brought about his full exoneration in December.

He returned to live in Bagdad in January 1938, and shortly afterwards it was officially announced that it had been proved that he was innocent of the charges made against him in 1937. On his return he went into business.

Early in 1941 started a trans-desert transport service between Bagdad, Syria and Palestine. Was suspected of working for Rashid Ali. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime, did his best to clear his name and made lavish use of the "V" sign on his business stationery and press advertisements. As director of Iraqi Manufacturing and Trading Company was interested in the erection of a wax match factory in 1944.

### 5. *Abdul Aziz al-Qassab*

Son of Bagdad. Kaimakam of Kut under the Naqib's Provisional Government and did very well. In October 1921 he was appointed Mutessarif of Mosul on probation for six months, but refused to go without the salary of a full mutessarif. In the beginning of 1922 he went as Mutessarif of Karbala, was transferred to Muntafiq in January 1923, and to the Ministry of Interior as Director-General of General Administration in June of the same year. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in January 1924. A capable and well-intentioned official without much strength of character. Minister of Interior, January 1925. Minister for Justice, November 1929.

Went out of office with the resignation of Naji Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Has not held any other Cabinet post since. Has an adequate pension. Appointed Chief Administrative Inspector, Grade 1, November 1933.

He was appointed Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil al-Mulfai in March 1935, but resigned with all his colleagues twelve days later. Elected a Deputy for Bagdad in the general elections of August 1935. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in December 1937, in succession to Tawfiq al-Suwaidi.

Deputy for Bagdad March 1947. Member of the Council of Regency summer 1947.

### 6. *Abdul Fattah bin Ibrahim*

Born Bagdad 1900. Educated in Baasa and Bagdad he was appointed as a teacher in 1924. He was sent to the American University, Beirut, whence he graduated B.A. in 1932. On returning to Iraq he was given an appointment as translator in the Port Directorate and in 1933 was transferred in the same capacity to the Ministry of Justice. In 1934 he returned to Education as a teacher and served in Bagdad and Nasiriyah. In 1939, on account of his leftist political views, he was transferred to Anah but succeeded in getting re-transferred to Bagdad in 1940. He taught in various schools in Bagdad until 1943, when he was appointed "Specialist Inspector" in which capacity he was undoubtedly an evil influence. In an endeavour to reduce the growth of communism in the capital he was transferred as Director of Education, Baasa Liwa, in 1945. He refused to take up the appointment and resigned on 11th June, 1945. After quitting Government service he became director of the Rahimah Printing and Publishing Company, which prints and publishes most of the leftist literature. He still holds this post.

Undoubtedly he was infected by communism while in Beirut. After his return, he was reported as openly teaching communism to his students. All efforts to curb him failed, as will be seen by his frequent transfers. During the war he worked hard against "the Nazis" but at the same time worked equally hard with the "underground" campaign against the Government and made preparatory propaganda against the British. He was the founder of Hizb al Ittihad el Watani (Party of National Unity) and the chief instigator of Hizb el Sina'ah el Watani (Popular National Party).

He is sympathetic to communism but his name was not connected in any way with those tried during 1947 for underground Communist activity.

### 7. *Abdul Hadi Chalabi*

Shiah. Born in Bagdad in 1895, the son of a wealthy landowner who was several times Minister of Education.

Chalabi was first elected a Deputy for Bagdad in 1904. In March 1935 he was arrested in connexion with the Kadhimain riots and deprived of his political rights until the amnesty of November of that year. He became a Deputy again in 1939. He attended the Atlantic City Economic Conference in August 1945. He is one of the most important corn brokers in the country and has large dealings with Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co., consequently better known in business than in political circles; this is his first Cabinet post. In the past he has supported Nuri al Said and Jamil Mulfai. Speaks only Arabic and Persian. He has a wife who appears in public.

Minister of Communications and Works in the al Umari Cabinet of June 1946.

Senator 2nd July, 1947.

### 8. *Dr. Abdul Hadi al Pachachi*

Born in 1891, the son of a former Rais Belediya of Bagdad. He was educated in Bagdad and Istanbul and qualified as a doctor in France. He entered Government service in 1933 as director of the Isolation Hospital and has recently been a lecturer at the Medical College. Together with two Bagdadi Jews he is responsible for the direction of the Salvation Clinic and Hospital. Fat and smiling he does not appear a forceful personality and until now has played no part in politics; he is, however, a cousin of Hamdi and Muzahim al Pachachi. Is married to a very charming White Russian wife who is well known in British society in Bagdad. He speaks fluent French and a little English.

Became Minister of Social Affairs in the al Umari Cabinet of June 1946. Resigned with the Cabinet in November 1946.

### 9. *Abdul Hadi Dhahir*

Shia. About 60. Former Deputy for Hillah, dabbles in law and has had considerable administrative experience. Appointed Director of Tribal Affairs, February 1943, and Mutessarif of Hillah later in the same month. Appointed Judicial Adviser, Ministry of Finance, August 1944. Too rich to have to work, his intellectual vitality is such as to prevent his sitting in idleness, hence his legal activities. His governmental work may be partly ascribed to the same cause. More of a student than man of action, but not afraid to assume responsibility and take decisions. Like Sa'ad Saleh, a bitter opponent of Saleh Jahar. In view of his wealth, unlikely to be corruptible. Minister of Economics in Tawfiq Suweidi's 1946 Cabinet.

### 10. *Abdul Riah Hafidh*

Born about 1897 in Mosul. Son of the late Muhammad Ali Fadhl, who was for some time a

Senator. Educated in Paris, where he qualified as a dentist. He also studied political economy. He obtained a degree in political science. Became Deputy for Mosul in 1926 and afterwards lost his seat. He then set up a dental clinic in Bagdad. Again elected Deputy in 1933. In 1935 he was appointed Iraqi Consul in Paris, but did not stay there long, and in September 1935 he became Director-General of Commerce. His subsequent posts were Consul-General, Beirut, 1938-39; Consul-General, Bombay, 1939-40; Director-General of Revenue, 1941. In July 1942 he became Minister of Economics and Minister for Foreign Affairs in October 1942. A fat, genial personality with wider horizons than most Iraqis. Speaks fluent French and fair English.

Appointed Minister of Education in June 1943 and was well spoken of by his British advisers. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

Joined Arshad al Umari's Cabinet in September 1946 as Minister of Supply, acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs during Dr. Jamali's absence in London.

Deputy for Mosul in 1947 elections.

Minister of Supply in Saleh Jahar's 1947 Cabinet and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during Dr. Jamali's absence.

### 11. *Abdul Jabbar al Chalabi*

Born Bagdad about 1900. Graduate in Agriculture, University of California and in Education, Columbia Teachers' College. Formerly Director of Elementary Education, February 1943. Promoted Chief Inspector of Education, February 1946. Has had the difficult task of reorganising the Iraqi educational system. Member of the Iraqi delegation to San Francisco Conference, and of the delegation to the United Nations Educational Conference in London, has also represented Iraq at the cultural conferences of the Arab League. Quiet, sober, of a studious turn of mind, his brain is one of the best in Iraq at the moment. Backed by sound administrative experience he is not afraid to take decisions or responsibility. As a result of his fairly extensive travels is a sincere Nationalist and convinced Shia, but is yet the reverse of narrow-minded. Convinced of the need of British aid for Iraq and has many British friends. Dislikes Saleh Jahar and Fadhl al Jamali. His name has never been linked with any suggestion of corruption. His English is perfect.

As Minister of Supply in the Suweidi Cabinet of 1946 he was an outstanding success. In September 1946 was appointed Director-General of Communications and Works.

His unpopularity with the Prime Minister, Saleh Jahar, blocks many of his progressive ideas and he is a disappointed man.

### 12. *Abdul Latif Nuri*

Born in Bagdad 1888. Gazetted as officer in the Turkish army in 1909. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Promoted *agid* (lieutenant-colonel) in 1926 and *zaim* (colonel) in 1929. He has held the command of the Northern and Southern Districts, and has passed the senior and junior officers courses, and was posted to the Northern District in 1933. Promoted *amir liwa* (brigadier) in 1932.

Joined General Bakr Sidqi as leader of the army revolt against Yasin al-Hashimi in October 1936, and became Minister of Defence in the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman.

Resigned after the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 and was then placed on retired pay.

Left Iraq in the same year for medical treatment and lived abroad. While in hospital in Damascus he was placed under arrest by the British military

authorities when Syria was occupied in June 1941, but was allowed to return to Iraq in September 1941, since when he has been living quietly in Bagdad on his pension.

### 13. *Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid)*

Shiah of Shitfa (Muntafiq). Born about 1894. Belongs to an influential family and owns a large estate (Abu Hawan Muqtatah). Deputy for Kerbala in Turkish Parliament, and in Iraqi Chamber in 1927. Minister for Education under Rashid Ali al-Gilani, March-October 1933. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1934.

He was a strong partisan of Yasin Pasha and a member of the Executive Committee of the party of National Brotherhood (Hizb al-Ikha al-Watani).

After the dissolution of the party in 1933 he played no part in politics, until he was again elected to the Chamber in December 1937.

He was again returned for this constituency in June 1939.

In February 1941 became Minister of Economics in the Cabinet of Taha al Hashimi. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet when Rashid Ali seized power in April. Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Nuri al Said in October 1941.

Made Senator October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in February 1942. Resigned in November 1942 as a result of a personal quarrel with Taha Ali, the Minister of Education. Has been politically active and verbose in the summer of 1945, protesting against French policy in the Levant and in favour of treaty revision, but is generally regarded as a wind-bag whose days of effective agitation are done.

### 14. *Abdul Majid Alawi, C.B.E.*

Born 1898 of a large Shia family of Bagdad. Graduated in law at Bagdad and for some time practised as a lawyer. Elected a Deputy in 1928 but was not returned in 1930. Is a founder member of the Iraqi Bar Association. In 1932 was appointed Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs but was sent at once as vice-consul to Khorrumschahr. Transferred to Tehran 1933 and to Tabriz in 1934, where he remained for four years and where he co-operated closely with His Majesty's Consul. Became Director of Oriental Affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1938 and Acting Director-General and Director of Political Affairs in 1941. He was much upset when Dr. Fadhl Jamali was made Director-General in 1944, leaving him merely as Director of the Political Department of the Ministry. On the 21st December, 1944, he joined the Cabinet of Hamdi al Pachachi as Minister of Social Affairs. He talks English well, if rather pedantically, and has always been consistently pro-British. He has recently married a second wife who appears in public, which is surprising for a Shia.

Since February 1946 has held no post in the public service. Created C.B.E. for war services, 1946.

### 15. *Abdul Qadir al-Gilani*

Elder brother of Yusuf Gilani. Born Bagdad 1904. Entered Government service 1926, and shortly afterwards was appointed attaché in the Iraqi Legation in London. While in London he studied at the London School of Economics. Speaks good English.

Appointed third secretary at Iraqi Legation in Cairo 1934. Promoted second secretary 1938. On many occasions he was in charge of the legation and maintained excellent relations with the British Embassy. In Egypt he married an Egyptian girl of good family and was popular in Egyptian society. Appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Royal



Palace, April 1940, where he appeared likely to exercise a good influence.

These hopes were, however, disappointed, and he associated himself closely with his cousin Rashid Ali when the latter became Prime Minister in March 1941, and during the rebellion led by Rashid Ali in May 1941. When it collapsed he took refuge in Persia. After the Allied occupation of Persia he was arrested by the British forces, and after some months' internment in Alwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Was sent back to Iraq with the other Iraqi internees for trial in April 1944. Tried in August 1944, he was found guilty of having, in May 1941, insulted the Queen Mother on the telephone. Although he was sentenced to three months' imprisonment, the Regent intervened and he was detained in the Police School, Bagdad, and later transferred to Amara. Released in October 1944. Has been described as arrogant and selfish, he certainly gives the impression of being a *faux bonhomme*.

During 1946 he and his wife have made determined efforts to return to public life and to win the favour of this embassy.

#### 16. Abdul Qadir-al-Rashid

Sunni of Bagdad, related to the Gilani family. Born 1894. Speaks English well.

Appointed secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1924 in succession to Hussein Afan. Remained in that post, the duties of which he discharged with noteworthy tact and efficiency, until November 1932, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Naji Shawkat's Cabinet. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Was appointed an assistant manager in the Rafidain Oil Company in October 1933 and is now well received in British business circles.

His Turkish wife is one of the most accomplished women in Bagdad and one of the chief hostesses of the capital.

He was awarded the King's Medal for service in the cause of freedom in 1946.

#### 17. Abdul Razzaq Hussein

Born in Bagdad 1893. Sunni Moslem of a poor family. Educated in Bagdad and received his military training in Istanbul. Appointed an officer in Machine Gun Corps of Turkish army in 1912. Was captured by the British in 1915(?) and imprisoned in Cairo Citadel, where he learned to speak English and, as he says, to appreciate the English. Took no part in Arab revolt. Joined Iraq army on the 15th February, 1924.

Is very pro-British. On the 17th May, 1943, he, along with eleven other Iraqi officers, went on a tour of the battle areas of the Western Desert on the invitation of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. As a brigadier he was Director-General of Defence Affairs, and in November 1944 he was promoted Amir Liva, which rank he now holds as Officer Commanding 3rd Division of the reorganised Iraq army.

Led the Iraqi contingent in the London Victory Parade in June 1946. Is jovial and fond of gay parties.

#### 18. Abdul Razzaq al-Uzri

Born about 1890. Shi'ah. A Bagdad lawyer. Deputy 1931-32. Public Prosecutor in 1932. Subsequently held post of Mutessarif of Kerbala and Diyala. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs by Nuri Said in November 1942. Ineffective and lacking in personality, he became a Minister only because no other eligible Shi'ah could be found.

Lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in December 1943. Appointed Mutessarif of Hillah in August 1944 as a result of Saleh Jabr's intrigues. Mutessarif of Bagdad March 1945.

Director-General of Tupu, October 1946.

#### 19. Abdul Wahab Mahmud

Sunni. Born Basra 1909. Brother of the late Muhammad Zaki Mahmud, a former Minister of Justice, who was at one time President of the Chamber of Deputies. Brother-in-law of Ismail Nuriq. Educated Basra and Bagdad, where he graduated in law in 1932. Reported during the thirties to hold decided Communist views and to have distributed Communist propaganda; his house was raided in 1934, but it was believed that his brother's influential position saved him from arrest. Engaged in anti-Madfa'i Government propaganda in 1938; toured the Diwanliya tribes in an attempt to unite them against the Government. Arrested December 1938 on the orders of Jamil Madfa'i and despatched to *residence forcée* in North Iraq. Released shortly afterwards when Nuri became Prime Minister. Deputy since 1939 and *rappporteur* of the Finance Committee of the Chamber of Deputies during 1945. Minister of Finance in the 1946 Sawaidi Cabinet.

#### 20. Abdul Wahid, Shaikh

Chief of the Fathah tribe, son of Haji Siddiq, once the most powerful sheikh on the Euphrates. Abdul Wahid cultivates extensive properties on the left bank of the Mishkab from Abu Sukhair to the Ibrahim. Throughout recent years he has steered his course with a view to maintain to the utmost his political and tribal influence. His support and loyalty were carefully cultivated by King Feisal, and all political parties have thought it worth while to try to make him an adherent. He has many friends and many bitter enemies, and is reputed to deal harshly with his followers.

He was prominent as a leader of discontent in the Middle Euphrates area in the spring of 1935, working with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani to overthrow Ali Jundat's Cabinet.

He had much influence during Yasin-al-Hashimi's tenure of office, but so abused it that after Yasin's fall in October 1935 he was afraid to return to his tribe.

He was elected to the Chamber in February 1937, but in July 1937 he was arrested and imprisoned for fomenting tribal disturbances in Diwanliyah. After the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government in August 1937 he was released from prison, but kept under surveillance first in Sulaimani and later in Samawa.

He was permitted to return to his home in July 1938 and elected Deputy for Diwanliyah in June 1939.

In April and May 1941 he closely supported Rashid Ali. In August he was interned in Fao and in December transferred to Samarra. He continued, nevertheless, to keep touch with his friends and supporters, among whom Hassan Subul, of the Beni Turfah, was prominent.

Transferred to the internment camp at Amara in the summer of 1942. He was released in 1944 and lived in *residence forcée* in Mosul till April 1945, when he was allowed to reside in Samarra. The compulsory economy of his exile leaves him the richest tribal leader in the Euphrates. His influence is still probably greater than that of any other chief of the Fathah tribe.

#### 21. Abdullah-al-Damtuji

Formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Born 1895. A native of Mosul. Studied medicine in Constantinople and calls himself doctor, though it is believed that he did not graduate. Seems to have been serving in the Turkish army when Ibn Saud occupied Hassa in 1913, and to have transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Soon rose to a position of influence in Ibn Saud's Court, and came to Bagdad

as his unofficial representative in 1921. Was Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 and signed the Uqair Protocol. Went with the Amir Feisal-al-Saul to London in 1929, and took part in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. After this his influence waned owing to the intrigues of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin.

In August 1928 he represented the Court of Nejd, the Hejaz and its dependencies at the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa. The conference was a failure, and when it ended, instead of returning to the Hejaz, Abdullah Damtuji came to Bagdad, posting his resignation to Ibn Saud. Arrived Bagdad, September 1928. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General, Cairo, in 1930, recalled October 1930, and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. This at first was resented by Ibn Saud, and for a short time Damtuji's presence at the head of the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed likely to embarrass Najdi and Iraqi relations, but when Nuri Pasha visited Jeddah in April 1931 Ibn Saud stated that he no longer wished to raise any objection to Damtuji's appointment. Was left out of office when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Director-General of Health, July 1932, and succeeded Safwat Pasha as Court Chamberlain at the end of 1933.

Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfa'i's second Cabinet in February 1934; resigned in July and was reappointed Director-General of Health in September.

He was suspended in 1935 and tried for misappropriation of public funds. He was acquitted and reinstated in his post at the end of December, but resigned a few months later.

For nearly two years he remained out of public life, but in July 1937 he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in succession to Abbas Mahdi.

He headed the Iraqi representatives at the funeral of Ataturk in November 1938. Soon after Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister in December 1938 he was removed from the Palace to an obscure appointment in the Health Department, which was later abolished.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in November 1941.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1942.

Resigned in June 1942.

Has given up politics for business and is unlikely to return. Speaks good English.

#### 22. Abdullah Qassab

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1900, the son of an Alim Shaikh, Abbas Amin-al-Futwa. Nephew of Abdul Aziz Qassab, *q.m.* Educated in Bagdad, graduated from the Law College in 1928 and entered the Civil Service. Became Kaimakam of Samarra in 1936 and later became Director of Tribal Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutessarif of Kerbala in October 1941 and was transferred to Diwanliyah a month later. Did well as a Mutessarif and joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Interior in October 1943. Quiet and efficient with no marked political leanings. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1943 and was dropped from Nuri's immediately following Cabinet. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in March 1944.

A strong and capable administrator. He initiated and worked hard at the Conferences (Der ez Zor, June 1944, Bagdad, May 1945) to settle Shammar-Ageidat disputes.

In June 1946 joined Arshad al-Umari's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior, but resigned in August owing to a difference with the Premier. He has

since been appointed Director-General of the Duts Monopoly. Awarded King's Medal for service in the cause of freedom 1946.

#### 23. Ahmad, Shaikh of Barzan

A chieftain of the Kurdish Barzan tribe. Headquarters at Barzan at the foot of the Chia-i-Shirin. Exercised powerful influence over the Barosh and Mazari Bala areas to the north-west of Rowanduz. Friendly relations were established with him in 1919, but no administrative control was exercised in his tribal area. In 1920 he was implicated in the murder of two British officials. He and Furis Agha of Bera Kijra were declared outlaws with a price on their heads, and Barzan was destroyed by troops, but his country was not occupied. In 1922 he welcomed Turkish agents into Barosh and Mazari Bala, and in September 1922 his men made an unsuccessful attack on Amadiyah. A month later Barzan was again destroyed by the Royal Air Force co-operating with Assyrian irregulars. In 1923, the Turks having been driven from Rowanduz, Sheikh Ahmad turned on their retreating columns and came into Aqra to make peace with the Anglo-Iraqi authorities. His outlawry was cancelled, and he was permitted to continue in unmolested control of his tribal villages and mountains. In the summer of 1931 he began a private war with a neighbouring chieftain of Baradest, Sheikh Rashid of Lolan. He was everywhere successful, drove Sheikh Rashid to flight into Persia and set fire to his villages. Government intervention became necessary to restore order. Iraqi troops were concentrated early in 1932, and after some sharp fighting, followed by intensive air action by the Royal Air Force, Sheikh Ahmad was defeated and driven across the Turkish border in June. He and his two brothers, Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, were interned for a time in Turkey, but the two latter contrived to find their way back into their old haunts in the following winter. After holding out in the mountains for some months they surrendered and were pardoned in July 1933 and allowed to return to their villages. A short time afterwards the Turks surrendered Sheikh Ahmad to the Iraqi Government on condition that his life should be spared. For a little over a year he lived in comfortable and honourable detention in Mosul, but in November 1934 it was found that he was in collusion with Khalil Khushawi, who was disturbing the peace of the Barzan area, and he was thereupon removed to Hillah.

Permitted to come to Bagdad in April 1935. A short while later he went to live in Sulaimani. After the escape of Mulla Mustafa from Sulaimani in the autumn of 1943 Sheikh Ahmad was removed to Hillah and remained there until a settlement was made with Mulla Mustafa in January 1944. Thereafter he was permitted to return to Barzan. He is now heavily overshadowed by Mulla Mustafa in local tribal affairs. His own home-made religion, which is tolerant to Christianity and which brought him into conflict before with Sheikh Rashid of Lolan, led him to arrange for the liquidation of various Mullahs in 1944-45. There is evidence that he is mentally unbalanced and his "dervish" influence is so strong that Mulla Mustafa does not directly oppose him and resorts to flattery and cunning to get his way. Throughout 1945 he was opposed to the moderate course pursued by Mulla Mustafa and expressed his disapproval by announcing his intention of retiring into the background; but his feud with the Reikan tribes has never died and in July 1945 he came forward again and ordered his tribe to overthrow the local Government. Disorder has spread and the Barzanis, with Mulla Mustafa, are committed to wholesale resistance to the Government's intention to crush them, for the fourth time in 25 years.



Despite warnings, disorders started and a campaign was necessary to crush the Barzanis. Aided by lavishly bribery, which the Minister of the Interior administered, the Iraqi army operations were brother fled to Persia. At first they were well eventually successful. Sheikh Ahmad and his received and courted by the Russians, but in September 1940 it was reported that Ahmad was seeking to return to Iraq as a suppliant.

He returned to Iraq in February 1947 and surrendered with a number of followers, including the Kurdish officers Ezzat Aziz and Mustafa Khoshnaw. He is now in prison at Basra under sentence of death.

#### 24. Ahmad Mukhtar Baban

Born about 1895. Sunni of the Baban family which is Kurdish in origin. He, himself, knows no Kurdish and has no racial interest in the Kurds. A lawyer by profession, he served as a judge for many years. For a short time in 1942 he held the war-time post of Director-General of Supplies and in October 1942 he joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Social Affairs. A fortnight later he was transferred to Communications and Works, where he remained until the Cabinet was reformed in December 1943, when he was appointed to the Ministry of Justice. He kept the same Ministry in Haudi Pacha's Cabinet of June 1944. Has held acting portfolios of Finance and Foreign Affairs in the absence of the respective Ministers. Not a brilliant man, he steers clear of political intrigue.

Minister of Social Affairs February 1946, resigned April 1946. In the autumn of 1946 he was appointed head of the Royal Diwan.

#### 25. Ahmad al Rawi, K.B.E.

Born about 1886. Sunni of Baghdad. Son of one of the leading Sunni Alims. Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraqi Government and after reaching the rank of commandant served in several liwas as a mutessarif. In February 1939 he was made administrative inspector and not long afterwards placed on pension. In June 1941, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government, he was recalled to duty by Jamil Mada'i and made Director-General of Police. In this position he co-operated energetically with the British officials in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda and intrigues and also gave his personal and official support to all plans for improving Anglo-Iraqi relations.

In 1943 Amir Abdullah of Transjordan created him a Pasha. Appointed Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in June 1944. The unprecedented number of farewell parties to Ahmad Pasha reflected the popular esteem in which he is held. A good sportsman, with a keen sense of humour, he is intelligent and though not sufficiently forceful to administer with successful results, he may have found his *niche* in this new appointment.

In August 1946 he was also appointed as first minister to the King of Transjordan, but returned to Baghdad during September to take up the post of Director-General of Foreign Affairs. He has twice been asked, by Haudi Pacha's Cabinet at the end of 1945 and by Arshad al Uqari in September 1946, to join the Cabinet, but prefers not to do so until he can join one which has some chance of durability. Is a brother of Najib al Rawi (q.v.). Created K.B.E. for war services, 1940.

#### 26. Ahmad-i-Taufiq

A Kurdish notable of Sulaimani, born 1898, who has had the advantage of a better education than most of his contemporaries. He has held a number of administrative appointments since the first days

of the occupation of the Sulaimani Liwa. Was appointed mutessarif after the reoccupation of Sulaimani in 1924. The Iraqi Government have several times endeavoured to replace him by others less sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations, but those chosen have not been successful. Ahmad Beg has now (1943) been mutessarif without interruption since 1939. He is connected by marriage with the ruling families of the Pizdar tribe, and owns property in the Surdash mulihah. A pleasant and presentable man, who has always been popular with British civil and military officers.

Transferred as mutessarif to Arbil in April 1936.

Made an administrative inspector April 1939. Placed on pension in spring of 1940.

#### 27. Ahmad Zaki-al-Khaiyat

Sheikh Baghdadi. Born 1896. Educated Baghdad Law School. Has held the following posts: Secretary of the Ministry of Education, consul-general at Mullaumerah and Bombay, katmakam in several places. Mutessarif of Kut and Hillah and Land Settlement Officer. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in July 1937. Was instrumental in placing important telephone contract with British firm against keen foreign competition.

Dismissed from his post in June 1941 on account of the support which he had given to Rashid Ali's régime in May.

Appointed Director-General of Press and Propaganda in August 1941, in which position he co-operated well with the British.

Appointed Iraqi Consul in Jerusalem, May 1945. Appointed consul at Jeddah 1946, but resigned the service rather than proceed and took up practice as a lawyer. A feeble individual. Speaks quite good English.

Deputy March 1947. Has an interest in the company which has the Rootes agency in Iraq.

#### 28. Akram Mushtaq

Born Baghdad 1903. Muslim Sunni. Brother of Talib Mushtaq (q.v.). Gazetted officer in army 1927. Passed through Cranwell and appointed to Royal Iraqi air force in 1930. Promoted captain 1932. Took an active part in the *coup d'Etat* of October 1936. Promoted major 1937 and lieutenant-colonel in 1938. Appointed Commander of Iraqi air force in September 1937. Retained this post until April 1939, when he was relieved of his command and commission and appointed Director of Civil Aviation. Married a daughter of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Sheikh Dawid in spring of 1940. Member of Iraqi delegation to International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago in November 1944, and to meetings of the Communications Committee of the Arab League in summer, 1946.

Has a thorough knowledge of the intricacies of civil aviation and is an intelligent and likeable person. Speaks excellent English.

#### 29. Ali Jaudat

Sunni, of humble Mosul origin. Born 1896. Officer in the Turkish army, fought at Shushah; subsequently surrendered to the British and spent most of 1915 at Basra. Was there employed to encourage Turkish officer prisoners to join the Sheriff. He was a member of the Abd-al-Iraqi. After the war he was Military Governor of Aleppo after the resignation of Jafar Pasha early in 1920, and was subsequently in Dair. Returned to Baghdad with the Amir Faisal in June 1921, and in October 1921 was given the post of Mutessarif of Hillah, which he held till September 1922. He took a very active part in the anti-mandate agitation, and was finally dismissed (on the advice of the High

Commissioner) for defrauding the Treasury by under-estimating revenue demands on supporters of his political views. In January 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in the hope that he might be able to reconcile the *muftahids*. He was unsuccessful, and in May was transferred to Muntaliq, where he did very well. Minister of Interior in the Askari Cabinet, November 1923-July 1924, and voted for the treaty. Appointed Mutessarif of Diyala, and later of Basra. In early 1930 was made Director of the Ministry of the Interior. Minister for Finance under Nuri Pasha, March 1930. Resigned from Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930, as a protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year, and his seat in the Chamber in 1931, together with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Yasin-al-Rashidi in March 1932. Re-elected for Mosul 1933. Appointed principal private secretary to the King, March 1933. Became Prime Minister and Acting Minister of the Interior in August 1934. Was forced to resign in February 1935 on account of the agitation worked up against him throughout the country by Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. He was made President of the Chamber in March 1935 and appointed Iraqi Minister in London in August 1935. Transferred to Paris in December 1936.

He came to Baghdad on leave in October 1937 and decided not to return to his post at Paris.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in April 1939. Resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

After Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in April 1941 he escaped to Basra, joined the Regent and accompanied His Highness to Jerusalem. He returned to Iraq after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion and was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Mada'i in June 1941.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941. Has a son, Nizar, who was educated at Downing College, Cambridge.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Washington in March 1942.

Has interested himself in conducting propaganda in the United States to make better known the Arab side of the Palestine question.

He is now recovering from a serious illness in Washington.

Speaks English.

#### 30. Ali Mahmud Shaikh Ali

Born 1902. Sunni Arab connected with the Ubaid tribe. Graduated at the Baghdad Law School in 1923 and practised as a lawyer for about thirteen years. He also learnt to speak English and French. He became well known as an extreme Nationalist and contributed many articles to the newspaper the *Intiqal* attacking British policy in Iraq. He was arrested in 1924 on account of his agitation against the first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but was acquitted on trial. He was brought before the courts again in 1930 for a similarly violent agitation against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance signed in that year and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. He has twice been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. He was one of the members of the delegation of Iraqi notables which visited Palestine and Egypt in 1936, and a short time after his return he was appointed (through the personal influence of Yasin-al-Hashimi, the Prime Minister) to a judgeship in the Court of Appeal. In this post he has shown more talent and good sense than was to be expected from his past career. Appointed Minister of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's reorganised Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned August 1937 and returned to the Bar.

Banished from Baghdad by Jamil-al-Mada'i's Cabinet in November 1938, but was permitted to

return when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. In February 1939 he was appointed Mutessarif of Basra, where he soon began to make trouble for the Sheikh of Kuwait. After holding this appointment for about a year he was transferred to Baghdad to be Director-General of Customs and Excise. As a mutessarif he allowed his political prejudices to colour too deeply his administrative activities.

Appointed Minister of Justice in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. Fled to Persia with the rest of the Cabinet after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. Handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned in Alwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to Iraq and handed over to the Iraqi court for trial in March 1942 and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in the following May.

#### 31. Ali Mumtaz

Born 1901. Sunni of Baghdad. Belongs to the Daftari family. Graduated at Baghdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Married a daughter of Yasin-al-Hashimi in 1933. Appointed Director-General of Revenues in 1935, but was obliged to leave Iraq for a time when Bakr Sidqi overthrew Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government in 1936. In January 1939 he was reappointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet.

Appointed Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Taha al Hashimi in February 1941. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in April after Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat*. In May 1941 he was appointed director of the newly-created Rafidain Bank, and in October he became Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said.

Resigned in October 1942 largely on account of his inability to get on with Saleh Jabr, then Minister of the Interior.

Made Minister of Finance in Nuri Pasha's ninth Cabinet in December 1943. Headed Iraqi delegation to Middle East Financial Conference in April 1944. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

Minister of Communications and Works in the Suweidi Cabinet of 1946. When this resigned he was partly responsible for the calculated leakage to the press of a Cabinet memorandum advocating drastic revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. He is efficient but has not shown himself very straightforward.

A member of the Liberal Party formed in 1945 which withdrew at the last moment from the 1947 elections alleging undue interference by the Regent and the Government of Nuri Pasha.

Speaks good English.

#### 32. Ali Shukur

President of the Railway Labour Union (now illegal). An ex-engine driver of radical outlook who was dismissed from the Iraqi State Railways at the end of 1944. Became President of the Union in November 1944 and was active in promoting the Railway labour strike, which lasted from the 15th April to the 1st May, 1945, and was the biggest labour movement which has been seen in Iraq since the formation of the Trade Unions. He appeared willing to stop the strike after a few days and to discuss terms with the Minister of Social Affairs, but the majority was in favour of continuing. Was arrested during the strike when the Union was closed and made illegal.



The Union has not yet been allowed to function again, despite the strenuous efforts of Shukur, who has been sending petitions to all the Ministers concerned with great regularity.

### 33. *Alwan bin Hussein, C.B.E.*

Sunni Arab, born Bagdad 1899, of good middle-class family. Married, 1923, daughter of Naimiq Beg, a relation of Sherif Pasha. He was educated at the English Protestant School, Bagdad, and would have gone to the United Kingdom but for the outbreak of the First Great War. On the formation of a Civil Police Force after the occupation of Bagdad in March 1917 he was amongst the first Iraqis to be enrolled, having been appointed Station Clerk Sub-Inspector on 11th May, 1917. Here, working with experienced police officers he learned rapidly and when Mosul was occupied in November 1918 he volunteered and accompanied the police party as inspector. He did outstandingly good work, both before, during and after the rising of 1920. He was one of the first three Iraqis to be promoted to gazetted rank in 1920 when he became Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mosul Town. He remained in Mosul until 1924 when he was promoted Commandant of Police and posted as C.P., Central Criminal Investigation Department. In 1930 he went to the United Kingdom. He was attached to the Birmingham City Police and later attended the "Senior Officers' Course" at New Scotland Yard. Returning to Bagdad he gradually took over the C.I.D. and its allied departments from the British D.I.G. Police and by the time Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations had assumed complete charge. However, he did not find favour with the late Yasin Pasha el Hashimi and Rashid Ali el Gailani, and it was not long before he was removed. When Nuri Pasha came in in 1939 he immediately put Alwan back into the C.I.D. and there he remained until the "Golden Square" and Rashid Ali gained control when he was pushed out again, first to Diwanliyah and then to Kirkuk at both of which places he was under the open constant surveillance of the Iraq army. After the collapse of the rebellion he was brought again to Bagdad headquarters and became Assistant Director-General, Political and Criminal Investigation Branch. For "Security" and other reasons he retained control of the C.I.D. itself as *ex officio* Director. He remained as A.D.G.P. until his promotion to Director-General on 28th September, 1941. Created C.B.E. for war services, 1946.

### 34. *Amin Zaki Sulaiman*

A Moslem (Sunni) of Turkoman origin. Born 1887 in Bagdad. Received his military training in Istanbul and appointed second lieutenant in the Turkish army in 1905.

He joined the Iraq army in 1921 as a captain, and was promoted major in 1926 and lieutenant-colonel in 1930, when he was placed in command of the 4th Iraqi Infantry Battalion.

He was promoted colonel in 1934 and appointed to the command of the Northern Division with headquarters at Mosul, and a month later he was appointed quarter-master-general. In October 1935 he was given the command of the Euphrates Division, Diwanliyah. Promoted brigadier in June 1936.

He was much opposed to the Bekr Sidqi régime in 1936. He remained with the Euphrates Division until August 1937, when he was appointed G.O.C. the 2nd Division, Kirkuk, which position he was still holding when he was appointed acting C.G.S. in March 1940. Promoted major-general in June 1940.

In 1940 he was 53 years old and was the senior officer serving in the Iraq army. A staunch supporter of Taha-ul-Hashimi, he was considered a capable officer and a strict disciplinarian, but was generally unpopular in the army with both officers and men.

Under pressure from Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, he threw in his lot with Rashid Ali in April 1941 and signed a proclamation charging the Regent with treason against the State. He fled to Persia when British troops advanced on Bagdad at the end of May and fell into our hands when British and Russian troops occupied Persia in August 1941. After provisional internment in Ahwaz, he was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq for retrial in March 1942, and in May was sentenced by a military court to five years' imprisonment.

### 35. *Arshad-ul-Umari, K.B.E.*

Of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Born 1888. Trained as an engineer in the days of the Turk. Municipal engineer in Constantinople. Staff officer during the war. Speaks French and understands some English. Member of the first Iraqi Parliament and supporter of Abdul Mahin Beg. Appointed by latter first Iraqi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Made Amin-al-Asimih (Mayor of Bagdad), November 1931, and during his two-year tenure of that appointment did much for the improvement of the amenities of Bagdad. Was appointed Director of Irrigation in November 1933. Joined Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934 as Minister for Economics and Communications. Resigned with the Cabinet in February 1935 and remained without a post until May 1936, when he was appointed Director-General of Municipalities. In November 1936 he again became Mayor of Bagdad, in which capacity he is well known and liked by most of the foreign community. He has proved himself a good friend to Great Britain.

Following the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, when Rashid Ali and his Cabinet fled to Persia, Arshad Beg formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces and to maintain order until the return of the Regent.

In November 1941 he was reappointed Lord Mayor of Bagdad. Has done much to embellish Bagdad by opening up new roads and laying out public gardens.

As president of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society he has shown himself very willing to co-operate with the organisers of all kinds of war charity work.

In June 1944 he joined Hamdi-al-Pachachi's Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acting Minister of Supplies. Rushing at supply problems, he soon met difficulties and had to relinquish his portfolio in August 1944. He headed the Iraqi delegation to the Arab Unity Congress in Cairo, signed the Protocol and returned to Iraq in October 1944. As leader of the Iraqi delegation to San Francisco, he failed to substitute the ideal of independence for that of trusteeship (with Palestine in mind) and refused to sign the Charter. Returning to Iraq in July 1945, after discussions in Cairo, he was coolly received and resigned in August 1945.

In June 1946 he formed a Cabinet. It was to be a caretaker Government for the express purpose of holding speedy elections. It developed, however, into a headstrong dictatorship which threatened to bring into disrepute not only the Cabinet and the British connexion but also the Regent and the Royal House. Resigned November 1946 very reluctantly.

His obstinacy and inability to endure the slightest criticism are the worst faults of an otherwise most likeable and hardworking man. Created K.B.E. for war services, 1946.

### 36. *Asim-al-Naqib, Saiyid*

The fourth son of Saiyid Abdul Rahman and younger brother of Saiyid Mahmud. Born Bagdad 1879. Appointed Naqib on the death of Saiyid Mahmud in July 1936. A man of little character, but he has successfully acquired the conventional appearance of a Sunni Alim and holy man.

### 37. *Ata Amin*

Born 1897. Appointed secretary to the Iraq Legation in London, September 1932, on transfer from a consular post at Angola.

In the summer of 1933 it was discovered that he had, while in Turkey, married one of the sisters of the Amir Zaid, a younger brother of King Faisal I. This was regarded as a scandal at the time, but later on he was forgiven. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Rome, October 1934. Transferred to London as counsellor in August 1935. Transferred to Paris as chargé d'affaires in August 1938 and to Berlin in February 1939.

In July 1939 he returned to Rome and remained there until June 1940, when he was transferred to London as chargé d'affaires. Returned to Bagdad, and was appointed Director-General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in October 1943. Was appointed Iraqi Minister at Angola in August 1944. He speaks good English.

A weak and ineffective individual.

### 38. *Aziz Sheriff (Abdul Aziz bin Sheriff bin Abdul Majid)*

Born Anah, Dulaim Liwa, 1904. Sunni Muslim. Lawyer.

Educated up to middle school at Anah he entered the Secondary School Teachers' Training College and the Law College, Bagdad. He graduated from the Law College in 1931 and set up practice in Basra. He practised before the Basra Courts until 1941 when he was appointed to the Judicial Service and posted as judge at Hillah. Later he was transferred to Bagdad. In 1945 he resigned and returned to practice in partnership with Nadhim al Zahawi.

He always has been anti-British and anti-Government but came to particular notice as a Communist only some ten years ago. During the war years he did good work in combating "the Nazis," but always with an anti-British bias. After the Rashid Ali rebellion he, with other extremists including Muhammad Saleh Bahr el Ullum, tried to form a society Hizb el Wahidah el Wataniyah el Demokratiyah. Owing to its combination, particularly the association of the latter individual, the good intentions of the proposers were doubted and sanction was not accorded. They continued to work and eventually the Hizb el Sha'uh was formed with Aziz Sheriff as the first President. Previously he had worked for a time with Kamil al Chadarehi (*q.v.*) but the views and policy of al Chadarehi were not sufficiently advanced for him and his associates, most of whom were employed in underground activity, and in the publication of secret Communist literature, *e.g.*, *El Sharakah*, *El Qa'idah*, *El 'Amm*, &c., and in forming Communist "Cells" all over the country. Working with this group were many capable men and the publications, always published at the right moment, had considerable effect. Throughout they were extremely critical of Britain, belittled her efforts and praised anything and everything Russian. Aziz Sheriff himself owns the very strongly leftist paper *El Wafan*, which openly publishes in a milder form matter formerly published in the "underground" press.

The Communist trials of 1947 did not produce any evidence to link Aziz with the underground organisations. Nevertheless, it is probable that his

party, the Sha'uh, is to some extent penetrated by Communists properly so called.

### 39. *Baba Ali Shaikh Mahmud*

Son of the well-known Shaikh Mahmud (*q.v.*). Spent much of his early life in Persia while his father was engaged in his various rebellions. After Shaikh Mahmud's surrender to the Iraqi authorities in 1927, Baba Ali was sent to school by the Iraqi Government in Bagdad and later at Victoria College, Alexandria. In 1933 he went to America and studied political economy at Columbia for five years. On his return he was given a minor post in the railways, but resigned after a short time as he did not like the life of a Government official. In 1941 he was ill in Sulaimaniyah and did not join his father, who escaped from Bagdad. His open criticism of the Administration led to his arrest and exile in July 1943. After his release in November he settled down to the improvement of his agricultural property, but again in February 1945 openly attacked the shortcomings of the Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniyah. This incident almost led to his arrest again.

Baba Ali speaks excellent English and possesses an attractive though not very forceful personality. Is very keen on improving the tobacco situation in Kurdistan and on preserving the remaining Kurdish forests. He has considerable practical knowledge of and enthusiasm for agriculture and if not blocked by bureaucratic methods may achieve something as Minister of Economics.

Resigned with whole of Nuri Pasha's Government in March 1947. As a Deputy, attacks the Government of Saleh Jibr on frequent occasions for their alleged anti-Kurdish policy, signs of which he distinguishes in the most improbable matters.

### 40. *Babekr Agha*

A powerful chief of the Pizhder (Kurdish) tribe of Qalah Diza (on the Lesser Zab River, north of Sulaimani). Has always been honest and friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi. An able and most estimable man, who has been liked and respected by all who have had close contact with him.

His rival for tribal influence in Abbas Mahmud Agha, who has always tended to be against the Government. Both, however, visited Bagdad in October 1933 and protested their loyalty and obedience to the Iraqi Government.

He behaved well after the Iraqi Government established normal administration in the Pizhder area in 1938.

On the outbreak of hostilities between Rashid Ali's rebel Government and the British forces in May 1941, Babekr Agha, together with Shaikh Mahmud and many of the Sulaimani tribal chiefs, planned a revolt against the Government. Rashid Ali's régime was, however, overthrown before their plans could materialise.

He visited the ambassador in December 1941 and pledged himself to act always under British guidance.

Operated on at I.P.C. Hospital in Kirkuk early in 1947 which may keep him alive a few years longer.

### 41. *Darwosh al Haidari*

Born in 1907, graduated from an American agricultural college and entered Iraq Government service in 1930. The greater part of his career has been spent in the Department of Agriculture, and for a long time he was manager of the Abu Ghurab experimental farm. In 1942, however, he became Acting Director-General of Grain. He was successful on the whole, but his term of office was marred by a quarrel with the then Mutasarrif of



Bagdad, Ja'afar Hamandi (q.v.), as a result of which he appeared before the Officials' Disciplinary Committee on a charge of illegally disposing of sixty sacks of grain belonging to the Supplies Department. He was transferred back to the Department of Agriculture.

In June 1943 he went to America as a member of the Iraqi delegation to the Hot Springs Food Conference, and in July 1946 he was appointed to his present post, that of Director-General of Agriculture.

His political views have generally been regarded as pro-British. He has, in the past, been considered a "Leftist" and a "Nationalist"; he now claims to be a "Democrat." He is not politically active, but in August of 1946 he was associated with Tahir and Nadim al Pachachi and others in an attempt to found a "United Nations Society," the aims of which were stated to be the enlightenment of the people on U.N.O. and the putting forward to the U.N.O. of suggestions in the Arab cause.

Thanks to the period spent in the United States, he has acquired many American ways. He speaks excellent English, as does his British-educated wife, who is the sister of Yusuf and Abdul Qadir al Gailani.

Though apparently jovial he is reported to be overbearing with his subordinates among whom he is most unpopular. His conduct of his Department does not arouse enthusiasm among British experts who have inspected it.

#### 42. Daud-al-Haidari

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1880. Son of Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-al-Islam. The family comes from Arbil, where Ibrahim Effendi has a small property. Daud Pasha was a Deputy and an aide-camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Speaks Turkish better than Arabic. His English is fluent. He was in Constantinople during the war, and returned to Bagdad in 1921. Appointed, in October 1922, Amin-al-Dinara (Chamberlain) in the King's palace. Member for Arbil in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and Vice-President. Voted for the treaty 1924. Harboured Shuh and opposed treaty of 1925. Minister for Justice under Tawfiq Suwaidi, April-November 1929. Disliked and distrusted in Arbil.

Re-elected to Chamber of Deputies to represent Arbil in general election of 1930, but has not held Cabinet appointment since Tawfiq Suwaidi's Cabinet resigned in August 1929. In 1930 became lawyer for the British Oil Development Company in Bagdad, and has done quite well out of this work. Was not elected to the Chamber in the elections of 1934.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran in June 1941. Appointed Minister of Justice in February 1942, but was squeezed out of the Cabinet in June 1943 because of his intrigues against the Prime Minister. He was immediately appointed a Minister Grade 1 in the Foreign Service *en disponibilité*. Posted to London as Minister in October 1943. He took an active part in founding the Anglo-Iraqi Society in England, where he experienced the war at first hand, the Iraqi Legation being damaged by a bomb. His two daughters are emancipated and, after a successful debut in London, are now in Bagdad. Of very doubtful financial reputation, but a firm friend of the Royal House and a shrewd observer who can on occasion play a useful role.

#### 43. Daud-al-Sa'adi, Sa'iid

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1887. Prominent extremist. Lawyer. Usually connected with all Nationalist agitations and intrigues. Elected to the Chamber for Hillah in August 1935.

Appointed public prosecutor in August 1936 by Yasin-al-Hashimi's Cabinet. Resigned in December after Yasin's fall.

Elected to the Chamber for Kut in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Banished from Bagdad by Jumal-al-Madfa'i in December 1938, but returned as soon as Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister.

An active supporter of Rashid Ali in 1941, he fled to Persia at the end of May after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. He was handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and then sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Brought back to Bagdad for trial in March 1944.

He succeeded in obtaining his release on medical grounds and is now the doyen of the ex-internees and a leader of the Independence Party.

#### 44. Dhi'a Sa'far

Born in 1911. He was educated in England where he spent nine years studying mechanical engineering at Birmingham University, and where he obtained a B.Sc. degree in 1934 and Ph.D. in 1936. After completing his studies he had twenty months' training with the Great Western Railways. On returning to Iraq he was appointed assistant mechanical engineer, Iraqi State Railways in 1937. He was subsequently promoted to mechanical engineer.

During the war he was Director-General of Engineering Supplies. He became Deputy for Bagdad in the 1947 elections and was appointed Minister of Communications and Works under Saleh Jabr's Government of March 1947.

He is a man of no family and, indeed, his family enjoys an extremely doubtful financial reputation. He is, however, well educated, speaks excellent English and may in the future render the State some service.

#### 45. Fadhil Jamali Dr.

Born Kadhimain 1902. Shi'ah. Educated at the American University of Beirut 1921-27. Columbia University, New York, 1927-29. Wrote a thesis on education among the tribes for his doctorate. On his return to Iraq he was appointed to the Ministry of Education. In 1933 he was made Director-General of Instruction. He has a natural predilection for American methods and is a disciple of Mr. Dewey.

In early 1939 he was invited by the British Council to visit the United Kingdom to study British educational methods. He was well entertained and shown the best colleges and schools of all kinds. As a result he became far more favourably disposed towards British education.

Although he posed as pro-British and generally collaborated in a friendly manner with the Embassy in developing the work of the British Council, he cannot escape responsibility for the deplorable state of education in Iraq. He was determined to do his utmost to resist British influence and opposed the appointment of a British adviser and the establishment of a boarding school on public school lines under British control. He was finally transferred from his post of director-general and appointed counsellor at the Iraqi Legation in Washington in January 1943, but at the end of May he was still in Bagdad hoping to contrive somehow to return to a post in Education. A year later he was still in Bagdad as transport by air could not be found to take him and his family to the United States. He has a Canadian wife, and is on friendly terms with the United States Legation. Appointed Director-General for Foreign Affairs in 1944. Member of Iraqi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Returned to Iraq August 1945. Still desirous of returning to Education. Is outwardly zealously pro-British nowadays, and professionally always obliging and helpful.

In June 1946 joined Arshad al Umari's Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which capacity he attended the Palestine Conference in London in September.

He is a self-made man and the first of the type to reach a prominent position. He is intensely ambitious, but has to feel his way carefully and is therefore something of a "Yes-man." No one has ever been able to accuse him of corruption. He is child on the subject of Zionism.

He has remained Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Governments of Nuri Pasha 1946-47 and Saleh Jabr March 1947 but has spent much time outside Iraq, at U.N.O. on the Palestine question and later in London leading Iraqi delegation for Sterling Balance talks.

His trips abroad have brought him greater self-confidence but he does not pay enough attention to the internal political situation. He is, therefore, apt to underestimate the difficulties of the policies he urges.

#### 46. Hamdi Pachachi, K.B.E.

Born about 1890. Sunni of Bagdad. Belongs to the Pachachi family, who are one of the richest families of the city. He himself owns valuable property in the town and also agricultural land outside in the hills. In the early days of the creation of the Iraqi State he had the reputation of being a young hot-head and a leader of the extreme nationalists. Became Minister for Aqaf in June 1925 under Abdul Muhaimin al Sudani, and resigned with the Cabinet in November 1926. After this he remained outside politics for many years but returned to public life as Minister for Social Affairs in Taha al Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941. He took no part in Rashid Ali's adventures in May 1941 and in November 1941 was elected President of the Chamber. He was re-elected to this position in November 1942, and again in October 1943. Censed to be President of the Chamber when he became temporarily Minister of Economics in December 1943. Was not reappointed a Minister in Nuri's ninth Cabinet formed on the 25th December, 1943. Succeeded Nuri Said as Prime Minister in June 1944.

Appointed Senator, May 1945.

In order to drop the obstinate Tahir Ali from Defence, he put in a formal resignation of the Cabinet in August 1944 and reformed the Ministry without Tahir Ali.

His Ministry resigned in February 1946.

Dignified and firm, he is a typical landowner with the advantages that he has no ambition to increase his holdings and gives a personal boost to any schemes for agricultural development (such as the Dujiella collective farm project). Has taken a prominent part in the Arab Unity Conferences and signed the Protocol. Despite prophecies, he has held his Cabinet together for a record period for recent years by steadiness, moderation and good sense, which were notable in his handling of the Levant crisis of May 1945.

Speaks a little English and French. A violent anti-Zionist.

Created K.B.E., for war services, 1946.

#### 47. Hanna Khaiyat

Syrian Catholic of Mosul. Born 1884. Medical diploma at Beirut and Paris, much medical and administrative experience and extremely able on both sides. Head of the Mosul Hospital under the Government of Occupation. Appointed Minister of Health 1921. When the Ministry was abolished in 1922 he accepted the post of Director of Medical Services. Speaks excellent French. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

October 1931. Appointed Inspector-General of Health in 1933. Became director of the Bagdad General Hospital and dean of the Royal Medical College in September 1934. Appointed Inspector-General of Health September 1937. Inspector-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs in December 1939.

Placed on pension at the end of 1940. Reappointed Director-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Director-General of Health in July 1941.

Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in January 1943.

Headed Iraqi delegation to Arab Medical Congress 1943. Elected a Deputy, October 1943. Became an invalid in April 1944.

#### 48. Hashim Jawad

Born Bagdad 1911. Muslim, Shi'ah.

Educated in Bagdad schools and at Beirut and London Universities. After graduating he returned from London in 1930 and shortly afterwards was posted to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and nominated as Iraq's representation on the permanent International Labour Office at Geneva. In that capacity he took part in several conferences. He returned to Iraq in 1941 and has been employed on labour affairs in one capacity or another ever since. In 1946 he was transferred to the Ministry of Social Affairs, as Director-General of a newly created Labour Department, in which capacity he attended the I.L.O. Congress at Montreal in September.

A very quiet, serious and studious man; well balanced and moderate of speech. He holds strong views on the rights of "Labour" and undoubtedly tries to act up to his principles. Since the Trades Union Movement and Labour questions have come more to the fore in Iraq he has gained much valuable practical experience in the settling of disputes and labour conditions generally, and there seems reason for hoping that in time he might be able to do something tangible to better the working and social conditions of the Iraqi working classes. He is not lacking in personality, but is more of a quiet, solid plodder than an enthusiast, such as is really wanted for the task. As might be expected, in politics his conversation indicates an inclination to the Left, but he is neither a member nor an associate of the members of the Political Leftist Parties recently established in Bagdad.

He was removed from his position as Director-General of Labour by Arshad-al-Umari in 1946. After his removal the Department of Labour has sunk into a powerless desuetude.

In Geneva at International Labour Organisation Conference July 1947.

#### 49. Hikmat Sulaiman

Sunni. Born 1895. Director of Education in Bagdad under the Turks. Also Assistant Governor. Member of C.U.P. Was in Constantinople at the time of the occupation. Returned in January 1921 and was a candidate for the Ministry of Education. Made Director of Posts in April 1922 and Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1923. Minister of Interior in the second Sudani Cabinet. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, but became Minister for Interior in March 1933. Resigned from Cabinet with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and from Chamber in November 1933. He played an active part in organising intensive opposition to Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in the early months of 1935, but refused office in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha after Ali Jaudat's fall. Paid a long visit to Turkey in the summer of 1935 and returned full of praise for modern Turkish methods. In the autumn of 1935 he was offered the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice, but did not accept it. Is



very influential in political circles, where his intelligence is much respected.

In October 1936 he joined with Bakr Sidqi in the plot which resulted in the successful military revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government, and upon Yasin's resignation he became Prime Minister. He remained in office until August 1937 when, after the murder of Bakr Sidqi, he and his Cabinet resigned. As a Prime Minister he was disappointing. His intentions were excellent, but his impatience with detail and administrative routine, coupled with the malign influence exercised by Bakr Sidqi over the Cabinet, prevented him from achieving anything of importance.

A well-mannered man of wide liberal views.

In 1938, though he took no active part in politics, he was on the alert to keep Nuri-al-Said from returning to power. When Nuri-al-Said formed a Government in December 1938, he sent messages of goodwill to Hikmat and later calls were exchanged between Hikmat and Sabah, Nuri's son. In spite of their reconciliation, he was arrested early in March 1939, tried by court-martial for treason and sentenced to death. This was at the same time commuted to five years' imprisonment. In the summer of 1939 he was removed to Sulaimani, where he was interned in a comfortable house.

In April 1941 was released by Rashid Ali and allowed to go to Persia, where he remained throughout the May rebellion. He afterwards returned to Bagdad and gradually began to take part in social life.

He is now a flourishing farmer and apparently determined to give up politics altogether. His wife is a Daghestani, a sister of Mrs. Najib-al-Rawi (q.v.). The Regent does not like him.

#### 50. Husain Fauzi-bin-Hassan

Sunni of Kurdish origin. Born in Bagdad in 1889. Entered the Military College in Istanbul and received a commission in the Turkish army in 1909. Joined the Iraqi army (artillery) in May 1922. Promoted major 1925. He has passed the Senior Officers' Course at Belgium, India, and has twice been attached to units in England for training. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1929 and colonel in 1933. In 1934 he was appointed Commandant of the Staff School, Bagdad, and in February 1935 he was given the command of the Northern District. In August 1935 he became a brigadier, and in November 1936 he was made G.O.C., 1st Infantry Division. A pleasant man with good manners. He speaks good English. He had nothing to do with the military revolt of October 1936. After the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Relieved of his appointment and placed on pension in February 1940 for interference in politics.

#### 51. Ibrahim Akif-al-Alousi

Sunni. Born Bagdad 1894. Educated Bagdad and Turkey. Graduated from Medical College, Istanbul, 1916, and came to Iraq, where he served in several places under the Turks. Joined Iraqi Health Service, and served as Director of Health, Basra and Bagdad, with considerable success.

Was Director-General of Public Health in May 1939 and afterwards Inspector-General of Health Services in Ministry of Social Affairs. He is secretary-general of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society.

Appointed Minister of Education in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet in June 1941.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs in 1946.

#### 52. Ismail Namiq, K.B.E.

Sunni, originally from Mosul. Born 1892, son of an officer in the Turkish army. Educated at Military College, and gazetted an officer in the Ottoman army in Istanbul in 1912. Joined Amir Faisal in 1917 and commanded the Hashimi Cavalry. After becoming an officer in the Iraqi army in 1921 he attended various courses, including one of six months at Tidworth, where he did well. Became Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in 1931 and Commander of the Iraqi air force in 1933. Commanded the Cavalry Brigade 1936 and the Third Division 1937. Was appointed Director-General of Administration in the Ministry of Defence in 1941, becoming a lieutenant-general the same year. Became Acting Chief of the General Staff in November 1941 and as such accompanied the Regent to England in October 1943. On the 21st December, 1944, he joined the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi as Minister of Defence. Became a Senator in May 1945. He is generally considered to be pro-British. He is a man of sound sense. He has not, until 1944, mixed in politics, and disapproved of Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat*. His venality has been the subject of comment, but he is quiet and temperate. Speaks good English.

He is at present in retirement, but may well return to the Cabinet later. The Regent likes and trusts him.

Created K.B.E. for war services, 1946.

#### 53. Ibrahim Saleh el Kabir, O.B.E.

Born Bagdad 1885.

Jew. Married to Renan Shu'al Elias. His son Jamil, born 1926, is now in England (Nottingham University). Has a daughter, Aida, born 1936. Has three brothers, viz.: Salman el Kabir, lawyer, Bagdad; Hesqail el Kabir, merchant, London; Yusuf el Kabir, lawyer, Bagdad.

Educated at the Alliance School, Bagdad; he entered business in the office of the merchant Hesqail Toweg, but continued his studies by attending occasional lectures at other institutions. Some time before the occupation of Bagdad in 1917 he went to Persia, having by then been admitted as a partner to Hesqail Toweg. He remained in Persia for some time, but after the fall of Bagdad he returned and found an appointment in the Ministry of Finance, Accounts Department. He remained in this Department and by gradual promotion became Accountant-General. Later he was transferred to the Directorate-General of Railways in the same capacity. He held this appointment for some years, but has now returned to his former post.

Ibrahim el Kabir has never been a politician; he is a typical civil servant. Absolutely trustworthy but extremely guarded in his speech. He, however, is known to have a very bitter tongue on occasion. He is not very popular, on account of a rather sneering expression and manner, possibly due to somewhat weak eyesight. A sound, reliable public servant, but too timid ever to make a mark for himself. In 1946 he gave evidence before the Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry on Palestine.

Awarded the O.B.E. for war services, 1946.

Speaks good English.

Was chief negotiator in the Iraqi delegation to London for Sterling Balances talks, where he won golden opinions from the British delegation.

#### 54. Jafar Homandi

Born 1894. At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 he was a school-teacher in Bagdad. After the war he graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a junior judgeship in Kadhimain. Later he was given an appointment in the Ministry

of Justice. In 1930 he was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and became kaimakam of Najaf, then after serving in several other districts he was made Mutesarrif of Kut in 1936 and was later transferred to the same post in Hilla. He was appointed Minister for Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned in August 1937, and in September he was appointed Director-General of tribal affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutesarrif of Kut September 1938, and transferred to Muntadig February 1939, to Kerkala in September 1939.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Mutesarrif of Bagdad in December 1941.

Resigned in October 1942. In early 1943 he received a substantial grant of Government land in the Hillah liwa. Saleh Jabr as Minister of Finance helped him to obtain this. In October 1943 was elected Shia Deputy for Hilla. Visited Palestine in early 1945.

Elected a Deputy for Bagdad in 1947 he has been active in Opposition in the Chamber to the Government of Saleh Jabr.

#### 55. Jalal Baban

Kurd of the Baban family. Born 1892.

In the early days of British occupation he was actively associated with extreme Nationalists and was deported to Henjam in 1920. Released in 1921. Appointed kaimakam in 1923 and continued to serve in the civil administration, holding the posts of mutesarrif in Nasiriyah, Kerkala and Arbil until November 1932, when he became Minister of Economics and Communications in Naji Shawkat's Cabinet. Became Minister for Defence under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with the latter in October 1933. Appointed Minister for Education in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934, and was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in December 1934. Transferred to be Director-General of the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in December 1936.

In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet as Minister of Economics and Communications. Made a Senator. Resigned from Cabinet in May 1938 on account of insinuations made by his colleagues (not without reason) that he had made a corrupt agreement with a Government road contractor. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in September 1939; resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet of Jamil Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

In the sessions of 1941 and 1942 he was active in the Senate as a critic of Government measures.

Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1943, but resigned in October of the same year.

#### 56. Jamal Baban

A Kurdish lawyer. Born 1890. Served for some time as a judge in the Northern Liwas. Became Deputy for Arbil in the general election of 1928. Appointed Minister for Justice in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice in Jamil-Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Retained his portfolio when Jamil-al-Madfai re-

formed his Cabinet in February 1934 and remained at the Ministry of Justice in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet formed in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935, and in October joined the party organised by Jamil-al-Madfai to oppose Yasin Pasha. Owing his continued presence in successive Cabinets perhaps more to the tradition that each Cabinet must have one Kurd than to his personal abilities.

Returned for Arbil in the elections of June 1939.

After practising as an advocate, returned to public life again by his appointment as Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in October 1941.

Resigned in October 1942 and began practising again as an advocate.

Minister of Justice in Saleh Jabr's Government of 1947 and appointed Senator on 2nd July, 1947. He has been the object of adverse criticism in his capacity of Minister of Justice both for venality and for influencing judges, particularly in the Communist trials.

#### 57. Jamil-al-Rawi

A Bagdadi; born 1892, officer in the Turkish army. Served in the Sheressian forces during the Arab revolt. Chief aide-de-camp to King Ali in Jeddah, and came to Iraq with His Majesty after Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in the general election of 1928, became vice-president of the Taqaddum party and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. Minister for Communications and Works in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet formed in March 1930. Became Minister for Defence in January 1931, but lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Mutesarrif of Kirkuk July 1932. Transferred to Kut in October 1935. His services were dispensed with by the Hashimi Cabinet in March 1936. In December 1936 he was in Jerusalem and in touch with the Grand Mufti and the Arab movement in Palestine. Appointed Iraqi Charge d'Affaires in Jeddah September 1939.

Appointed consul-general at Jerusalem in July 1941. Withdrawn in the autumn of 1941 and was appointed Iraqi Minister at Jeddah in December 1942.

Returned to Bagdad in 1945. Appointed Director-General of Public Works 1946.

Speaks some English.

Appointed Minister at Amman in May 1947.

#### 58. Jamil-al-Madfai

Of Mosul, born about 1886. Led the party which in June 1929 came from Dair and called upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Sherief. Entered Tall Afar after the murder of Captain Stuart, which he had instigated. Styled himself leader of the Northern Mesopotamian army. On the approach of British troops from Mosul returned to Dair. Returned to Iraq 1923. Soon after, appointed mutesarrif and saw service in a number of different *liwas*. Appointed Minister for the Interior under Nuri Pasha in March 1931. Became President of the Chamber in December 1930, following Jafar Pasha's resignation. Resigned October 1931, at the same time resigning from Nuri Pasha's party as a protest against the high-handed actions of Muzahim Beg Al Pachachi, then Minister for the Interior. Composed his quarrel with Nuri Pasha in November and was re-elected President of the Chamber on the 30th November. Again elected President in November 1932 and March 1933. Became Prime Minister in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but resumed office with a reformed Cabinet about ten days later. Resigned again in



August 1934, but accepted portfolio of Defence in Cabinet which was then formed by Ali Jaudat. Became Prime Minister in March 1935, but was forced to resign by Yasin Pasha's agitation in the Euphrates after being in office for only twelve days. In October 1935 revived the party of National Unity as an opposition to Yasin Pasha's Cabinet, but received little support. Declined an invitation to join the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936. In the winter of 1936-37 he went to the Yemen to obtain the adhesion of the Imam to the Pact of Arab Brotherhood, signed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq in April 1936, and in August 1937, after the resignation of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet, he became Prime Minister.

He lacks administrative ability, but is a figure in the political world. Is generally popular because he expresses his opinion in an honest, downright manner.

Throughout 1938 he held his Cabinet together and carried on the government of the country in difficult circumstances with success. Forced to resign on the 25th December, 1938, by a military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi, the Chief of the General Staff, and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al-Said. Continues to enjoy considerable political influence.

When Rashid Ali seized power by a *coup d'Etat* at the beginning of April 1941, Jamil Madfai fled to Basra, where he joined the Regent. Both narrowly escaped capture by the Iraqi rebel troops and took refuge on a British warship. Thence they were flown to Palestine, where Jamil Madfai remained during Rashid Ali's rebellion of May. He returned to Iraq with the Regent on the collapse of the rebellion, and after considerable hesitation was persuaded to form a Cabinet. Faced with the difficult task of restoring public confidence and security, he showed that he had lost his former resolution and energy. An ageing man, susceptible to the intervention of others, he inclined towards a policy of appeasement and refrained from drastic action against the pro-Nazi elements. Within these limits, however, he co-operated loyally with His Majesty's Government, and during the four months of his premiership conditions in Iraq were largely restored to normal. Feeling unable, however, to carry out the policy of strong action which was pressed on him from many sides, Jamil Madfai, together with the whole Cabinet, resigned in October 1941.

Since then he has been active in the Senate. In March-April 1943 he visited Syria, Transjordan and Egypt at the request of Nuri Said to canvass support for the idea of an Arab congress to plan the closer union of all Arab States. He met with little success but was pleased to have had an opportunity to maintain his part as a veteran of the Pan-Arab movement.

Elected President of the Senate in December 1943, in which position he used his influence against Nuri Pasha's Government. Superseded as president in December 1944 and resigned from Senate in February 1945.

His name was widely canvassed in May and June 1947 as a possible leader of an anti-Government bloc to be composed of the Left and Reformist Parties together with a few old-time politicians; this bloc appears to have come to nothing.

Is now very rich. Has much land in favourable positions and is interested in many commercial ventures whose success is at least partly due to his influence.

#### 59. Jamil-al-Wadi

Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Hamid-al-Wadi, aide-de-camp to the Amir Abdullah, and Shalir-al-Wadi, formerly aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal (q.v.).

Appointed a judge in 1923 and became director of the Land Registry Department (Tapu) in 1931.

Appointed Minister for Justice November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of State Domains Lands (in the Ministry of Finance) October 1933. Returned to the Ministry of Justice in June 1934 as member of the Court of Cassation, and a month later was appointed Chief Public Prosecutor. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1935.

Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in July 1937, but lost this post when Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet fell, and was passed into obscurity as an inspector in the Ministry of Justice.

Appointed Director-General of Tapu in January 1938, and of Land Settlement in August 1939 when the latter Department was amalgamated with Tapu.

Land Settlement was taken away from him in the autumn of 1941. Dishonest and corrupt.

#### 60. Jamil Abdul Wahhab

Born about 1900 of a comparatively unimportant family, he was able to contract an alliance with a niece of Nuri Pasha-al-Said and it is to this influence that he probably owes any political distinction that he has obtained. Educated at the Bagdad Law College, he was for some time a judge. A keen political intriguer, he was at one time arrested and deported by Jamil Madfai. His attitude during the Rashid Ali rebellion was ambiguous, nevertheless he was elected Deputy for Dhyala in October 1943 and became president of the Lawyers' Association in March 1946. His first ministerial appointment was in Nuri Pasha-al-Said's coalition Government of November 1946, in which he was Minister of Social Affairs. He retained this portfolio in the succeeding Cabinet of March 1947 under Saleh Jabr. He appears to devote any talents that he may possess to political intrigue and is said to take practically no interest in his Ministry. He is personally spiteful, ambitious and untrustworthy. He speaks a little English.

#### 61. Jebran Malkon

Was at one time associated with Rafael Butti in the publishing of *Al Bilad*. In 1940 he refused German Legation offers made by Dr. Grobba to publish anti-Jewish articles. Malkon is now proprietor of *Al Akhbar*, although he does not write the articles as he himself does not write good Arabic. Malkon comes from a large and wealthy family in Mardin. He and his sister were the only two who escaped a family massacre in 1917 when the remainder of the family was wiped out by the Turks and the Germans. Malkon and his sister found refuge in Deir-az-Zor. After the British occupation he was appointed a director of customs and excise.

He is a man of a mild and affable disposition but he has more courage than his meek appearance suggests and has always resisted pressure to publish articles unfriendly to Britain. He has, in fact, resolutely kept clear of all political controversy, a very creditable achievement for any editor in Bagdad. *Al Akhbar* is now generally accepted as the leading vernacular newspaper and has the largest circulation. Malkon is scoffed at by his fellow-editors but has no real enemies. He visited Britain in 1945 with a delegation of Iraqi journalists and came back full of wonder and admiration for all he had seen. He has a large happy family.

He speaks a little English.

#### 62. Kamil al Chadirehi

A Moslem (Sunni) born in Bagdad in 1901. His brother is Raul al Chadirehi who was Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in London. Kamil was educated locally

and graduated at the Bagdad Law College. He obtained a minor post in the Ministry of Finance but soon gave up this job for journalism and political agitation. In 1930 he was editor of *Al Ikha al Watani* (National Brotherhood) which paper was suppressed for its attacks on the Government of Nuri Said. In May 1934 he was convicted for publishing false news in *Sa'at al Ahali*, and in September of the same year he was arrested for publishing pamphlets against King Ghazi, but was released for lack of evidence. He was at that time well known for his Left-wing views. The *coup d'Etat* of Hikmat Sulaiman in 1936 gave him his first Cabinet post as Minister of Economics and Communications in October of that year—a post which he resigned in June 1937 because of a difference of opinion on the Cabinet's policy regarding the Euphrates. He left the country for a few months, returning after the Bekr Sidqi incident, and from that time he has been an active leftish politician. He formed the Democratic Party, described as "left of centre," which includes among its members Mohammed Hadid, Majid Mustafa and Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.). Given the right conditions his party might expect strong support from the middle classes, particularly the younger professional men.

Kamil al Chadirehi was asked to enter Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in 1943 but refused to do so on the ground that he could only take office if he could head a Government formed of his own party. In the autumn of 1946 he fell foul of the Government. He was arrested, tried and imprisoned for attacking the Government in his newspaper *Sa'at al Ahali*. His sentence was subsequently quashed and a re-trial ordered (October).

The trial made a considerable stir which his party exploited, but the affair showed that he is no leader. He has progressive ideas but is unable to co-ordinate them or to form any stable or consistent policy. Chadirehi is a rich landlord, cultivated, and a pleasant dinner-party companion. He is no Communist and has had little personal contact with the working-classes whose cause he champions in the clubs and drawing-rooms of Bagdad. His English is weak but his Turkish is good. He is friendly to us and has just sent his son to study at an English university.

As the leader of the National Democratic Party he has given expression in his newspaper to strong views against various aspects of the policy of Saleh Jabr, notably the Turkish and Transjordan treaties. This has again led to his trial on press law charges.

#### 63. Khalid Sulaiman

Brother of Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.). Born 1877. Returned in 1926 from Constantinople, where he had spent most of his life in commerce. Was Minister for Education under Tawfiq Suwaidi in April 1929. In the reshuffle of portfolios which followed Abdul Muhsin Beg's suicide in November 1929, Khalid Beg was made Minister for Irrigation and Agriculture under Naji Pasha Suwaidi. A pleasant, honest and likeable man, but has no influence in politics. Appointed Director-General, Public Works Department, January 1932. Transferred to be Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in September 1934. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1935.

Retired in March 1939 and now lives on his pension.

#### 64. Khalid Zakawi

Sunni. Born 1889. Entered Military College at Constantinople in 1908. Served in the Turkish army until 1924. Joined Iraq army and was appointed aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal I. Promoted to colonel in 1931 and appointed Commandant of the Military College. Went to the Staff College,

Camberley, in 1934 and on his return was made a brigadier and appointed Director of Military Operations. Became O.C. R.I.A.F., in 1936. Appointed Director of Army Administration in 1937. Placed on pension in February 1939. Appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1939. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 became Mutessarif of Bagdad, but was relieved of his appointment in June. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Kabul in November 1942.

#### 65. Khalil Ismail

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1900. Graduate of Law College, Bagdad. Held various positions under the Ministry of the Interior 1925-32. Appointed Secretary to the Cabinet 1932. Director-General of Ministry of Interior 1935. Director-General of Education 1936. Pleasant, reasonable, speaks English well.

Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1937, but in October he was sent to be Mutessarif of Amarah.

Director-General of Ministry of the Interior September 1939.

Appointed Director-General of Awqaf in 1940. Appointed Director-General of Census in October 1941.

Director-General of Finance, August 1943.

Appointed Director-General of Revenues in December 1942.

Transferred to the more lucrative post of Director-General of Customs and Excise in March 1945. Chairman of the Import Committee of Ministry of Supply formed in July 1947.

#### 66. Khushaba, Malik

Assyrian chieftain of the Lower Tigris tribe, aged about 55. Presbyterian, and generally in disagreement with Mar Shimun. Well educated by American missionaries at Urmia. A striking personality with a romantic record as fighter and leader. Supported the Iraqi Government in their efforts to settle the Assyrians satisfactorily in Iraq and thereby incurred the bitter enmity of Mar Shimun. Many of his followers were, however, quite innocently massacred in August 1933 in spite of their friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Government. He desires to leave Iraq, but does not wish to be resettled in the same place as Mar Shimun.

Since hope of moving all the Assyrians from Iraq has been abandoned, Malik Khushaba has settled down to a quiet life in his village. Now resides in Mosul.

#### 67. Mahmud Abdul Karim

Aged about 52. Reuters correspondent in Iraq. Worked as a secretary in the Royal Bilat from 1932-38. Started a daily newspaper called *Al Diyar* in 1943 but it was not a success and folded up in July 1946. Karim is very friendly to us. He went to London with the Iraqi press delegation in 1945 and remained in England for some time working in Reuters head office. He returned to England in January 1946 as press attaché to the Iraqi Delegation to U.N.O. He was a follower of Ibrahim Kerani (q.v.) but has taken no active part in politics. He was well-liked by Ramdi Parhaichi but is disliked by Nuri Pasha and has fallen foul of Arshad. He is a good writer but is inclined to be careless in checking his facts. While in England he fell in love with a London solicitor's daughter whom he married in the summer of 1946. He speaks fluent English.

#### 68. Mahmud Subhi Daftari

Sunni of Bagdad. Lawyer. Born 1890. Went with his father to Constantinople during the occupa-



tion and returned in 1919. Appointed Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad) April 1920, but was dismissed in September 1921. Appointed principal of the Law School November 1921, but resigned immediately after his appointment. Became Director-General of Tapu December 1922 and Amin-al-Asimah October 1923. Transferred to the Ministry of the Interior as Director-General of Municipalities in November 1926. He soon quarrelled with Arshad-al-Umari, the Amin-al-Asimah, and resigned. He was made a Senator in October 1927.

Pleasant, well intentioned and noticeably more moderate in politics than in his earlier days.

Became Minister of Justice in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1928, but devoted more attention to his entertaining than to his official duties. Resigned February 1930 with whole Cabinet. Made a Senator in 1930.

Made Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri Said's Cabinet in December 1933, a post which he obviously enjoyed enormously. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in June 1944.

### 69. *Mahrut-bin-Hadhkhal, Shaikh*

Chief of the Amarat, Anaiza (Arab) tribe of Iraq. He succeeded his father in 1927. Born about 1896. Intensely proud, but wiser than he appears to be. He has endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Government, though the Nationalist element in Bagdad regard him with some suspicion on account of his father's close friendship with the British. His tribal area is from the Euphrates southwards to the Nejd border.

He obtained a good contract for the supply of labour on the Hsiah-Bagdad road in 1940. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he lost control of his tribe, parties of which attacked and looted some of the road camps.

His estate at Razza, near Karbala, has been expropriated for the Abu Dhillis reservoir and Mahrut has experienced great difficulty in obtaining compensation from the Government.

He is now (1947) trying to get the pre-1941 division of labour and guards on the pipeline restored. This division divided these intensive services between the Amari and the Dulaim tribes on a geographical basis.

### 70. *Mahmud, Shaikh*

Of the family of Barzaja Sayyid. He has inherited from his father and grandfather great tribal and religious influence throughout Southern Kurdistan. He was made Hukmdar of Suleimani in 1918, shortly after the British occupation. In June 1919 he revolted against British authority, was wounded and deported to Henjam Island in the Persian Gulf. He was reinstated as Hukmdar of Suleimani in 1922, after the Turks had forced the British political officers there to withdraw. In 1923 armed action had to be taken against him to check his endeavours to establish his influence in the Kirkuk and Arbil Provinces. Suleimani was reoccupied in 1924, but Shaikh Mahmud was not brought to terms until 1927. These were that he was to abstain from politics and live outside Iraq in one of his Persian villages close to the border. He chose Piran and stayed there quietly until 1930, when an outbreak of Kurdish Nationalist feeling in Suleimani again tempted him into the political arena. Air and ground forces had again to be sent against him, and on the 31st May he surrendered at Panjw. He was granted an allowance and sent to live at Hilla. From there he was later removed to Ramadi, and in the summer of 1938 he was permitted to take a house in Bagdad. He receives an allowance of 900 rupees a month from the Iraqi Government. He has three sons,

Rauf, Baba Ali and Latif. Rauf is quiet and industrious and is a student in the Law College. Elected Deputy for Suleimani in December 1938 and again in June 1939. Baba Ali, after completing his secondary schooling at Victoria College in Alexandria, was sent to Columbia University, New York, to study political economy. On his return in 1938 he was given employment in the railways. Latif is the pet of his father, and will follow closely in his footsteps, if he has the chance to do so.

His properties in Suleimani were confiscated in 1931, but restored by special Act of Parliament in December 1938.

Towards the end of May 1941, during Rashid Ali's rebellion, Shaikh Mahmud escaped from Bagdad, and in company with Abbas-Salim, brother of Babekr Agha (q.v.) he raised a tribal force to attack Suleimani with the object of ejecting Rashid Ali's officials. Before their plans could materialise, however, Rashid Ali's rebellion collapsed and most of the chieftains returned home. Shaikh Mahmud himself endeavoured to exploit the occasion to obtain concessions to the Kurds, but he was persuaded in the end to disperse his followers and to settle down in Darikella, one of his villages in Barzaja. His youngest and favourite son, Latif, is restless and unreliable, and a source of anxiety to the Mutesarrif of Suleimani.

### 71. *Majid Mustafa*

A Kurd of Suleimani, born about 1864. During the war of 1914-18 he was an officer in the Turkish army, and for some time after the Armistice of Mudros held pro-Turkish views. He was an active supporter of Shaikh Mahmud 1924-26. When Shaikh Mahmud submitted to the Government Majid was made a Mudir in the Kut liwa. His administrative ability was soon apparent. In 1928 he became Qaimmaqam of Nusiriyah, and in 1935 he was promoted to be Mutesarrif. Two years later he was posted to Amara where he remained until 1941.

His attitude in the Rashid Ali disturbances of 1941 was equivocal, but he seems on the whole to have favoured Rashid Ali's cause rather than that of the Regent. Rashid Ali did not, however, trust him and brought him in to the capital so that he could be watched. After the Regent's return to Bagdad at the beginning of June 1941 Majid took leave in Turkey.

He returned in September and was then suspended for four years on account of his compliance with the orders of the Rashid Ali régime.

Nevertheless, in December 1943 he joined Nuri Pasha's Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, with the special task of finding some means to stop the fighting with Mulla Mustafa in the Barzaja area and of redressing Kurdish grievances. The Regent disliked his appointment and only reluctantly agreed to it.

Majid succeeded in bringing about a peaceful settlement with Mulla Mustafa in January 1944 and remained in the Cabinet, without Portfolio, but charged specially with advising the Government on Kurdish affairs.

Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

Has gone into business but has not abandoned politics. Made a vigorous and impressive speech on Kurdish needs in the Chamber in January 1945. By the Kurds he is not trusted as they consider he is only interested in the fruits of power. Has been careful to advertise on the surface his dissociation from events in Barzaja.

Not a member of the 1947 Chamber, he is concentrating on business, he has business connexions with the war millionaire Shidly Bisbari of Transjordan.

### 72. *Mar Shimun*

Eshai, Mar Shimun, Patriarch of the Assyrians (Catholics of the Church in the East).

Born about 1900. Succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury. Since coming of age and assuming the authority of his position, Mar Shimun has actively fostered discontent among the Assyrians. Whatever his position as the head of a spiritual community, his temporal authority is not acknowledged by a large number of Assyrians, estimated at a maximum at 12,000. His aim has been to establish the whole community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. He was the inspirer of the mutiny of the levies in 1932 and of the exodus to Syria in 1933. Deported by the Iraqi Government in the summer of 1933, he was given an asylum in Cyprus, where his father David and his aunt Sarma joined him. In October 1933 he went to Geneva to protest to the League of Nations against the massacre of Assyrians which followed the Assyrian attack on the Iraqi army at Dairaban (Fahkhbar) in August 1933, and in November went to England to obtain support from friends and sympathisers there. On his deportation King Feisal granted him and his family a provisional allowance of £750 a year, subject to his correct behaviour. This allowance was stopped by King Ghazi in the summer of 1934 on account of the propaganda which Mar Shimun persistently carried on against Iraq.

While paying lip-service to the League of Nations and always ready to petition that body on behalf of the Assyrians, he has proved disloyal to its decisions whenever they have conflicted with his personal ambition. By preferring temporal power to spiritual leadership, he has been the means of inflicting much needless suffering on a deserving people. During the year 1934 he was mostly in England, paying several visits to Geneva when Assyrian affairs were under discussion. He remained in Europe throughout 1935 and 1936, spending much time in London.

In 1939 he was granted British naturalisation and went to live in Cyprus.

Since 1940 he has been living in the United States.

His 1936 Christmas message to his flock, though innocuous enough, roused the suspicions of the Iraqi Government.

### 73. *Maulud Mukhlis*

Sunni. Born about 1875. A fine soldier, he behaved with great gallantry with the Sharifian army and was badly wounded. His exploits do not lose in the telling. Served in Syria and was sent in 1920 to Dair, where the agreement between the British Government of Occupation and the Arab Government was reached under his auspices in April. A hot Nationalist, he continued to spread anti-British propaganda among the tribes until he was recalled by King Feisal in June. Remained in Syria after the fall of the Arab Government and returned to Bagdad in July 1921. He lost no time in joining the extreme Nationalist group. There was no post to offer him in the Iraqi army, but he was given some land near Tikrit and settled down to cultivate it, with occasional visits to Bagdad and Mosul to take part in Nationalist activities. In May 1924 he was appointed Mutesarrif of Karbala, to deal with the Ulema. He is no administrator, but he kept things quiet at the time of the exodus of the *mujtahids*. An impulsive man, who allows his pan-Arab sentiment to rule his actions. He was bitterly hostile to the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1937 after Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat* and openly condemned the murder of Jafar Pasha. In February 1937 an attempt was made to assassinate him and three of Bakr Sidqi's aides-de-camp were suspected. Maulud then

went to live in Syria, but returned soon after Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937. Has been a Senator since 1925.

He was elected president of the Chamber in December 1937.

Attended the Arab Parliamentary Conference on Palestine arranged by Alubba Pasha in Cairo in the summer of 1935.

Re-elected president of the Chamber November 1938 and again in June and November 1939. Was not re-elected in November 1941.

In recent years his drunkenness has increased and discredited him.

### 74. *Muaffaq-at-Alousi*

Born about 1894. Belongs to a learned family of Bagdad. He is a graduate of the Sorbonne whence he returned to Bagdad in 1920. Was appointed a professor in the law school and afterwards in 1928 Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Two years later he quarrelled with the Minister, Abdullah Damhaji, and withdrew to Beirut. In 1931 he accompanied Nuri Pasha to Mecca to negotiate the Iraq-Nejd "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement. In the autumn of 1932 he went again to Mecca, this time to take up a post as judicial adviser to King Abdul Azziz-at-Saud. He remained in Arabia for about a year and then returned to Bagdad. In May 1934 he was appointed first secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran. Transferred to be consul at Beirut in May 1935. Appointed consul-general at Bombay December 1936. Dismissed from the Foreign Service in November 1937.

Remained in Syria until January 1939 when he returned to Iraq. Returned to the Foreign Service in February 1939 and posted to Paris as chargé d'affaires. Transferred to be consul-general at Damascus June 1939.

Transferred to Istanbul as consul-general in July 1941. Recalled in November. A heavy drinker, with unsavoury habits, he is not a good consular officer and is suspected of pro-Nazi sympathies.

He was dismissed in April 1943 for insubordination and in the early summer was seeking official employment in Saudi Arabia. In 1944 he was living in Turkey on an allowance supplied to him by Ibn Saud.

### 75. *Mudhdhajar Ahmed, O.D.E.*

Born Hilla, 1890. Sunni Muslim. Married. His wife (who appears in public) is of the Partow family and a sister of the wives of Ibrahim Kemal and Tahir Askari, to which family, and to that of Nuri al-Said, he is related through his mother.

Educated in Bagdad he served in the Turkish army as an officer. He was among the first direct officer-appointments to the police after the formation of the National Government having been gazetted Assistant Commandant on 10th December, 1921. He received his initial training under various British officers and by the mid-1920s had established a good reputation in the Diwaniyah Liwa. He was promoted commandant in 1932 and was one of a group of officers sent for training in the Birmingham City Police School. After completing this course he returned to Bagdad and was appointed Principal of the Inspectors' Training School, which post he held for some years. Thereafter he became Director, Passport, Residence and Nationality Department, Director, C.I.D., and held other posts on the headquarters staff. After the 1941 rebellion, working under the orders of Sayyid Ahmed Al-Bawi, as Director, C.I.D., he was most energetic in clearing up the chaos remaining after the collapse of the Rashid Ali régime. He hunted out and deported foreign Arab "Nazis" and was equally active in regard to Iraqis of the same type. In September 1941 he was appointed Director-General of Civil



Defence which post he retained until appointed Mutasarrif, Basrah, on 12th August, 1944. Here he distinguished himself by his cordial co-operation with the British forces, but he was equally popular with all shades of Iraqi opinion and classes. Since then he has served for a short while as Mutasarrif, Mosul Liwa, and in October 1946 became Mutasarrif, Bagdad Liwa.

Mudhaffar Ahmed has matured slowly. In his younger days he did not show outstanding promise, although he always was looked upon as being steady and reliable. Always keen on sport, he was a keen "soccer," polo and tennis player and did much to foster keenness for the first and third (polo had always been played) in the police, and later in the Royal Olympic Club, Bagdad. He has developed into a sound steady public servant and in the normal course of events, being still under fifty, should go far in the service.

Awarded the O.B.E. for war services, 1946.

An attractive personality. He speaks excellent English and some French, as does his agreeable wife.

#### 76. *Muhammad Ali Mahmud*

Sunni. Born 1905. A lawyer who has served in many posts under the Ministry of Justice, including that of Director-General of the Ministry, Director-General of Taps and judge of the Court of Appeal. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in 1935 and for Arbil in 1936. Has twice been elected Vice-President of the Chamber and held the post of chairman of the Finance Committee in 1937. Appointed Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's reformed Cabinet in June 1937. He resigned in August 1937 with the whole Cabinet.

Elected Deputy for Arbil December 1937 but lost his seat in June 1939.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion at the end of May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over by the Persian Government to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Alhwa and subsequently sent to Southern Rhodesia to be interned. Sent back for trial in March 1944. Sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Released in July 1947.

#### 77. *Muhammad Amin Zaki*

A Kurd of Sulaimani. Born 1880. Well educated and speaks French, German and English. Formerly staff officer in Turkish army. Was made Minister for Communications and Works in November 1925, and subsequently held the portfolios of Education and Defence. Exerted little influence in the Cabinets in which he has held office. His policy is to try to please the Kurds by supporting Kurdish Nationalists without compromising his position with the Arabs. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930. Again Minister for Economics and Communications July 1931. Resigned October 1932. Appointed Director-General of Economics and Communications March 1933, but became unemployed when this post was abolished in September 1934. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1935 in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet. Resigned when the Cabinet fell in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Became Minister for Economics in March 1940 in Rashid Ali's third Cabinet.

Resigned in July 1940 on account of severe illness.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Nuri al-Said in October 1941. Resigned in February 1942 on account of ill-health. Made a Senator December 1943.

#### 78. *Muhammad Hassan Kubba*

Shi'ah of Bagdad. Born 1891. Belongs to the old family of Kubba. In 1920 was associated with the Nationalist activities of Ja'far Chalabi Abu Timman. In 1923 he entered the service of the Ministry of Justice. Served as a judge in many parts of the country and also held posts in the Ministry. In December 1943 he joined the Cabinet as Minister for Social Affairs under Nuri Said. Retained this position in the Cabinet of Hamdi al Pachachi which followed Nuri's resignation in June 1944, but became President of the Chamber of Deputies on the resignation of Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi in December 1944.

Joined the Al Umari Cabinet in June 1946 as Minister of Justice. The Prime Minister's interference with the Courts however soon caused him uneasiness and he wanted to resign in August, only remaining in office at the Regent's request. Senator 2nd July, 1947.

#### 79. *Muhammad Hussein el Hadid*

Born Mosul 1906. Sunni Muslim. Merchant.

Muhammad el Hadid was educated at Mosul Mutawassit School until 1924, when he went to Beirut. He returned from Beirut in 1928 and almost immediately went to England to continue his education at the London School of Economics. After returning to Iraq in 1931 he was appointed to a post in the Ministry of Finance which he held until 1937, when he was elected as a Deputy for Mosul. He then went into business with Kamil el Khediri, Muhammad Ja'far Abu Timman and others and formed the "El Sherikat el Ziyat Wal Nahlitayeh" and engaged in a considerable export trade. He is still (1946) a partner in that company. His father, Haji Hussein, is reputed to be one of the wealthiest men in Mosul, while Muhammad el Hadid himself has married the daughter of the man who, by common talk, is probably the richest in the Liwa, if not in the whole of Iraq.

Through his friendship with Kamil el Chadarchi, and possibly through contacts while in England, he became interested at an early date in the "Progressive" Movement and was one of the signatories to the application for the founding of the Hizb el Watani el Demokrati, of which he is the vice-president.

He has made many heated speeches attacking "colonisation" and professing to support "Progress," all with a strong anti-British bias, but it is stated that he has always opposed violence and was against the general strike of July 1946. He has many British friends, to whom his frankness appeals. His son is being educated at Victoria College.

Is generally looked upon as being a pleasant, shrewd man. In September 1946 he wrote an article on Iraq in the *New Statesman and Nation* which attacked the Umari régime, as a result of which the paper was excluded from Iraq.

He was defeated in the 1947 elections, owing to Government pressure, but he appears less embittered than others who underwent the same experience. Unconfirmed reports state that he is not unconnected with the Russian Legation.

#### 80. *Muhammad Husain Kashif-al-Ghata (Sa'iid)*

Shi'ah Alim of Najaf. One of the few Arab Divines of importance.

Attended the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931 as Iraqi delegate. Visited Persia on a prolonged tour in the summer of 1933, and returned to Iraq in February 1934. In the spring of 1935 he took a prominent part in the tribal insurrections on the Euphrates, and gave his full support to the tribes

which took up arms against Yasin Pasha's Government. He hoped to persuade them to make a united front with the Ulama in an attempt to force on the Government a series of sectarian demands intended to secure for the Shi'ah community a greater share in the government of the country. He was only partially successful and, after the defeat of the tribes by the army, he wisely withdrew to silence in the shrines of Najaf.

Declared a jihad for Palestine in the summer of 1938.

In 1939 it was suspected that he had accepted money from the German Legation to foster anti-British feeling.

Issued a fatwa against the British during Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. His nephew, Ahmad Kashif-al-Ghata, actively supported Rashid Ali and was interned in August 1941 at Fao, but was released in August 1944.

#### 81. *Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi*

Shi'ah of Bagdad, born about 1890. Belongs to a well-known family. Member of Constituent Assembly and Minister for Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Again given the portfolio of Education in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935. His reactionary views soon brought him into conflict with his colleagues and with the chief permanent officials of his Ministry, and he resigned in September 1935. He became President of the Senate, February 1937, and was reappointed Minister for Education in Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1937. He is president of the Bagdad branch of the Pen Club and has a considerable reputation as a man of letters. Resigned with Jamil-al-Madfa'i in December 1939.

Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfa'i in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed to the Board of Education created in April 1943.

Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943 and again in December 1944, but resigned almost immediately.

A genial old bigot determined to have nothing to do with anything modern. Speaks no English.

Took a leading part in debates of Parliament during spring session 1947, criticising the Government and getting in some shrewd blows at the British.

#### 82. *Muhammad Salih-al-Qazzaz*

Bagdad mechanic. Born about 1898. At one time came into prominence as a labour leader and agitator. A professional demagogue, he used to thrust himself in the van of any bazaar troubles, and was especially conspicuous in encouraging discontent among the labour employed by the foreign companies operating in Iraq. Played a leading part in organising the boycott of the Bagdad Electric Light Company in the autumn and winter of 1933.

During the premiership of Yasin al-Hashimi he was not allowed to agitate, but when Hikmat Sulaiman came into office in October 1936 Muhammad Salih became the treasurer of the Popular Reform League which was organised by Kamil Chadirji with a left-wing programme. His activities became so tiresome that in February 1937 he was sent to live in Ramadi, where he remained until December 1937, when he was released. Little has since been heard of him.

#### 83. *Muhammad-al-Sadr, Sa'iid*

Born about 1895. An influential Shi'ah divine of Kadhimain. Was a violent Nationalist in the early days of the British occupation, and played a prominent part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled

to Syria when the insurrection was put down, but returned with the Amir Feisal in June 1921. Took an active part in the anti-mandate controversy of 1923, but after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1924 greatly modified his views. Appointed a Senator in 1925, and elected President of the Senate in 1929. He has subsequently been re-elected to this position at each new session, until February 1937, when Ridha-al-Shabibi was elected instead. He was re-elected President of the Senate in December 1937 and again in December 1938, June 1939 and November 1939.

Re-elected President of the Senate in November 1941 and November 1942. A dignified and picturesque personality with an acute and sometimes embarrassing idea of his own importance. Ceased to be President of the Senate in December 1943 on the election of Jamil-al-Madfa'i.

An overpowering figure familiarly known as "God" from his resemblance to Byzantine representations of a bearded deity.

Appointed a member of the Council of Regency during the Regent's absence in the summer of 1947.

#### 84. *Muhammad Salim el Radhi*

Born Bagdad 1890. Muslim. Public servant and landowner.

Educated in Bagdad primary and secondary schools, he graduated from the American University, Beirut, and later went to the United States, where he studied at Texas and California Universities, from which he took doctorates in Agriculture and Science. He returned to Iraq in 1926 and joined the Department of Agriculture, in which he has continued until he became the Director-General, which post he has held for several years.

A quiet, capable man, with many friends in all communities. He has shown no pronounced political tendencies or attachments and this, perhaps, explains his undisturbed service as Director-General of a Department. However, owing to the fact that he is connected to the wealthy Shabandar family—Ibrahim al Shabandar being his cousin—and that he himself is a considerable landowner, it is unlikely that he holds any "advanced" views, in spite of his associations in the United States.

He was made Director-General of Labour in the Ministry of Social Affairs in November 1946 and appointed minister at Tehtan in June 1947.

He and his attractive wife speak excellent English.

#### 85. *Mulla Mustafa*

Born about 1898. Brother of Ahmad of Barzan (q.v.). Was the fighting leader of the Barzanis in the troubles of 1931-32. He surrendered with Shakh Ahmad and was banished to Sulaimani. There he lived for ten years in poverty on a small allowance from the Government. In the autumn of 1943 he bolted back to Barzan and a few months later became involved in skirmishes with the police. The fighting gradually developed, and Mulla Mustafa successfully resisted the considerable forces of police and Iraqi troops sent against him.

In the beginning he was concerned only with his own position, but later on he began to put forward political demands and to pose as a champion of Kurdish nationalism. He won a good deal of Kurdish sympathy and support. In January 1944 a settlement was arranged whereby he was promised a pardon after paying a formal visit to Bagdad to make submission to the Regent. Thereafter he returned to Barzan, but he remains restless and untamed, and the Government have not yet been able to re-establish control over the Barzani tribal area. Was formally pardoned in April 1945 by the Barzan Amnesty Law, and the Government



embarked on a programme of improving security and of developing agriculture in his area. However, he became impatient in the summer and took up arms against the Government again in August 1945.

He was eventually defeated, more by the agility of the Minister of the Interior in distributing gold than that of the army in occupying his country. He fled with his brother to Persia, whence photographs of him have since found their way back to Iraq showing him as General Mulla Mustafa in a uniform strangely reminiscent of that worn by Generalissimo Stalin.

Recently his fortunes seem to have declined and many of his followers have returned to Iraq.

After the collapse of the Kurdish independence movement led by Qazi Muhammad, he was forced to return to Iraq retiring before the Persian forces. His brother Shaikh Ahmad surrendered with his forces to the Iraqi authorities. Mulla Mustafa with about 500 men attempted to come to terms with Iraqi Government, who demanded unconditional surrender. The Mulla thereupon returned to Persia via Turkey and made his way through Azerbaijan to Soviet territory where he and his men surrendered to the Russian authorities.

### 86. Musa Shabandar

Bagdadi Sunni, born 1899. Elder son of Mahmud Shabandar, a wealthy land and property owner of Bagdad.

Went to Berlin soon after the armistice, and lived in Europe, mostly in Zurich and Berlin, until the autumn of 1932, when he returned to Bagdad.

In January 1933 he was appointed secretary of the permanent Iraqi delegation at the League of Nations.

Speaks English, French and German. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation in Berlin in October 1935.

Early in 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain and recalled to Bagdad, where he was placed under arrest. In December proceedings against him were dropped and it seems doubtful whether there was ever any real evidence against him. Elected Deputy for Amarah, December 1937.

Lost his seat in June 1939. Reappointed to the Diplomatic Service in June 1939 and sent as chargé d'affaires to Berlin. Returned to Bagdad October 1939, and was appointed Assistant Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. His polished and friendly manner hid a close and sinister co-operation with Rashid Ali in his pro-Nazi intrigues. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Alhaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to stand his trial with internees in March 1944. Sentence was finally passed on him, in August 1944, of five years hard labour and sequestration of all his property. Now an invalid.

### 87. Muzahim al-Amin Pachachi

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1888, a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and sat in the first Chamber in 1925. Minister of Communications and Works in the Hashimite Cabinet, August 1924. In 1927, while in London, he made a close study of British politics. Recalled to Bagdad in February 1928 and joined the active Nationalists. His ideas seemed to be tinged with communism. Was prominent in anti-Zionist manifestations in summer of 1929. Became Minister of Economics and Communications in January 1931, and, shortly after, Minister of the Interior, in which

post he unexpectedly gave satisfaction to his British advisers. Resigned in October 1931 on account of a difference with his colleagues regarding his dismissal of the Amin al-Ashwah. Towards the end of May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous anonymous letters, making allegations against the personal honour of the King. Resigned his seat in the Chamber and was committed for trial with four others by Bagdad magistrate's court. Acquitted in October 1932. In October 1934 he was appointed Minister at Rome and permanent delegate at Geneva. In November 1935 he was relieved of his duties at Geneva. Appointed Minister at Paris in July 1939.

Remained in France as Minister to the Vichy Government after the collapse of France in 1940. Recalled in November 1941, when Iraq severed relations with the Vichy Government, but did not return to Iraq. In 1943 he appeared to be living in Rome. Later he went to Geneva and sought but was refused facilities to return to Iraq.

Eventually returned in November 1945.

He is now said to be working with the Opposition group of Hikmat Sulaiman and Jamil Madfai.

He is very deaf.

### 88. Mustafa al-Umari

Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born 1893. Graduated in Law School in Bagdad just before the war. Served as an officer in the Turkish forces fighting in Mesopotamia during the war and was made a prisoner just before the fall of Bagdad. Returned to Iraq after the armistice and entered Government service. Since then he has served in the Waqf Department and in the Ministries of Finance and Interior. His posts included the following: kaimakam in several districts, Accountant General, Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior and mutessarif in a number of liwas. In 1930 he was appointed Mutessarif of the Muntafiq liwa and in June 1937 he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior. He retained this portfolio in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in August 1937.

During the first half of 1938 he acquired a reputation for taking large bribes, and, though no allegations were proved, the Prime Minister thought it well to transfer him to another Ministry. He accordingly went to Justice in October 1938. In December 1938 he resigned with the whole of Jamil al-Madfai's Cabinet after the military demonstration organised by Husain Fawzi and Taha al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri al-Said. He is a Senator.

Appointed Minister of Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941. Since then he has been a prominent speaker in the debates of the Senate, and has been a constant critic of Nuri Said's Administration. Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet of Hamid al-Pachachi formed in June 1944.

He has the reputation of being corrupt, but he is certainly an able administrator and has a comprehensive knowledge of the north as anyone. He put this to good use during the Barzani troubles of 1945, when his well-directed bribery made possible the victory of the Iraqi army.

### 89. Dr. Nadim bin Shakir al Pachachi

Born Bagdad 1914. Muslim, Sunni; nephew of Hamid al Pachachi, late Prime Minister, and of Muzahim al Pachachi, late Iraqi Minister in Paris (q.v.).

Educated at Bagdad and London School of Economics. Returned to Bagdad in 1938 on completing his studies and was appointed to the

Ministry of Economics, of which he is now Director-General. He has a civil service outlook and has never figured in politics.

Went with the Iraqi delegation to the General Assembly of U.N.O. in London, where he took the opportunity of searching for British experts to advise his Ministry in certain matters (e.g., co-operative farming) in which he is anxious to see reform and progress—less perhaps from a disinterested love of the working classes than because he believes that to raise their standard of living is the best defence against discontent and communism.

Speaks excellent English.

He had already left Bagdad as a member of the Iraqi delegation to the Sterling Balance talks in London in June 1947 when he was recalled from Cairo. No reason was given officially but some connected his recall with his recent divorce of his wife and marriage with a cabaret artiste. His position as Director-General of Economics remains outwardly unaffected but his conduct has done him no good.

### 90. Dr. Naji al-Asil

Bagdadi, born 1895. First became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. Continued to represent Hashimite interests in London until final conquest of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud. Dr. Naji then became destitute in England, and was deported to Iraq in October 1925. In Iraq he was soon employed under the Ministry of Defence in the Iraqi Military Medical Service. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General and Chargé d'Affaires in Jeddah in August 1931. Returned to Bagdad in June 1932 to be present during the visit of the Amir Feisal, son of King Abdul Aziz al-Saud. Appointed consul, Mohammarah, October 1932. Acting Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1933. Appointed counsellor in the Legation at Tehran, April 1935.

In June 1936, while on leave in Bagdad, he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the palace, and accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs when Hikmat Sulaiman formed his Cabinet in October 1936. Resigned with Hikmat Sulaiman in August 1937, and was not included in the Cabinet formed by Jamil al-Madfai.

Appointed Director-General of Antiquities in 1941.

A pleasant man of considerable intelligence who speaks excellent English. He is violently anti-Zionist.

He worked very well with the Adviser to the Antiquities Department, but has lately been in personal financial difficulties which have had an adverse effect on his work. There are few of the leading politicians with whom he is on really friendly terms and this too obstructs him.

### 91. Naji Shaukat

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1891. Studied in Constantinople and became a reserve officer. Joined the Sharif and was at Agabah with Colonel Lawrence, for whom he has a great admiration. Returned to Bagdad in 1919. Early in 1921 he was given an appointment under the Mutessarif of Bagdad, and subsequently became mutessarif. He showed considerable administrative ability and maintained cordial relations with his British advisers. He was appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1922, of Hillah in 1923, and of Bagdad in 1924. Minister for Interior, June 1928, Minister for Justice, September 1929, and reverted to Interior in the changes which followed Abdul Muslim's suicide. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in September 1930. Recalled to Bagdad in October 1931 to take up portfolio of Interior. Became Prime Minister in November 1932. Received the Order of Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy in January 1933. Resigned premiership March 1933. Minister for the Interior in November 1933,

resigned February 1934. Again appointed Minister at Angora April 1934. He accompanied Tawfiq Rustu Aras, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his official visit to Bagdad in the summer of 1937, and was then offered a Cabinet post in Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He declined because of his objection to Bakr Sidqi's influence.

Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Nuri al-Said in December 1938, but resigned in April 1939. Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939.

Became Minister for Justice in Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940.

After the collapse of France, he became a strong advocate of reinsurance with the Axis. With Rashid Ali's approval he went to Istanbul in September 1940 to establish contact with the German Ambassador, Herr von Papen. It was perhaps more than a coincidence that just before his return to Iraq, towards the end of October 1940, the local Arabic press published the official Axis declaration of sympathy with Arab aspirations, and that just after his return the resumption of direct telegraphic communication between Iraq and Germany and Italy was announced. He resigned in January 1941, but was appointed Minister of Defence in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he went to Turkey to try and enlist Turkish support for Rashid Ali's cause. After the collapse of the rebellion he remained in Turkey. He was tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment.

In 1942 he found his way to Europe and moved between Berlin and Rome, receiving a Minister's salary from the Reich Government. In 1943 it seemed that he had taken up his residence in Rome, where he was in touch with the ex-Mufti of Palestine. In the summer of 1945 he was arrested in Italy, sent back to Iraq and imprisoned.

### 92. Nadhi Shawi

Born Bagdad about 1890. Educated in Military College, Constantinople, and the Turkish Staff College. Served in Turkish army until the end of the war 1914-18. He joined King Feisal's army in Syria and fought at Ma'inah, where Feisal was defeated by the French. He then returned to Bagdad and for some years was employed as a teacher in the secondary schools. During this period he graduated at the Bagdad Law College. He later returned to the army and was given rank as a senior captain. In 1935 he attended army manoeuvres in England. On his return he was made Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College. After two years in this post he was promoted brigadier and appointed Assistant Chief of General Staff. He was placed on pension in 1939 and became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the flight of Rashid Ali to Persia. He made a pleasant if colourless Minister and resigned with the whole Cabinet in early October 1941.

### 93. Najib al-Rawi

Born about 1890. Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Ahmad al-Rawi. Married to a sister of Mune, Hikmat Sulaiman. Ran for many years practised successfully as a lawyer and in 1942 was elected president of the Law Society. In 1940 he was suspected of being too close intimacy with the ex-Mufti of Palestine (then a fugitive in Iraq) and with the Italian Minister. He was careful, however, to avoid becoming involved in Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in 1941.

Slender and mountain, he is a prominent figure in upper class social life in Bagdad. Elected a Deputy in October 1943. He represented Iraq at the Arab Lawyers' Conference at Damascus in August 1944.



He has performed useful services for us, but it is difficult to say how trustworthy he is. He and his wife speak good English. She is a sister of Mune. Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.).

Minister of Education in Sawaidi Cabinet of 1940.

Returned to presidency of Lawyers' Association as soon as the former president had become Minister for Social Affairs in the next Government but an.

#### 94. Nasrat al-Farisi

Lawyer of Bagdad, born about 1890. In the early days of the Iraqi Government he held somewhat extreme Nationalist views, which he voiced as a Deputy in the Chamber. Was later given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice, where he served diligently for a number of years.

Minister for Finance, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Beg Shaukat in March 1933. Appointed Minister for Finance in Jamil Beg Al Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1935. Appointed Iraqi delegate at Geneva in June 1937.

Steady and intelligent, but inclined to be obstructive.

Was relieved of this appointment in the summer of 1939 when it was decided to withdraw the Iraqi delegation from Geneva. He then returned to the Bar.

Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Jamil al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angola in April 1943, but did not proceed.

In June 1943 he became Foreign Minister. Resigned in October 1943 as a protest against the Regent's interference in the choice of Government candidates for election to Parliament.

Went to San Francisco in 1945 as a member of the Iraqi delegation. Speaks excellent English, but still takes lessons to keep himself up to date.

In the Parliament of 1947 he has spoken much on financial questions for the Opposition.

#### 95. Nishat al-Sanawi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Studied in the School of Law, Constantinople. He was in Bagdad before the occupation, went to Mosul with the Turks, and was employed in various capacities there. Returned after the armistice and took service under the British Administration. Was appointed Director of the Law School when it was reopened in 1919; criminal magistrate, February 1922; judge in the Court of Appeal, March 1923. Amin al-Asimah, Bagdad, 1925-30. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior in April 1930, and became Principal of the Law School, February 1931. Reappointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior, November 1931. Appointed Administrative Inspector, November 1933. Became Director-General of Municipalities in June 1935.

Appointed Chief Finance Inspector, May 1936. Placed on pension about end of 1938.

#### 96. Nureddin Mahmud

Born 1880. A Kurd. Commissioned in the Turkish army in 1915. Intelligent, resourceful and ambitious. Director of Military Operations. Graduate of Cambridge and Quetta. Good man both in administration and in the field. One of the few Iraq army officers with modern military knowledge. Has done several courses in England. Command over men is good, and influence on the army high—no witness his behaviour on the flight of Rashid Ali when he took over command of the army and initiated the Anglo-Iraqi armistice. Does not dabble unduly in politics but sympathises with the Allied cause and was heartily against—and worked

against—Rashid Ali. His only strong feeling is apparently for the Kurds, and as long as there is friendship between the Kurds and the British his support can be taken for granted.

Attractive personality. Has been military attaché in London. Was Officer Commanding 2nd Division at Kirkuk and was transferred to Bagdad as Assistant C.O.S. He visited the battle-fields of the Western Desert on the invitation of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, in May 1943.

Was promoted Amir Liwa in November 1944 and later became Officer Commanding, 2nd Division, in the reorganised Iraq army.

He is said to enjoy the confidence of the army to an eminent degree.

#### 97. Nuri al Qadhi

Born 1889, joined Iraq Government service in 1921 and has held the following appointments: Vice-President Bagdad Courts 1925, Vice-President Mosul Courts 1937, Director-General of Waqfa 1931, Head of Legal Drafting Department, Ministry of Justice, 1936, Secretary-General to the Council of Ministers 1941. Of the old school, he has excellent manners and considerable charm, but he has hitherto played no part in politics and little is known of his character and abilities.

Minister of Education in the al Umari Cabinet of June 1946. Dean of the Law College November 1946.

#### 98. Nuri al-Said, G.C.V.O., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated in Constantinople, speaks Turkish, German, French and English. Served in Balkan War. He was one of the founders of the Ahd in 1918 and came from Constantinople to Iraq in order to start branches there. He was in Basra at the time of the occupation as a patient in the American hospital; joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in June 1916, and commanded the troops till the arrival of Jafar Pasha (his brother-in-law); served as C.O.S. till the fall of Damascus. A good strategist very receptive of ideas; clever, hard-working, rash and hot-headed under fire. A modernist with an exceptionally alert intelligence. Was awarded the D.S.O. 1917 and the C.M.G. 1919, and accompanied Feisal in London, Paris and Syria in 1919 and 1920. He always wished for a reasonable rapprochement between the French and the Arabs, and dissuaded King Feisal from offering resistance to the French on the ground that he could not hope for support from the British. When the break came in July 1920 he went with Feisal to England. Returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and took charge of the Ministry of Defence during the absence of Jafar Pasha at the Cairo Conference. On his return he became C.O.S. and Director-General of Police, and held these appointments till October 1922. Acting Minister of Defence from November 1922 to November 1923. Held the same portfolio in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet. Minister of Defence again in November 1926, and retained that portfolio with only short intervals out of office until he became Prime Minister in March 1930. Negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 1930. Visited Feisal in 1931 to negotiate a "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty with Nejd and the Hejaz. Resigned with the whole Cabinet the 10th October, 1931, but reaccepted office on the same day in a reformed Cabinet. Visited Angola with King Feisal July 1931, and again in December-January 1931-32. During latter visit he signed with Turkish Government an Extradition Treaty, a Treaty of Commerce and a Residence Convention. Resigned premiership in October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1933, but did not proceed. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs

in Cabinet of Rashid Ali Gihani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and accepted portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Defence under Jamil al-Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1934 under Ali Jaudat's premiership. Resigned with Ali Jaudat in February 1935, but retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the succeeding Cabinet formed by Jamil al-Madfai, and returned again to the Ministry in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935.

In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, Nuri Pasha, fearing for his life, fled to Egypt with his family, where he carried on a restless agitation from Cairo to secure his return to Iraq. He came back in October 1937 after the murder of Bakr Sidqi and the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He was offered the post of Iraqi Minister in London, but did not accept it. In early December he went to Syria with the intention of working privately for a solution of the problem of the future of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

But for two short visits to Bagdad, Nuri al-Said spent the whole of the year 1938 outside Iraq, occupied principally in desultory conversations about Palestine with politicians in Syria, Egypt and London. On each of his short visits to Bagdad his presence gave rise to rumours concerning his political intentions, but these died away as soon as he left.

In December 1938 he came back to stay, and a few days later a military demonstration in his favour organised by Taha al-Hashimi and Hussein Paozi overthrew Jamil al-Madfai's Cabinet and brought Nuri al-Said into office as Prime Minister. He represented Iraq at the opening of the London conversations about Palestine in January 1939.

Resigned the premiership in February 1940, but at the Regent's request reformed his Cabinet and continued in office until the end of March when, with his own collaboration, a new Cabinet was formed by Rashid Ali.

Remained in office as Minister for Foreign Affairs until the end of January 1941, when he and several of his colleagues resigned because of Rashid Ali's increasing inclination towards the Axis. In April, shortly before Taha al-Hashimi's Cabinet was overthrown by Rashid Ali and the army, Nuri Said wisely withdrew to Transjordan, where he remained until he was able to come back with the Regent at the beginning of June. Before the end of the month he was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo, but was recalled to form a Cabinet on the resignation of Jamil Madfai at the beginning of October 1941. From that time onwards he collaborated closely with His Majesty's Ambassador in emulating pro-Nazi propaganda in Iraq and it was due to his initiative that Iraq declared war on the Axis Powers in January 1943.

In the summer of 1943 Nuri Pasha visited Egypt to discuss Arab unity with the Egyptian Prime Minister Nuhus Pasha. He also went to Syria and Palestine for talks with Arabs there. He remained Prime Minister throughout 1943, but there were many changes in his Cabinet, and he formed his ninth Government on the 25th December, 1943.

Resigned in June 1944 with his whole Cabinet after an unedifying brawl in the Chamber between some of his supporters and the Opposition, which convinced him that he did not enjoy the Regent's confidence and support. In any case he was tired and needed a rest. Accompanied the Regent on his travels in America and Europe during the summer of 1945.

In July 1945 he was elected President of the Senate.

In April 1946 he negotiated a treaty between Iraq and Turkey covering economic and commercial matters but the Tawfiq Sawaidi Cabinet which had come into power during the negotiations wished to recall him on the ground that he had gone too far. When he returned he contrived, with his usual ability to have all his actions sanctioned retrospectively, and the treaty was accepted.

During the summer he went to London with the Regent and then returned to Syria and Turkey in the hope of arranging an understanding, and perhaps a treaty, between the two countries.

He refused to represent Iraq at the Palestine conference partly through jealousy of Azzam and partly because, having been one of the negotiators who obtained the 1939 White Paper, he feels it beneath his dignity to attend a conference whose *point de départ* is its abrogation.

Nuri Pasha is still amazingly youthful and vigorous, both in mind and body, and is likely to remain for some years one of the few Arab statesmen with an international outlook and an international reputation.

He again became Prime Minister after the collapse of the Cabinet of Arslan al-Umari in the autumn of 1946. In this position he missed no opportunity to declare that the long-postponed elections would be free and neglected no step to ensure the return of his and the Palace's nominees. Still incomparably the ablest Iraqi politician, he has gained no affections from the others by this display of his superiority in intrigue and manipulation.

He refused to form the new Government himself on grounds of health, but is thought by many, not altogether correctly, to be the real power in Saleh Jah's Government.

He accompanied His Royal Highness on his European trip and was selected to represent Iraq at the U.N.O. General Assembly on Palestine.

#### 99. Rafail Petrus Butti

Born Mosul 1901. Christian. Journalist and editor. Educated at the Syrian Orthodox School, Mosul, and at a secondary school in Bagdad, he graduated from the Law College after extra-mural studies in 1929. He entered Government service as a clerk in the Ministry of Interior on the recommendation of Razzaz Ghamum, for whose paper *El Iraq* he contributed articles. He himself also published a weekly magazine *El Hawiyeh* which was violently anti-British but which also criticised the Administration for subservience to the British Advisory and Inspectorate staffs. There is no doubt that he received encouragement and support for this as part of the general propaganda campaign for the termination of the Mandate. He over-stopped the mark in 1927 when, after a particularly venomous attack on the British Inspector-General of Police, British policy and the Government, he was dismissed. Within a few weeks, however, he was given a better job in the Ministry of Interior as Translator. Here he was comparatively safe. He remained so employed until he graduated from the Law College when he resigned and in partnership with Fedrum Melkon published *El Bilad*. Until the conclusion of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty he backed his patron, Nuri al-Said, then he switched over to Nuri Pasha's chief opponent, Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi and the Hizb al Ikha al Watan and became a constant and bitter critic of Nuri and his pro-British policy. This was his first change of raiment: there were others, viz., 1921-23, Nuri al-Said; 1923-29, mainly Nuri al-Said, but occasionally al-Hashimi; 1930-35, Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali; 1936-37, Bakr Sidqi; 1937, he loathed to Jamil Madfai after the murder of Bakr Sidqi, but al-Madfai would have nothing to do with him and, when his paper became abusive,



suppressed it for a year. 1939-42, Rashid Ali. 1942-43, Interned. 1943-45, Rashid Ali when he dared. 1946, anti-British.

He has been a Deputy on two occasions, first in 1935 for Mosul and secondly in 1939 for Basra. He was rabidly anti-British both in Parliament and in his paper but his seat in Parliament protected him until July 1942 when in a clear up of probable Fifth Columnists he was interned. Within a short time he whined, said he repented his folly and asked for release. In spite of every opposition he was released in July 1943, but on conditions. These he respected, more or less, and in January was permitted to restart publication of *El Bilad*. Censorship prevented a good deal, but the eleven-hoof showed occasionally and called forth reprisals. As soon as the war ended and the internment camp was cleared, he came forth with all his old-time venom. Recently, for reasons at present unknown, he suddenly removed himself to Egypt whence he wrote saying that he intended to take up permanent residence in that country. His wife sold up the house and furniture and has joined him. He still owns *El Bilad* although he has for the moment leased it at a monthly rental of 1D. 25 or 1D. 30.

Butti is probably the most capable of the Iraqi journalists and is curiously fearless in his comments. Since he first came to notice he has been bitterly anti-British and anti any Government or Politician whom he considers to be in any way favourable to Britain or British policy. It has been suggested that this is a phobia the result of extreme disappointment at not obtaining preferment as a Christian on the occupation by British forces. This has been observed, although in a lesser degree, in other Christians—particularly of Mosul—of about his age.

The real reason for his presence in Egypt is as yet unknown, but it has been suggested that it is not unconnected with Iraqi interests in the Arab League.

It is probable that he could be induced to support any policy for a consideration.

#### 100. Rashid Ali-al-Gilani

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. In Turkish times was a clerk in the Waqf Department. Fled to Mosul with the Turks on the capture of Bagdad, and after the fall of Mosul practised as a lawyer. In May 1921 he was appointed a judge in the Court of Appeal. His work as a judge won him the good opinion of his advisers. Was appointed Minister of Justice in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's Concession in March 1925, which, at Yasin Pasha's instigation, he strongly opposed. Became Minister of Interior in the second Saduniyah Cabinet in June 1925, but resigned almost immediately on being elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. From November 1926 to January 1928 was Minister of the Interior. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931, in company with Yasin-al-Hashimi, Naji-al-Suwaidi and Ali Jaudat, as a protest against the conduct of Nuri Pasha's Government. Became a prominent leader of the Hizbul-Ikha-al-Watani (the party of National Brotherhood). He encouraged the general strike in July 1931, hoping thereby to embarrass Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Appointed chief private secretary to the King in July 1932. Became Prime Minister in March 1933. Resigned October 1933. Appointed Senator in summer of 1934. Helped to organise the disturbances on the Euphrates which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in March 1935 and, as Minister for the Interior, joined the Cabinet then formed by Yasin-al-Hashimi.

After Bakr Sidqi's military revolt against the Hashimite Cabinet in October 1936, Rashid Ali fled

to Constantinople. He came back in October 1937.

During 1938 he made several speeches in the Senate attacking the policy of Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet.

Deported to Anah December 1938. Returned a few days later when Nuri-al-Said succeeded Jamil-al-Madfa'i as Prime Minister. Appointed chief private secretary to the Palace in January 1939, and remained in this post after King Ghazi's death in April 1939. Became Prime Minister in March 1940.

Throughout 1940 he moved steadily towards a break with His Majesty's Government and a closer understanding with the Axis. He refused to break off diplomatic relations with Italy when Italy entered the war, but remained in the closest personal contact with the Italian Legation. He also gave full support to the Mufli's intrigues with the Axis Governments and sponsored the overtures which Naji Shawkat made to the German Minister at Angora in October 1940. In Iraq he gave free rein to the Palestinian agitators and to the pro-Nazi elements of the Press, even allowing it to be stated officially that the policy of his Government was one of strict neutrality in the war in spite of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. Pressure from the embassy forced his resignation at the end of January 1941, but he returned to office by means of a military *coup d'Etat* on the 1st April. He then set aside the Regent and installed Sharif Shuraf in his place. At this juncture, as part of their war plan, His Majesty's Government began to move troops into Iraq, but Rashid Ali, backed by the army, refused to agree to the presence of more than one brigade.

At the beginning of May the Iraqi army attempted to surround the British air base at Habbaniyah and hostilities broke out. Throughout the month Rashid Ali and his colleagues endeavoured to unite the country in a campaign against us, but, though the townspeople were with him, he received little support from the big tribes and fled to Persia after a comparatively small British column had defeated the far larger Iraqi forces opposed to them. From Persia he contrived to make his way to Turkey, and in December, having broken his parole, he escaped to Germany and joined the Mufli in Berlin, where he became a feature of the Berlin Arabic broadcast. Tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to death in January 1943.

Throughout the years 1942-44 he continued to conduct an active campaign against Great Britain from Berlin and Rome and was recognised by the Axis as the legitimate Prime Minister of Iraq. It is now known that the struggle for predominance between him and the Mufli led to a split in the ranks of the Arab traitors. When in London the Regent reiterated his determination that when caught he would be executed.

When the Germans realised that the end was near they offered to fly him to Egypt. He said he preferred Saudi Arabia but the Germans said they could not fly him so far. He therefore was taken through the German lines in a car and went to the Tyrol, thence through Austria to Prague where two Syrian friends gave him a passport. Apparently with the unwitting assistance of American, British and French military transport he finally arrived at Marseilles and thence sailed to Beirut. On the morning of the 24th September, 1945, he arrived in Riyadh in disguise. When he declared himself Ibn Saud gave him asylum. This at once precipitated a crisis in Saudi-Iraqi relations and there were many perfunctious and futile interchanges between Ibn Saud and the Regent. The Prime Minister, Hamdi Pasha, insisted on regarding it as a personal matter and not a political one involving the two countries. The Regent was finally persuaded to accept this view and seems now overtly reconciled to Rashid Ali's con-

tinued presence in Riyadh. Covertly, however, there is no doubt that he harbours this additional grudge against Ibn Saud.

There has been a press campaign recently in his favour in Egypt and various requests for his pardon have been forwarded to the Regent. Reports indicate that he is recognised by the Iraqi Istiqlal Party as their leader.

#### 101. Rashid-al-Khojah

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1884. Staff officer in Turkish army. Came to Damascus after the armistice. Prominent member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. He returned to Bagdad in November 1920 and was appointed mutessarif in January 1921. He is weak and much under the thumb of the extreme National group. In February 1922 he was appointed mutessarif of Mosul, where he was completely under the influence of Mustafa Sabunji. As his presence in a frontier division was considered inexpedient by the Iraqi Government, he was removed and reappointed mutessarif of Bagdad. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General at Cairo October 1928, and Director-General of Education January 1930. Consul-General, Beirut, August 1931. Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General at Jeddah, August 1933, but did not take up post. Appointed Minister for Defence under Naji Shawkat, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Shawkat's Cabinet in March 1933. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies November 1933 after resignation of Jamil-al-Madfa'i. Reappointed Minister of Defence in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1934. Re-elected President of the Chamber in December 1934. Again appointed Minister for Defence in Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in March 1935, but resigned with the whole Cabinet after being only twelve days in office. Elected to the Chamber in August 1935 and joined the Opposition led by Jamil-al-Madfa'i. Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in September 1937.

Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in January 1939.

Placed on pension in the autumn of 1941.

#### 102. Rauf-al-Bahrani

A Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1897. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance, where he rose to be Accountant-General (not altogether by merit). Appointed Minister for Finance in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in March 1935.

Resigned October 1936.

Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise, January 1938. Became Minister of Finance in February 1940 and of Social Affairs in March.

Resigned with Rashid Ali and his Cabinet in January 1941 and joined Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April 1941. Fled to Tehran when British troops approached Bagdad towards the end of May 1941 and was arrested by the British forces which occupied Persia in August. After a period of detention at Aliwal he was sent to Southern Rhodesia in December 1941 to be interned. Sent back for trial in March 1944 and in August 1944 condemned to three years' hard labour and sequestration of all his property.

#### 103. Rauf-al-Chadirchi

Sunni of Bagdad. He was Mayor of Bagdad at the time of the cutting of New Street and earned a great deal of personal unpopularity thereby. Left for Berlin shortly before the occupation, and subsequently went to Switzerland, returning to Bagdad in the summer of 1920, up to which time permission to return had been refused him. Speaks

French, English and German well. He set up practice as a barrister and consorted much with British officials. He took no part in the Nationalist agitation; nevertheless, when his father was deported to Constantinople in August, he was asked to return with him. He came back in 1921 and resumed his legal work without taking any part in politics. He has most of the business of foreign firms in his hands owing to his knowledge of English. He was in England on a visit during the summer of 1923, returning home in September. A retiring man of modernist opinions. Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly in March 1924. He was strongly opposed to the passage of the treaty without amendments and voted against it. Chosen director of the Law School August 1924. Minister of Finance, Second Saduniyah Cabinet, and afterwards became Minister of Justice in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet in November 1926. Iraqi Minister to Angora autumn 1929. Resigned post as Minister at Angora in December 1930, and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Appointed Iraqi Minister in London in December 1936, and proceeded to his post early in 1937. Resigned March 1940 and remained in England, where he has a well-paid post with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

A cultured, likable and intelligent man.

#### 104. Rauf-al-Kubaisi

Sunni; of Kubaisah origin. Born 1885. He was commandant of gendarmerie in Aleppo under Jafar Pasha in 1919 and did useful work in keeping order before the advent of the French in July 1920. Refused office under the French and returned to Bagdad in February 1921. He was appointed Kafmakam of Suq in November 1921, but was removed in June. He then for a time joined the extreme Nationalist group in Bagdad. Appointed Director-General of Prisons in 1924 and subsequently played no part in politics. Appointed Mutessarif of Basra January 1930. Dismissed for incompetence, April 1931. Appointed Director-General of Auqaf in summer of 1933, and Director-General of Census in November 1937.

Mutessarif of Bagdad November 1938 and Director-General of Auqaf April 1939. Resigned June 1940.

Reappointed Director-General of Auqaf in November 1941 by Nuri Said.

#### 105. Razzuq Ghannam

Dayen of Bagdad journalists. Owner of *Al Iraq*. A Christian. Pro-British; backer of Nuri Said. He is a Deputy for Bagdad. At one time he employed Rafael Butti, but soon fired him when he realised his true feelings. Pan-Arabist. According to a speech he made while a Deputy, he had no time for those who supported the merchants and landowners at the expense of the people. "Parliaments were not collected for the protection of the profiteers and opportunists." Invited to visit Britain as one of the delegation of Iraq journalists, autumn 1945, but refused on the grounds of ill-health. He holds rather woolly views on political theory, but is sincere and means well. Speaks good English. Recently his newspaper has been losing ground. It comes out only two or three times a week and circulation is said to be only about 300. He apparently does not depend on his journalism for a living as he has a large house and his daughters, who are progressive and modern, take a prominent part in the social life of Bagdad.

#### 106. Sa'ad Salih, C.B.E.

Shia. Born about 1898. Of a poor family from Najaf. Kurdish grandfather. He was one of the



young Shias chosen by King Faisal I to study at the Law College (where he graduated in 1927) prior to receiving an administrative appointment. Served as Deputy in the early thirties and was posted to Diwaniya as administrative inspector in 1930. Appointed Mutassarif of Kut 1940 and thereafter of Basra, Hillah, Duhain and Amara. During the 1941 rebellion kept his Mutassarifiyah (Kut) free from trouble. Bitter enemy of Salih Jabr, who displaced him from Amara (Sa'ad Salih had annoyed him whilst at Hillah). Deputy for Diwaniya since 1944. An efficient administrator, he is less biased than many Shias, and his name is comparatively free of any hint of corruption. An able writer and impressive speaker. In December 1945 he led the attack in the Majlis on the Pachaichi Cabinet which finally brought about its fall. Minister of the Interior in the succeeding (Suweidi) Cabinet.

Created C.B.E., for war services, in 1946.

Now, since the resignation of Tawfiq Suweidi, the leader of the Liberal Party, Sa'ad was very disgruntled with the conduct of the elections of 1947 and roundly accuses the Regent of bad faith with him and his friends.

#### 107. Sabih Najib

Born 1892. Gazetted to the Turkish army in 1912. Joined Iraqi army 1921, and reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel 1929. Passed a staff course in England, and for some time was Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in Baghdad. Speaks English and French and some German. Appointed Director-General of Police in March 1931. Represented Iraq on the Syria-Iraq Frontier Delimitation Commission in 1933. Appointed counsellor, Berlin, June 1935. Transferred to Geneva as Iraqi delegate to the League of Nations in November 1935.

He was appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in December 1937, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

Made Minister for Defence in October 1938. Resigned with the whole Jamil-al-Madfa'i Cabinet the 25th December, 1938.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rustam Haider, Minister of Finance. Acquitted on this charge and sentenced to one year's imprisonment for having used insulting language when speaking of the Government at a semi-public gathering. Was pardoned by the Regent after serving only a few weeks of his sentence.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Ankara in December 1941.

Relieved of his appointment in February 1943 and now seems to be living on his pension in Turkey. Was retired from the service in August 1944.

#### 108. Sadiq-al-Bassam

Shiah of Baghdad. Born 1895. Graduated at the Baghdad Law School, and for several years practised as a lawyer. Deputy for Kut 1930-34. In the Chamber he gave steady support to Yasin Pasha, and was a member of the Ikha-al-Watani party. In June 1935, as a reward for his political services, he was appointed Director-General of Government Lands and Properties in the Ministry of Finance, and became Minister of Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in September 1935. Resigned in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Kut December 1937 and for Baghdad in June 1939. Became Minister of Economics in September 1939. Joined the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in March 1940 as Minister of Education.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in January 1941. Throughout the disturbances of 1941 he remained inactive and was made Minister of Justice in Nuri

Said's Cabinet in October 1941.

Resigned February 1942.

Appointed an unofficial member of the Board of Education in April 1943.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in December 1943. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

A Senator since February 1941, he has been one of Salih Jabr's principal critics in the Upper House in the Extraordinary Session of 1947.

#### 109. Said Haqqi

Born 1883. A Kurd from Sulaimaniyah and a former Turkish army officer, commissioned from the Constantinople Military School in 1903. He joined the Iraq army on its formation and became at one time Director of Administration in the Ministry of Defence. He reached the rank of colonel, resigning from the army as a result of a disagreement with Taha Pasha al Hashimi, then Chief of General Staff. He has subsequently held posts as Director-General Jails, Director of Civil Aviation and finally Keeper of the Privy Purse at the Palace. He leads a quiet life and politically and socially is almost unknown. Appears friendly disposed to the British, but speaks no English.

Became Minister of Defence in the al Umari Cabinet of June 1946 while retaining his post as Keeper of the Privy Purse.

#### 110. Salih Saib, al Fariq

Has served as chief of the Iraq army General Staff since 1944. He began his military career in 1916, when he was commissioned an infantry officer. He became instructor in the army's small arms school in 1921 and later pursued staff college work in both England and Iraq. Following a period of inactive service during which he served as assistant director-general of the Iraqi State Railways, he was recalled to active service, became a Zaim in 1940 and al Liwa three years later. In August 1944 he was appointed commanding officer of the First Division of the Iraq army. His promotion to the rank of al Fariq took place in November 1945.

A stupid man and basically anti-British. He is nevertheless popular in the army, but not with the Regent, who would like to see him go, if only because he was a member of Bekr Sidki's staff. He attended the Victory celebrations in London in 1946 and came back slightly more reconciled to the British, though full of complaints about his accommodation. So long as he is Chief of Staff, he will be a potential danger to Britain and to the ruling House. Speaks good English.

#### 111. Salman-al-Barrak

Shiah and a tribal notable of Hillah, Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture 1928-29. Has been in the Chamber of Deputies for many years and has frequently held position of Vice-President.

Appointed Minister of Economics in November 1942.

Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943, but returned to the Cabinet as Minister of Economics at the end of the same month. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

#### 112. Salman-al-Shaikh Daud

Sunni. Born Baghdad about 1900. Son of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Shaikh Daud (q.v.).

A lawyer with a large practice and a forceful personality. Given to women and drink, but a staunch supporter of democracy. He was the first person of note in Iraq who openly and independently attacked the Axis in speeches and press articles.

Elected a Deputy in October 1943 and was prominent in debates as a critic of Nuri Pasha's Government. Arab News Agency representative, for which he is very well paid. Visited Britain as a member of the Iraqi journalists' delegation, autumn 1945.

Wealthy, generous and good company, but a lightweight politically. Speaks French, but almost no English.

#### 113. Salih Jabr, K.B.E.

Shiah lawyer of Najaf, born about 1890. Employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and resigned from the bench. Acquired notoriety in the Chamber as a persistent asker of questions and ready speaker. Appointed Minister for Education under Jamil Madfa'i November 1933. Resigned February 1934. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq December 1934. Appointed Mutassarif of Karbala in April 1935, where he proved successful. In October 1936 he accepted the portfolio of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Resigned in June over the Euphrates disturbances and went away for several months. He returned when Jamil-al-Madfa'i formed a Cabinet and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

Became Minister for Education in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938. Elected for Diwaniyah June 1939. Minister for Social Affairs in February 1940. Resigned in March 1940.

Appointed Mutassarif of Basra in June 1940. Supported the Regent when His Royal Highness fled to Basra in April 1941 to escape from Rashid Ali and the "Golden Square." For this he was arrested and narrowly escaped a heavy sentence. He was in the end released on condition that he left the country. He withdrew to Tehran and returned in June 1941 after the fall of Rashid Ali. Appointed Minister of Interior and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Finance in October 1942 with the special task of finding solutions for the country's economic difficulties.

Did not come up to expectations and in June 1943 he was returned to the Interior. Resigned from the Cabinet in October 1943.

Joined the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachaichi as Minister of Finance in June 1944. Took on portfolio of Defence in August 1944 when Taha Ali refused to dismiss senile officers as part of the scheme for reorganising the army, but in the reshuffled Cabinet he took up Supplies, only to hand them over in December 1944, and return to Finance. During the absence of Hamdi Pachaichi, the Premier, he acted for him. When the Pachaichi Cabinet fell it was expected that Salih Jabr, who was one of the Ministers who accompanied the Regent to the Amman Conference, might become the first Shia Prime Minister. He was not chosen, however. He spent much of the summer of 1946 in England, where he had gone for treatment for an arm which had been broken in a motor accident on his return from Amman.

He is undoubtedly the leading Shia statesman and has shown himself to be a good friend of Britain, though a hard bargainer for the interests of his country. Unfortunately, Shia opinion is by no means all behind him, particularly the tribes from the Middle Euphrates. This is largely due to his wife, who is a strong-minded tribal woman of Hillah who causes her husband and others much trouble by interfering in politics.

Created K.B.E., for war services, in 1946.

He formed a Government after the elections of March 1947 and presented an ambitious programme, largely concerned with economic development, to the Majlis on 10th April.

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He worked both Parliament and himself extremely hard during the Extraordinary Session of 1947 and laid some of the financial foundations of his programme.

#### 114. Sami Fattah

Has been in command of the Royal Iraqi Air Force since June 1941. He is a graduate of the Higher Teachers' Training College (1922) and served several years as an instructor in Iraq schools. Turning to a military career in 1925, he attended the Military College at Bagdad and later studied at Sandhurst in England. Shortly after his appointment as a second lieutenant in the Iraqi army in 1928 he became air-minded, joining the Iraqi air force and later training with R.A.F. units in England. In 1932 he flew an Iraqi air force plane from England to Iraq. He joined the Iraq Staff School and graduated from it in 1937.

He has shown himself determined to clean up the R.I.A.F. and to prevent its dabbling in politics, and in this he has had considerable success. During the summer of 1946 he was in London where he attended the Victory celebrations and also visited a number of aircraft factories.

#### 115. Sami Shaukat

Born Bagdad 1893. Sunni. Brother of Naji Shaukat. Graduated at Military College of Medicine, Constantinople, 1916. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1919. Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921 and subsequently served for several years as Director-General of Education. Became Director-General of Public Health in 1935. An ardent Arab Nationalist.

Appointed Director-General of Education in March 1939. He did much to increase military education in the secondary schools. Became the first Minister for Social Affairs in September 1939 and Minister for Education in February 1940. Resigned in March with whole Cabinet and was reappointed Director-General of Education in April 1940.

Retained his position throughout the disturbances of 1941 and survived subsequent changes. Is believed by many to have had pro-German leanings, but he himself stoutly denied these allegations. However this may be, he has done little himself to eradicate pro-Nazi sentiment from the Iraqi education system.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in January 1943.

Resigned and started the newspaper *Baath al Qaeimi* ("National Resurrection") in the autumn of 1945. It was extremely nationalistic, anti-Communist and anti-British. In tone it somewhat resembled *Die Stürmer*. Fortunately it kept falling foul of the Government and was suspended for a year in the summer of 1946. Since then little or nothing has been heard from Shaukat and his followers.

Speaks Arabic and Turkish but no English. A buffoon, but potentially dangerous through his influence on young fanatics.

#### 116. Selim Terzi, O.B.E.

Born Bagdad 1890. Jew. Educated at the Alliance School, Bagdad, he entered the Posts and Telegraphs Department and has remained there until he became acting Director-General. Presumably his religion has prevented his permanent promotion, as twice or thrice completely unfitted incumbents have held the post, e.g., an eye specialist, London-trained, and an unwanted official from the Royal Bilat.



Like most Jews in Iraq he has never been involved in any form of politics, nor has he expressed any strong political convictions. Is a quiet, decent and capable man and co-operated wholeheartedly with the British forces (for which he was made an O.B.E. in 1946). It was the Government policy that this should be, but he added the personal touch which made the co-operation successful.

He and his wife speak good English.

#### 117. *Shakir-al-Nu'ama*

Editor and owner of *Al Thaghr*, a Basra paper. A quiet intelligent man with no liking for the Iraqi methods of administering the supply situation and its attendant corruption. He was, in 1943, involved in a little trouble with the Mutassarif of the Basra Liwa for publishing articles in his paper criticising the local supply distribution methods. He was told to cease such publications but he asked for such instructions in writing—presumably he would have taken the matter further. The instructions in writing were not forthcoming, but from that time he has been the subject of persecution by the Mutassarif. A good friend of Britain. Visited Britain as a member of the Iraqi journalists' delegation, autumn 1945, and wrote several glowing articles for his newspaper, *Al Thaghr*, the only regular daily newspaper in the south, has always been pro-British. He speaks good English.

#### 118. *Shakir-al-Wadi, M.V.O.*

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1894. Brother of Jamil-al-Wadi (q.v.). Served as an officer in the Turkish army from 1915 to the armistice. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Captain 1928. In 1929 he was attached for training to various units in England, and in 1930 he was promoted major and made aide-de-camp to King Faisal. He was on King Feisal's staff during His Majesty's State visit to England in 1933. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1935 and attended the Staff College course. Returned to Iraq 1936 and was appointed G.S.O. 1 in the Kirkuk Division, of which Bakr Sidqi was the G.O.C. He was right-hand man to Bakr in the military revolt of October 1936. He is intelligent, capable and ambitious. After Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937 he was appointed military attaché in London, but a few weeks later he was dismissed and placed on the retired list.

Banished from Baghdad in December 1938 for intrigues against Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Government, but permitted to return in January 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had formed a Government. Appointed to the Iraqi diplomatic service in June 1939 as second secretary to the Iraqi Legation, Tehran.

At first he seems to have done well and kept in close touch with His Majesty's Legation. Later on, however, he seems to have yielded to the blandishments and bribes of the German Legation and, as chargé d'affaires during April and May 1941, he dutifully carried out instructions sent to him by Rashid Ali's Government. Daud Haidari, who was appointed minister at Tehran in June 1941, was asked to keep a close watch on Shakir.

Appointed consul at Jerusalem in November 1941. Transferred to London in October 1944 as first secretary in order to take charge of the Iraqi Legation during Daud-al-Haidari's absence in Iraq.

Return to Baghdad in October 1946 to become Master of Ceremonies at the Palace.

Minister for Defence in Salih Jahir's Government formed in March 1947. He owes this position to his close personal friendship with the Regent.

#### 119. *Dr. Shawkat al Zahawi*

A Kurd, born in 1898, son of a Turkish army officer by the name of Colonel Abdul Hakim al Zahawi.

Educated in Bagdad and Istanbul. In the latter place joined the Military Medical College, and graduated about 1919. He returned to Iraq, and in 1922 joined the Iraqi Health Service. For some time worked as assistant to Dr. Mills; specialises in pathology, has produced several articles on that branch of medicine, and also lectures in the Medical College. He is a cousin of Khalid al Zahawi, Iraqi Minister for Afghanistan, and is related also to the late Jamil Sidqi al Zahawi, famous Iraqi poet. He is married to a daughter of the late Mohammed Fadhil Pasha al Daghistani, and through this marriage therefore has connexions with Hikmet Sulaiman and Najib al Rawi.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in April 1946 but resigned with the rest of Tawfiq Suweidi's Cabinet a month later.

#### 120. *Sufuq-al-Ajl*

Of the Shammar-Jarba tribe. Born about 1910. Educated Beirut University. Once spoke English well, but is forgetting it. Eldest son of Sheikh Ajil-al-Yawar, who became paramount sheikh of the Shammar in Iraq in the early nineteen twenties and died in November 1940. Ajil acquired much money from his relations with the B.O.D. Company and from supplying labour to the railways when the line was extended from Bagdad to Mosul. Sufuq inherited this wealth.

Sufuq's younger brother, Ahmed (born about 1923), is said to have the stronger character and may become influential when he grows a little older.

During the autumn of 1941 some of Sufuq's cousins, led by Mishan-al-Faisal, showed dissatisfaction with Sufuq's leadership, but the quarrel was patched up and the family now accept Sufuq's leadership.

In 1942 he obtained a number of contracts from the British military authorities which increased undesirably Shammar influence. Steps were therefore taken to curtail the number of contracts assigned to him and to check Shammar arrogance. By the middle of 1943 the situation had improved and Sufuq and his subordinate tribal leaders had become more amenable.

In early 1944 he had a serious quarrel with his younger brother Ahmed about the division of their inheritance from their father Ajil. A settlement was made in May, but its terms were so ambiguous that it is not likely to endure for long. An attempt was made to murder him in June 1944 by putting locust bait in his food. His brother Ahmed was suspected of being the author of the plot and while Sufuq was convalescing in Palestine he increased his prestige with the tribe by issuing free the Shaikh's reserves of corn, ghee and sugar to grateful tribesmen. Ahmed has lost no opportunity to undermine Sheikh Sufuq's influence. Flashy, engaging and plausible, he has made himself acceptable to authority, more especially the Regent. Sufuq, who is flabby, selfish and incapable, has with his persecution complex proved a sore trial to the Mosul authorities, who have attempted to sort out his quarrel with Ahmed over the inheritance. Sufuq was detained in August 1945 with the rest of the Shammar Shaikhs in Mosul, for failing to assist the Government effectively to control his tribesmen near the Syrian frontier.

Of the younger brothers, Mish'al, though only 19, is stouter than either Sufuq or Ahmed.

Sufuq was again arrested in August 1946 for aggression against the Ati Muteiwit.

#### 121. *Tahsin al Askari*

Sunni. Born 1892. Fought with the Arab forces under the Amir Faisal 1916-18 and later appointed Governor of Aleppo. Returned to Iraq at the end of 1920 and was appointed to the police with the rank

of commandant. Became Kaimakam of Samawa in 1927 and Mutassarif of Kirkuk in 1930; a year later he was transferred to Mosul, where he remained until 1935 when he became Director-General of Irrigation. When his brother Jafar-al-Askari was murdered by officers of Bakr Sidqi's staff at the time of the latter's *coup d'Etat* in October 1936 he left the country on three months' leave with Jafar's widow and later resumed his post at Irrigation. In May 1940 he was appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in Cairo and became minister in October 1941. In October 1942 he was recalled by his brother-in-law Nuri Said to become Minister of the Interior.

He is devoted to the Pan-Arab cause but at the same time well disposed towards Great Britain and the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance.

Transferred to the Ministry of Communications and Works in June 1943, and acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in November 1943. He resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1943, and was appointed minister at Cairo.

His wife is a sister of those of Ibrahim Kemal K. Mudhahhafar Ahmed (q.v.). His son, Kanan, rose to the rank of lieutenant in the Royal Navy—a unique achievement for an Arab.

He is rather a weak man and has not succeeded in impressing the Iraqi point of view on the Egyptians.

#### 122. *Taha-al-Hashimi*

Brother of the late Yasin-el-Hashimi. Born 1888. Served in Turkish army and was employed in Arabia and the Yemen during the war. Was given a post on the Turkish General Staff in Constantinople in 1920, but returned to Bagdad in 1922 to join the Iraqi army, and was at once appointed Officer Commanding Troops in Mosul. Appointed Chief of the General Staff and came to Bagdad in 1923. Was attached to Sir Percy Cox in May 1924 for the boundary negotiations with the Turkish Government which followed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The post of Chief of the General Staff was abolished shortly after his return in August 1924, and for a while he acted as tutor to the (then) Crown Prince Ghazi. Appointed Chief of the Census Department in 1926 and Director of Education in 1928. In 1930 he returned as Chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence, and was promoted *farig* (general). In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahya of the Yemen and concluded a treaty of friendship between the Yemen and Iraq.

In September 1935 he was appointed Acting Director-General of Education in addition to his other duties.

He was in Angora in October 1936 when Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakr Sidqi forced Yasin-al-Hashimi to resign and wisely did not return to Iraq. He came back in September 1937 and was offered the post of Director-General of Works. He refused this offer on the ground that it was beneath his dignity to accept any position lower than that of Chief of the General Staff.

Elected Deputy for Bagdad in December 1937. Opposed Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in the Chamber. Worked actively on the committee of the Palestine Defence League in 1938. On the 25th December, 1938, in collaboration with General Husain Fauzi, he organised a military demonstration against Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Government, and became Minister for Defence in the Cabinet which Nuri-al-Said formed when Jamil-al-Madfa'i resigned. Became a Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939. Retained the portfolio of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in February 1940.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of the members of Rashid Ali's Cabinet and on the

1st February succeeded the latter as Prime Minister. On assuming office he feebly attempted to break the power of the military clique which during 1940 he and Rashid Ali had allowed to dominate not only the army but the Cabinet. They defied him and overthrew him and his Cabinet after it had enjoyed office for only two months. Taha Pasha thereupon went to Turkey, where he remained throughout Rashid Ali's rebel régime. When the Regent had been restored Taha Pasha wished to return to Iraq, but Nuri Said (the Prime Minister) did not want him back and it was arranged that a transit visa through Syria should be refused.

He was still in Turkey in May 1944.

There were rumours during 1946-47 of his being appointed Chief of General Staff of the Syrian army. These have so far, August 1947, not materialised.

#### 123. *Tahsin Ali*

A Sunni Moslem born in Bagdad in 1890. Educated in Bagdad and Istanbul. Participated in the Balkan War, fought against the British at Basra, and after the fall of Bagdad joined King Hussain of the Hejaz. Fought under Feisal and was a brigade commander in the Arab army at Aleppo. Was awarded the M.C. Returned to Bagdad with Feisal and became Secretary to the Defence Ministry. Commandant of Police in Mosul in 1923, he was removed because of his connexions with the Salmuchi faction and transferred to the Dulaina area in 1925. Between 1927 and 1938 held a number of administrative posts, including those of Mutassarif of Mosul and Basra. Director-General of the P.W.D. in 1938. Was largely connected with the activities of the local Palestine Defence Committee while in Basra. Became Mutassarif of Mosul again in April 1939, but was removed by Rashid Ali after his *coup d'Etat* in May. Was restored when the Madfa'i Cabinet was formed in June.

Not particularly clever, and apt to be pig-headed. In Mosul he was too much under local influence and showed a strong prejudice against the Yazidis. He was slow to take action against Nazi sympathisers and favoured a policy of "appeasement." Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Transferred to the Palace as Ruis of the Royal Diwan in June 1943. Became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet of Husni-al-Pachachi in June 1944, where he proved obstructive to the reorganisation of the army. Transferred to Works and Communications in August 1944 and finally dropped from the Cabinet altogether at the end of that month.

Now, 1947, Director-General Awqaf.

#### 124. *Tahsin Qadri, K.C.V.O.*

Sunni of Damascus. Born 1893. Was with Feisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in July 1920. Came with him to Bagdad in June 1921, and was appointed an A.D.C. to the King in August. Married the daughter and heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qaraw of Basra. Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace March 1932. Accompanied King Feisal on his State visit to England in 1933 and received the K.C.V.O.

In June 1930 he was compelled to resign from the Palace on account of the scandal of the marriage of Princess Azzah. He was later appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Tehran and took up his post in November 1936. Appointed consul-general at Bombay in December 1937. Speaks English and French. Pleasant and clever.

Appointed Director of Ceremonies in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in February 1939. Became consul-general in Beirut in July 1939.



In May 1941, like all Iraqi consuls, he seems to have carried out his orders from Rashid Ali without protest and his behaviour was strongly criticised by the British authorities.

In September 1943 he was appointed chargé d'affaires at Damascus, when the Iraqi Government recognised the new Syrian Government. On the 27th January, 1944, he was accredited as first Iraqi Minister to Syria and the Lebanon to reside at Beirut, where he has been active in Arab Unity affairs at the same time maintaining close touch with His Majesty's Minister. Recalled early in 1945 and appointed Acting Director-General for Foreign Affairs in the absence of Fadhil-el-Jumali at San Francisco. Appointed minister in Tehran, June 1945, but in September was still in the Lebanon.

In 1946 appointed Iraqi Minister to Paris.

July 1947 he was appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Royal Diwan.

### 125. Talib Mushtaq

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1900. Father was minor official. Took part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922 and in the spring of 1923 was one of those responsible for anti-British posters issued over the signature of the Supreme Committee of Iraq Secret Societies. Appointed Inspector of Schools in 1924 and held a variety of appointments under the Ministry of Education until November 1931, when he was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Angora. Appointed Director of the Consular Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in November 1935. Appointed consul-general at Beirut in August 1937.

Withdrew and dismissed from the service in February 1938. He remained for a time in Syria, but returned to Baghdad when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. Appointed Accountant-General in January 1939 and Director-General of Propaganda, Publicity and Broadcasting in May 1939. Became consul-general in Jerusalem May 1940.

During May 1941 he carried on an anti-British propaganda campaign and zealously supported Rashid Ali's rebel Government. He was recalled in June and subsequently interned.

He was appointed manager of the Baghdad branch of the Arab Bank in 1945, in which capacity he sought, vainly, for embassy co-operation.

### 126. Taufiq-al-Suwaidi

Born 1889. Studied law in Baghdad and Constantinople and international law in Paris. In 1913 became first interpreter to the Ministry of Education, Constantinople. Represented Iraq at the Arab Conference held in Paris in July 1918. After the armistice went to Syria and was appointed judge in Damascus. Returned to Baghdad in October 1921 and in November was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School. Minister for Education January 1928. Prime Minister 1929. President of the Chamber 1929. Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1931. Joined Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in July 1934 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in August. Held Cabinet office for twelve days as Minister for Justice in Jamil-al-Madfa'i's short-lived Cabinet in March 1935 and in October was appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts. He became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1937, and headed the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations in September. There he handled the Assyrian and Palestinian questions with tact and moderation.

Again represented Iraq at the League of Nations in the autumn of 1939, and afterwards visited London as the guest of His Majesty's Government.

There he had conversations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and with the Secretary of State for the Colonies about Palestine.

Resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet on the 25th December, 1938, as the result of a military demonstration made against them. Represented Iraq at the London conversations on Palestine in 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had returned to Iraq.

Joined Tahwal-Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941 as Minister for Foreign Affairs and did what he could to break up the military clique which during 1940 had established a stranglehold over the Government. Was forced out of office by Rashid Ali's coup d'état of April 1941. Tried to join the Regent at Basra, but failed. He took no part in the events of May and would have been asked to join Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in October 1941 if the fact that his brother Naji had been summoned to stand his trial for treason had not made it difficult to include him.

He is aggrieved that he has not been appointed to the Senate and blames Nuri Said for his exclusion. He is not well disposed towards the Regent. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to get him into the Cabinet in 1942, but was unsuccessful owing to the exaggerated conditions he sought to make.

In the summer of 1943 he reached an understanding with Ibrahim Kemal to co-operate in political matters. But by the end of the year he was reconciled to Nuri and joined the latter's 9th Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister in December 1943. He was violently attacked both in Parliament and outside, and the legality of his office was called in question. Resigned in March 1944, when a High Court was appointed to consider the constitutional validity of the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister. Went to San Francisco Conference. On his return appointed Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Arab League.

Became Prime Minister in February 1946. Resigned May 1946.

Is intelligent and very good company but as his nickname ("the red fox") shows. Appointed Senator 2nd July, 1947.

### 127. Taufiq Wahbi Maroof, C.B.E.

Kurd, born Sulaimania 1887. Educated Sulaimania and Turkey. Graduated from Turkish Military College in 1904, and thereafter served in many military stations in European Turkey. During the war 1914-18, he held a regimental command, and later a staff appointment with the 18th Corps, commanded by General Ali Ihsan Pasha.

After the war he returned to Iraq, and entered the Iraqi army. He was appointed Military Adviser and Staff Officer to Shaikh Mahmud in Sulaimania in 1923, but left him when his attitude became pro-Turkish and his conduct impossible. He returned to Baghdad and re-entered the army, and with the rank of colonel became Commandant of the Military College, Baghdad. In 1929 he was sent on a course to the United Kingdom.

In April 1930 he was appointed as Mutessarif of Sulaimania, but lasted only until July, when as the result of election troubles he was removed.

For several years he remained unemployed, but ultimately obtained appointment to the post of Director-General of Surveys. After the conclusion of the operations against Rashid Ali, Taufiq Wahbi resigned from Government service, took pension and made a comfortable fortune as a contractor for the British forces.

In June 1944 he was appointed Minister of Economics in Hamdi Pashachi's Cabinet, in which capacity he has toured the north to investigate possible relief and developments. It was largely owing to his initiative that the Director of the Sudan

Forestry Service was engaged to prepare a comprehensive survey of the economic possibilities of forestry in Kurdistan. To the young Kurdish nationalists and hot-heads he pleads moderation and gradualism, but his influence on them is not effective.

Taufiq Wahbi is keenly interested in Kurdish culture, and has devoted much time to modernising the Kurdish language. He has given valuable help to the Information Department of the embassy in the production of propaganda in Kurdish.

A charming and cultivated man who speaks good English, Persian and Turkish. Created C.B.E. for war services, in 1946. Minister for Education in Salih Jahra's 1947 Cabinet.

### 128. Thabit Abdul Nur

Born 1890. Son of Aziz Abdul Nur, a prominent Jacobite Christian of Mosul. He was christened Nikola. Was an officer in the Turkish army, embezzled money and fled to Syria to join Sheriefian cause. At this time he changed his name to Thabit, became a Moslem and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Came to Baghdad in November 1921 and became prominent in extreme Nationalist politics. Elected Deputy for Mosul in general election of 1930, and appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1931. The post was abolished in March 1933. Tried in 1932 for misappropriating the funds of the Agricultural Exhibition (April 1932), but acquitted.

Appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in London December 1933. This post was abolished and he was appointed Iraqi Oil Representative in London in July 1934. Appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. His post was abolished in November 1936, and he remained without employment until December 1937, when he was appointed to the Iraqi Diplomatic Service.

Early in 1938 he was appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah. There he put forward a number of fantastic proposals to the Saudi Arabian Government for which he had been given no authority by the Iraqi Government. The Saudi Government soon detected the folly of his schemes and gave up taking him seriously. In December 1938 and January 1939 he was in Sanaa visiting the King of the Yemen.

He was on leave in Germany on the outbreak of war in September 1939 and chose to remain there rather than return to Iraq. It is believed that he helped in the preparation of Arabic broadcasts from Berlin.

He is now living in retirement at Lausanne and has shown no sign of wishing to return to Iraq.

### 129. Umar Nazmi

Kurd. Born Kifri 1893. Graduated at the Baghdad Law College 1913. Appointed Judge, Khaniqin 1913; Baqubah 1914; on the outbreak of the war joined the Reserve Officers' School and was named Public Prosecutor to the Military Court, Baghdad. Appointed Judge, Civil Courts, Kirkuk 1921; Arbil 1923; Kirkuk 1924; Vice-President, Civil Courts, Mosul 1924; Hilla 1925; President, Civil Courts, Diala; Mutessarif of Kirkuk Liwa 1927, Mutessarif of Kut and Basra Liwas; Administrative Inspector 1931; Mutessarif of Mosul Liwa 1934.

Held other Government posts up to August 1937, when he was made to be Director-General of Revenues. Became a Minister of Economics and Communications in December 1938 in the Cabinet of Nuri-al-Said.

Made a Senator April 1939. Minister of Interior in September 1939 and Acting Minister of Justice in February 1940. Joined Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940 as Minister of Communications and Works.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of his colleagues as protest against Rashid Ali's pro-Axis policy.

Since November 1941 he has been an active member of committees in the Senate.

Appointed Minister of the Interior in Nuri Said's Cabinet in December 1943. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

Minister of Justice in the Suwaidi Cabinet of 1946. An amiable, unimpressive man.

### 130. Yahya Qassim

Age 30. Advocate; ex-Iraq State Railway employee. Is the editor and proprietor of *Al Sha'ab* newspaper. He is a Muslawi and is married to the daughter of Hamdi Effendi, the brother of the ex-chief of the general staff, Amin Zaki Sulaiman. He is a prominent leader of a growing Socialist movement. Secretary of "Biyout-al-Umma" (Houses of the Nation) Society. He was interested in the publishing of a secret Radical paper called *Al Shamsa*, which ceased publication some time ago.

As a result of his political activities—including the distribution of pamphlets, for which he was arrested and released on bail—the Iraq State Railways Board dispensed with his services. Owing to his discharge from the railway directorate, which, while being an Iraqi Department, has a British director, he was somewhat embittered against the British. He is an active member of a group of advocates known to have advised the Railway Union to strike. He was for a time a member of Kamil Chadireli's Democratic Party, but resigned following personal differences. He visited Britain with a party of journalists in autumn of 1945, and stayed on in Britain for several months. He was greatly impressed by what he saw, and had the courage to say so when he returned to Iraq. He has become more balanced and mature in the past year. He is personally very friendly with us and has not published any anti-British articles or comments for some time. He is outstanding among the young Socialists. His English is rapidly improving.

### 131. Yunis Bahri

Born about 1904. Of the Juhar tribe of Mosul. From his early days he has been well known for his unprincipled character and immoral private life. From 1923 to 1926 he held minor clerical posts in Government offices. In June 1926 he went on a journey round the world and was repatriated destitute from Paris after having served a term of imprisonment for a misdemeanour. Between 1929 and 1933 he travelled in Arab countries, including Tripoli, Tunis and the Hadramaut, and also Java, India, Afghanistan and Iran. On his return to Iraq he took up journalism and gave his support to extreme nationalism. He also published a newspaper called *Al Ugab*. He was subsidised in 1935-36 to publish articles favouring the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and in 1936 he sold himself to the German Legation. In April 1939 he went to Berlin and soon afterwards became the announcer of the Berlin Arabic broadcast.

In this position he has been very successful, and his broadcasts were a powerful instrument of German propaganda.

In the spring of 1942 he "went off the air" and it is rumoured that he was put into an internment camp in Germany.

Broadcast from Berlin in connexion with the Lebanese crisis of November 1943.

In the autumn of 1943 he was living in Paris, under the name of B. Jahouri, and was in correspondence with former friends in Baghdad.

He is now attempting to return to the Middle East and is said to have hopes that King Abdullah will allow him to come to Transjordan.



**132. Yusuf bin Saïyid Absullah el Gailani**  
Born Bagdad 1907. Muslim. Sunni. Educated Bagdad and at Balliol College, Oxford. After taking his degree he returned to Bagdad in 1934 and was appointed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Is now, October 1946, Director of the Political Section.

A quiet, well conducted gentleman. Has always been friendly. Has never been reported as being in any way concerned with politics.

Married to Masoodah, daughter of the late Asim al Gailani, who speaks some English and good French and appears, modestly, in mixed society.

### 133. Yusuf Ghanimah

An intelligent and hardworking Chaldean Catholic of Bagdad; born about 1890. Diminutive and unimpressive, he mixes freely with Moslems and was made Minister for Finance in January 1928, after having shown industry and ability as rapporteur of the Finance Committee of the Chamber. Has sat in Parliament for Bagdad since the first election. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, and then began to take part in the activities of the two Opposition parties, the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) and the Hizb-al-Ikhs-al-Watani (the Party of National Brotherhood). Appointed Director-General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance, December 1932, and Director-General of the Ministry in 1933. Became Minister for Finance in Ali Jundat's Cabinet in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in June 1935.

Appointed general manager of the Agricultural-Industrial Bank in December 1936.

Was made Director-General of Antiquities in November 1941. In July 1944 appointed Director-General of Supplies and President of Post War Planning Committee, and he became Minister of Supplies in November 1944, since when the country has settled down to accepting supply controls and rationing has become more effective in reaching the consumer at the end of the supply line.

Speaks good French and fair English.

Minister for Finance in Salih Jabr's 1947 Cabinet. An unimpressive "Yes" man, in poor health.

### 134. Yusuf Iz-al-Din

Sunni. Son of Ibrahim Pasha, a Kurd of Sulaimani. Born Bagdad 1891. Married to the daughter of Ali Agha of Sulaimani. Owns property in Bagdad, Amara and Sulaimani. Educated locally and entered the civil service in 1918. Graduated at the Law School in 1927. Became a finance inspector in 1928 and was promoted Assistant Director-General of Finance in 1930. Became Director-General of Land Settlement June 1934, Accountant-General June 1935. Appointed Minister of Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in October 1936. He resigned in July 1937 because of his dissatisfaction with the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and with Bakr Sidqi's influence over the Prime Minister.

#### Obituary since last report

Ahmad-al-Shaikh Daud, Saïyad. Died June 1947.  
Ibrahim Kamal. Died in Beirut July 1947.

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No. 23

## CONVERSATION WITH HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE REGENT OF IRAQ

*Mr. Bevin to Mr. Pelham (Bagdad)*

(No. 332)

*Foreign Office,*

*13th October, 1947*

Sir,  
I received the Regent of Iraq on 10th October in order to inform him that the Cabinet had discussed the suggestion that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty might be revised. Mr. Busk was present.

2. I told His Royal Highness that though revision was not provided for until 1952 I did not wish to wait that long. I thought that a suitable basis for discussion would be that we should offer the Iraqis a share in the facilities which we enjoyed exclusively at the moment at the two air bases. I asked whether this was agreeable to the Regent, who said he would have to consult his Government and enquired what precisely I meant by sharing and, in particular, who was to be in command? I replied that details could be worked out in secret by military experts I was prepared to send to Bagdad, but that I envisaged that the bases would remain under our command.

3. His Royal Highness said that the Prime Minister had already indicated during the secret talks which took place in Bagdad in May that he would wish the command to be Iraqi. He would be prepared to pay for the upkeep. I said I felt sure the Prime Minister had no idea of the cost involved merely in maintenance; moreover, I was anxious to share all our secrets with the Iraqis. I could tell the Regent privately that we had made immense strides in air development and we were anxious to make all these new facilities available to the Iraqis as members of the family. We would not do so to anyone else. The expense involved would be enormous and clearly if we footed the bill we must retain the command. I realised the strength of nationalist feeling and I had no desire that we should appear to dominate Iraq, but it was essential that the interest of the R.A.F. in these bases should be maintained. Offence was now the best defence, and I was anxious to

make Habbaniyah and Shaiba the best bases in the world. We left it that His Royal Highness would put what I said to his Prime Minister and inform me as soon as possible of his views.

4. I then said that I hoped His Royal Highness would soon return to Iraq. The Palestine situation was dangerous and I felt he should be at the helm. The Regent replied that he was going to Paris for a few days. He thought he would leave London on 25th October, before which date he would have had a reply from the Prime Minister.

5. I took the opportunity to tell the Regent that I hoped he would assist the Prime Minister to strengthen his Government by including both elder and younger statesmen. From Pakistan to Egypt the situation was disturbed and the next three or four months were critical. A strong Government was vital to Iraq and the Middle East. His Royal Highness repeated what he had told me before that personalities always obtruded in Iraq. Politicians were apt to raise difficulties about serving under others. I begged the Regent to urge that country must come before self. He promised to do his best.

6. Finally I mentioned the dollar position. I said we regarded the maintenance of a common dollar reserve in the sterling area as a big contribution to peace. The stronger the reserve, the less likely we were to have trouble from Russia and other countries. We now had to face great austerity, but I hoped that in a couple of years we should be in a strong position; what the world needed most was one good harvest. Iraq and Great Britain must sink or swim together. We must take great care over our reserves, moderate our requirements and economise very closely. I asked the Iraqi Government to take a big view and promised that I would help to see that Iraq obtained from this country any machinery or supplies she needed urgently for the Government's economic schemes. I had already discussed this with the Chancellor and Minister of Economics. The next nine months would be the critical period and I counted on Iraq to exercise rigid economy during what was after all only a brief span in the history of a nation.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

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No. 24

## CONVERSATION WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER Palestine

*Mr. Bevin to Mr. Busk (Bagdad)*

(No. 411)

*Foreign Office,*

*23rd December, 1947*

Sir,  
I received the Iraqi Foreign Minister on 19th December. He had just arrived in London from New York on his way back to Bagdad.

2. Dr. Jamali began by speaking in terms of intense indignation of the decision by the Assembly on the partition of Palestine. He wished to recall that when I had informed him earlier in the year of the decision to refer the question of Palestine to the United Nations he had expressed his grave misgivings of the impartiality of that institution. He now felt that his worst fears had been justified. The representatives of the Arab countries had witnessed the spectacle of an international body which was supposed to base its decisions on justice being swayed by partisan feeling and political combinations.

He blamed the United States Government, which at the last moment had, he maintained, blatantly influenced the votes of otherwise reluctant States in favour of partition.

3. I told Dr. Jamali that when I saw Nuri Pasha on 11th December he had said that he hoped that His Majesty's Government would lay down the mandate and complete their withdrawal from Palestine at the earliest possible moment; it was only when the Jews and the Arabs were left to confront each other directly that any solution could now be reached. Nuri Pasha felt that conciliation at some stage was now the only way out. I told Dr. Jamali that His Majesty's Government were prepared at any time to persist in the process of conciliation if they could helpfully do so. I regretted that during the last discussions with His Majesty's Government



in London the Arabs had, like the Jews, refused to accept any of the compromise proposals which His Majesty's Government had put before both parties. I knew full well how difficult the Jews were to deal with, and it was the intervention of the New York Zionists which had wrecked any chances of final agreement at that time. But the Arabs had not been willing to make a sufficient advance either.

4. I reminded Dr. Jamali that I had made it clear in my statement in the House of Commons on 12th December that His Majesty's Government would not hand over to the United Nations Commission until the termination of the mandate and had stated that His Majesty's Government would not make a port available to the Jews for immigration before that date. He expressed his appreciation.

5. Dr. Jamali went on, however, to say that in his view there was no legal basis for the decision of the Assembly and the United Nations Commission had no legal right to take over responsibility in Palestine. It followed that His Majesty's Government had no right to hand over authority to them. The United Nations only had the right to adopt one of two courses, either

to declare Palestine independent or to place it under trusteeship. I reminded him that I had at an earlier stage proposed trusteeship to both Jews and Arabs, but neither had accepted. I did not pursue further the question of the legality of the decision of the Assembly.

6. Dr. Jamali emphasised that the Arab countries were looking to His Majesty's Government to help them and to give them guidance.

7. I repeated that His Majesty's Government were prepared to assist in attempts to reach a solution by conciliation if that should prove at any stage possible. I went on to say that once we were quit of the embarrassing commitments of the mandate, which might have led us into increasing friction with Middle East countries, our hands would be freer to pursue a policy towards the Middle East as a whole.

8. As he was leaving Dr. Jamali raised the question of the future of Libya. I told him that we were bearing fully in mind the interest of Arab countries in this question.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.